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ABSTRACT 
The primary aim of this research is to explore how the urban regeneration 
policies and practices are shaped by the larger social, political and economic 
structures respectively in China and the UK and how individual agents 
involved in the regeneration process formulate their strategies and take their 
actions and at the same time use discourses to legitimize their actions. It 
further probed the lessons could be learned by both countries from each 
other’s success or failure in implementing the regeneration initiatives.  
This thesis adopts a cross-national comparative strategy and intensively 
referenced the Variegated Neoliberalism, Neoliberal Urbanism and Critical 
Urban theory when developing its theoretical framework. The comparison 
was conducted at three levels. At national level, the evolution of urban 
regeneration and public participation policies and practices in both countries 
are compared; at city level, the neoliberal urban policies and their impacts on 
the development of two selected cities, which are respectively Liverpool in 
the UK and Xi’an in China are compared; at the micro level, the major 
players’ interactions and the discourses they used to underpin their actions in 
two selected case studies, which are the Kensington Regeneration in 
Liverpool and Drum Tower Muslim District in Xi’an are examined and 
compared. In carrying out the study, literatures regarding the transformation 
of urban policies in the two countries, detailed information in relation to the 
two selected cities and case studies are reviewed. Around 35 semi-structured 
interviews have been conducted.  
The research results had demonstrated the suitability of the Variegated 
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Neoliberalism in explaining how the process of neoliberalization in both China 
and the UK are affected by non-market elements. It is found that the stage of 
economic development, the degree of decentralization, the feature of politics 
and the degree of state intervention in economic areas had played a 
significant role in shaping the unique features of urban regeneration policies 
in the two countries. In spite of the differences, similar trends towards 
neoliberalization could be found in the evolution of urban regeneration 
policies and practices in both countries, including the elimination of public 
housing and low-rent accommodation, the creation of opportunities for 
speculative investment in real estate markets, the official discourses of urban 
disorder as well as the ‘entrepreneurial’ discourses and representations 
focused on urban revitalization and reinvestment are playing significant roles 
in the formation and implementation of regeneration policies in both countries. 
Moreover, similar tactics are used by municipal government in both countries 
to conquer resistances from local residents. In the research, it is also found 
that the discourses used by the municipal government in describing the 
regeneration project is heavily influenced by the Neoliberal Urbanism, which 
is significantly different from that used by local residents who intensively 
referenced concepts from the Critical Urban theory.  
It is suggested that the Chinese government should from its British 
counterpart’s experience in introducing partnerships in delivering urban 
regeneration programs and at the same to learn how to use the formal 
venues to resolve conflicts resulted in physical regeneration programs. For 
the British government, lessons could be learnt from China’s successful 
experiences in decentralization and the empowerment of municipalities.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT  
In the early 2000s, urban regeneration became a highly debated issue in 
China. The unprecedented scale and speed of regeneration process has 
brought substantial changes to many inner urban areas, where dilapidated 
building blocks were replaced by brand-new properties with glazed facades 
while previous narrow alleys were expanded and beautified with pavements 
and plants (Enserikn and Koppenjan, 2007; Shin, 2010; Zhang,S., 2005). In 
many cases it has seen even more radical changes: both physical and social 
fabrics of the old neighbourhood were entirely swept away and the newly 
developed commercial and residential properties leave little room for the 
former residents and their activities (Wu, 2012; Xu, Tang and Chan, 2011). 
Additionally, the controversial roles played by municipalities and the 
grass-root resistances sometimes lead to tragic confrontations (Chen, 2011).  
Lacking public participation is frequently seen as one of the major causes for 
various problems emerged from the contemporary Chinese urban 
regeneration process, such as the poor design quality, social injustice and 
constant conflicts between local people and the coalition of government and 
private sectors, etc. (Xu, 2007; Boland and Zhu, 2012).  ‘Enhancing public 
participation’ has been formally required since the promulgation of the first 
version of the Chinese Town and Country Planning Act (CTCPA) (1990) and 
has been frequently used in the official discourses as an important instrument 
to mitigate various possible negative consequences. The rationales are 
numerical and government-centric: the input of local knowledge will help to 
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improve the design quality; the mutual communication will be enhanced and 
the implementation would be smooth. In reality, however, the concept of 
‘public participation’ is more than often nothing but a hollow slogan with fuzzy 
definition of the ‘public’ and manipulation on the participation activities. In 
many cases, local residents are given insufficient rights and opportunities to 
influence the regeneration-related decisions that may have a great impact on 
their lives and, in some extreme cases, local people are even incapable of 
protecting their property rights from been infringed by the powerful coalition of 
municipal governments and private sectors (Putterman, 1995). The 
profit-driven urban regeneration and malfunction of public participation has 
been prevailing in China for years and so far little evidence shows the 
momentum would be reversed. There is a need to question if such a 
phenomenon only exists in China or rather it could also be found in other 
countries and what can be done to mitigate it.  
Western countries had a long history in formulating and implementing 
regeneration policies in response to social and economic challenges, which 
is especially the case in the United Kingdom. Since the 1960s a number of 
innovative urban regeneration initiatives were implemented by the British 
government to address inner city deprivations (Atkinson and Cope, 1997; 
Tallon, 2013) and experiences learned from the previous practices constantly 
served as evidence base for the formation of new versions of regeneration 
policies (Chatterton, Paul, Bradley and David, 2000; SEU, 1998; Tallon, 
2010). Yet until very recently, a number of issues, such as the effective model 
of regeneration and participation and the degree in which public should be 
empowered, are still highly debatable (Taylor, 2007; Webler and Tuler, 
2011).  
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Studying the British experiences and current practices in relation to urban 
regeneration and comparing them with that in China would not only contribute 
to a better understanding of how the phenomena are shaped in different 
contexts, but also help to lay the foundation for questioning and probing 
potential alternatives to the prevailing models of urban regeneration and 
public participation in both countries.  
1.1.1 Major considerations for a cross-national comparative 
study 
China is a continental nation with nearly one and a half billion people. Britain, 
on the contrary, is an island state with around 60 million people. Coincidently 
both countries see a concentration of population in their southeast region and 
a spatial disparity between the north and south regarding economic vitality. In 
terms of urban development strategies, since the late 1990s, the 
development of Chinese cities generally followed a pattern of high-density 
property development alongside major public transport lines, which is widely 
adopted in many East Asian countries. Although the UK has long been a 
highly urbanized country, many of its urban areas have a middle-to-low 
density if measured using the Chinese standards. Moreover, the urban-rural 
inequalities in China are much larger than that in the UK regarding physical 
environment, residents’ income and educational level, accessibilities to social 
services and other public goods and people’s capacities in protecting their 
civil rights from being infringed.  
To a large extent, China is still an authoritarian state with strong 
characteristics of central authority (Ortmann and Thompson, 2014; 
Weatherley, R.,2007). However, such a reality is generally accepted by its 
people with a notion that the government has a responsibility to mitigate 
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individual preferences for the good of the community. In the UK, the civic 
society is mature and ‘rule of law’ is deeply rooted in people’s mind. 
Capitalisms in both countries have different features. Generally, the Chinese 
version of capitalism imposes a much stronger central control of ‘critical 
sectors’ such as finance, energy, natural resources and rail ways. In the UK, 
radical marketization has been initiated by the Thatcher government in many 
of the industries listed above and it helps to shaped today’s British economy.  
The relations between the central and local government in China are also 
different from that in the UK. Although the Chinese central government has 
considerable power in making policies and regulations and designating 
provincial major officials, which means a great capacity in implementing 
policies at its will when necessary, it indeed has a comparatively weak control 
of the land use and urban development practices at the municipal level. This 
is to some extent different from that in the UK, where central government can 
directly intervene into urban development cases at local level (Beatty, Foden, 
Lawless, and Wilson, 2010). Additionally, the sources of legitimacy for the 
governments in both countries are significantly different. While the British 
government is democratically elected, its Chinese counterpart is now 
intensively relying on its performance in developing economy to enhance its 
legitimacy (Heberer, Schubert, 2008).  
In spite of the differences listed about, similarities could also be found from 
the two countries. Since the late 1970s, both UK and China had experienced 
significant social and economic changes that were shaped by neoliberalism 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2005; Jones, and Popke, 2010; Wu, 2008). In the 
transformation of urban spaces, similar trends such as the opening up of the 
housing market for speculation, creation of privatized spaces of elite 
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consumption and gentrification (Brenner and Theodore, 2002, pp. 369) can 
be found in both countries. A comparative study can help to reveal how 
similar outcomes can be reached within different contexts.  
1.1.2 The Evolution of Regeneration Policies in Both 
Countries  
The evolution of urban regeneration policies in both countries deserves a 
closer examination before any attempts in mapping the experiences across 
border. Policies are formulated either to resolve problems encountered by the 
government or to realize its political aims during a specific period of time. The 
consequences, in turn, help to shape the context for the formulation of new 
strategies, which always finds a position in between the reinforcement of the 
former policies or a radical break away from it. Most of the conventions 
followed by people at present are produced through such a loop. 
Before the middle of the 1960s in the United Kingdom the local authority-led 
physical redevelopment was the major means to tackle urban problems such 
as the lack of housing and poor quality of existing properties provided in the 
1930s. It resulted in problems such as poorly designed city centres and 
spatial concentration of socially and economically disadvantaged groups, 
especially in tower blocks. Moreover, the massive demolition and 
redevelopment has reconstructed many of the former communities together 
with the social fabrics (Wu, 2004b, 2012; Chen, 2012). Policies addressing 
urban problems led by social-economic changes such as deindustrialization 
and suburbanization evolved constantly since the middle 1960s, when the 
concept of ‘Urban Regeneration’ was firstly imported from the US, aiming at 
providing a ‘comprehensive and integrated vision and action that could 
resolve urban problems and to bring about a lasting improvement in the 
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economic, physical, social and environmental conditions of an area that has 
been subject to change’ (Roberts, 2000, p.17). 
In China, Urban Regeneration (Chengshi Gengxing) firstly appeared in 
literatures in the early 1990s with an emphasis on the scale, speed and 
pattern of the physical redevelopment in inner city areas (Wu, 2004).  
Although it was later suggested by many academicians (Ruan and Gu, 2004; 
Ye, 2011) that regeneration projects should not narrowly focus on physical 
redevelopment but also give considerations to economical, social and 
environmental aspects of targeted areas, the idea in fact has never become 
popular among practitioners and government officials. Urban regeneration is 
usually replaced by terminologies such as urban redevelopment or urban 
renewal that are more closely related to the physical redevelopment.  
In the Town and Country Planning Act 1968, public participation was formally 
introduced as a norm into the British planning system for the first time. It was 
hoped that formalized participation exercises together with various 
area-based policies could help to effectively address the challenges such 
deindustrialization, urban poverty and deprivation of inner city 
neighbourhoods faced by the government. Municipalities in the UK were 
required to undertake planning participation activities after dominating the 
physical development for 30 years. In spite of the debate on the question of 
whether this was a ‘genuine attempt in facilitating participatory democracy’ 
(Thornley, 1977) or a means of making the planning process as well as the 
public more manageable, a new dimension was added into the planning 
theory and practice and has a profound impact on the formulation of the 
planning regulations in many other developing countries.  
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Public participation was formally written into China’s Town and Country 
Planning Act 2008. Notably, this happened 30 years after 1978 when China 
took the first step to move away from the socialist ideology as well as the 
planned economy and to embrace the free market. The past three decades 
has seen rapid economic growth and fast urbanization across the country. 
However, the massive-scale physical developments dominated by the 
Chinese municipalities also led to severe challenges such as stratification, 
social unrests and the loss of city characteristics. Therefore, it was not a 
coincidence for the Chinese government to emphasize the significance of 
public participation at the moment, just like what the British government did 
40 years ago.  
As is pointed out by Giddens (1984, pp.303), there is a typical thinking 
regarding social changes: ‘in a society of a given type, there is only one way 
forward, which means every particular society must at some point follow if it is 
of that type’. Accordingly, for China, where capitalism and free market are 
now thriving, a certain pattern of development that has been repeated by 
many other capitalism and free market countries seems to be waiting ahead. 
Although currently China is comparatively retarded in social and political 
reform, it may have the potential for further democratization and liberalization.  
In spite of the development determinism nature, the ‘one way forward’ 
argument has indeed won a great number of supporters. However, it is 
questionable whether the logic could be applied in predicting China’s future 
social and political evolution, which is in such a puzzle that no one could 
really tell whether the expected changes would come, if yes, when and in 
what way? 
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1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
1.2.1 Research Aims and Questions 
Although there are no certain answers to the questions listed above, it is still 
possible to capture the dynamics of the Chinese society and compare it with 
that of its western counterparts from a particular angle. As is argued by 
Giddens (Giddens and Pierson, 1998, p. 95), social life is a ‘series of 
on-going activities and practices that carry on within, and at the same time, 
reproduce larger institutions’. According to him, within a society, ‘rules and 
resources recursively implicated in social reproduction’ (GIddens, 1984, p. 25) 
and is ‘established by the way agents operate: deploying, acknowledging, 
challenging and potentially transforming resources, rules and ideas as they 
frame and pursue their own strategies’ (Healey and Barrett, 1990, p.90), 
while agency, with certain rational and knowledge, is able to deploy a range 
of resources and causal powers within a certain framework that is provided 
by the structure to ‘make a difference’. The daily actions of agents contribute 
to maintaining or changing the structure over a time span while the structure, 
on the other hand, constrains or enables the agent’s actions at a specific 
point in time.  
Urban regeneration provides an ideal arena for observing and comparing the 
social dynamics across different contexts as regeneration projects are more 
than often driven by market forces yet constrained by non-market relations, 
such as laws, regulations and the institutional setup in a given context, and at 
the same time involve players with different and sometimes contrasting 
interests and various capacities in mobilizing resources.  
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Since the late 1970s, the entrepreneurial state has become one of the most 
important players in the urban regeneration process in both China and the 
UK and the interactions between the government, private sectors and local 
residents in a regeneration project can well serve the purpose of capturing 
the social dynamics of the society. 
This research focuses on how the activities of the government in inner urban 
regeneration projects are shaped by the wider social, economic and political 
factors and how these activities are legitimized in the official discourses. It 
also tries to explore how individuals experience and perceive the inner city 
regeneration and at the same time proactively mobilize the resources and 
power they have to maximize the benefits they can gain from it. Through both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis, this research will answer the following 
questions: 
How are the urban regeneration policies and practices shaped by the larger 
social, political and economic structures respectively in China and the UK 
and how do individual agents involved in the regeneration process formulate 
their strategies and take their actions and at the same time use discourses to 
legitimize their actions? What lessons could be learned by both countries 
from each other’s success or failure in implementing the regeneration 
initiatives?  
1.2.2 Research objectives 
In reaching the above aims, there are several specific objectives to be 
achieved:  
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1) To examine the evolution of urban regeneration and public participation 
policies and practices in both China and the UK.  
2) To observe and compare the regeneration process and the related public 
participation activities in both countries based on case studies and to 
probe the relationships between the phenomenon existing in both 
countries;  
3) To have a better understanding of the social dynamics reflected in urban 
regeneration projects and the interactions between different players in 
both UK and China and to probe possible trends regarding social change 
in China for the next decade to come.  
4) To explore possibilities for mapping experiences between China and the 
UK.  
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
The thesis is divided into 12 chapters in total. In Chapter 2, the theoretical 
background is introduced and social and urban theories such as Variegated 
Neoliberalism are reviewed. In Chapter 3, the comparative strategy is 
elaborated. In Chapter 4, the evolution of British urban regeneration policies 
and practices are introduced after reviewing the UK’s social, political and 
economic change. The institutional setup and the delivery model of urban 
regeneration projects in the UK are also examined in this chapter. In Chapter 
5, the Chinese context is introduced and the evolution of urban regeneration 
and public participation in China since 1949 are reviewed. The institutional 
set up and prevailing genre and delivery model of urban regeneration 
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projects in China are examined. The profile of Liverpool City and the 
Kensington New Deal for Community and Kensington Housing Market 
Renewal programs are introduced in Chapter 6 while the Xi’an City and the 
DTMD case is introduce in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 and 9, the discourses 
used by different players in interpreting the regeneration programs as well as 
their behaviors in the regeneration process are elaborated. The comparisons 
are conducted in Chapter 10 and 11 and there is an attempt to generalize 
some of the research findings from both cases studies to the national level. 
Chapter 12 wraps the final conclusions for the whole thesis and gives some 
suggestions on future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND THEORY  
In empirical studies, theories help to formulate the research framework and to 
decipher findings in depicting different facades of social realities. Specifically, 
theories provide a specific perspective for the researcher to understand and 
explain the contextual factors and serve as a handy instrument to probe the 
connections between social realities existing in different countries. In this 
research, the concept of Variegated Neoliberalism, Neoliberal Urbanism 
Critical Urban theory and Gentrification are referenced in introducing the 
historical context, explaining the evolution and realities of urban regeneration 
related policies and practices and analyzing research findings from the 
empirical works.  
2.1 NEOLIBERALISM 
After the World War II, the forms of state were restructured based on a 
commonly accepted idea that government should give priority to full 
employment, economic growth and the welfare of citizens. Fiscal and 
monetary policies known as 'Keynesianism' were widely deployed in many 
western countries to ensure reasonably full employment. States actively 
intervened in making industrial policy and setting standards for social wage 
by constructing a variety of welfare system such as free health care and 
educational systems etc. (Harvey, 2005a, p.10). The system began to fall 
apart by the end of the 1960s, when many western countries saw tax 
revenues plunged while social expenditures soared. Neoliberalism emerged 
from such a crisis as an ideological alternative to Keynesianism, with a 
fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of collective interventionism at 
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national, regional and local levels. Focus of the state policies had since 
turned away from the former concerns for full employment and the wellbeing 
of all citizens.  
Neoliberalism has since predominated for nearly half century in many 
democratic countries across America, Europe and East Asia. The term is 
more than often used to describe a model of governance and as a shorthand 
for understanding the trends toward privatization, welfare retrenchment, 
Labour-market flexibility, financial liberalization, public-private partnerships 
and the externalization of government responsibilities in maintaining social 
welfare and providing public goods and services (Peck and Tickell, 2002; 
Tickell and Peck, 2003). In spite of the fact that neoliberal policies generally 
focuses on curbing inflation, creating a good business climate and promoting 
market freedoms’ (Harvey, 2003, p.216), neoliberalism has its inherent 
contradictions in enlarging inequality, creating working poverty and endless 
chasing for growth at great social and environmental costs and is often 
tagged as one of the major causes of many unwanted outcomes such as 
legitimized ‘accumulation by disposition’, unregulated financial system with 
unprecedented risks and the deteriorated environment and low human rights 
in many developing countries, etc. (Harvey, 2005b). 
Previous readings on neoliberalism generally fall into two categories. On the 
one hand, neoliberalism is examined from a macroscopic perspective and is 
seen as a systematic project propelled by a top-down disciplinary regime. It is 
described as a pervasive model featured with financial capitalization, unequal 
redistribution across classes and an emphasis on the structural coherence 
and global hegemony (Harvey, D., 2003, 2005a). On the other hand, 
Neoliberalism is examined through microscopic lens focusing on its 
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particularities revealed in different contexts, such as the fusion with different 
forms of governance and adaptive political technologies (Amable,2003; 
Coriat et al.,2006). Peck and Theodore (2007) argued that neoliberalism 
coexists with the socio-economic and political systems in a parasitic way. 
Neoliberalism can only function through the existing institutional setup and 
power structure yet it also consistently erodes the system it coexists with. 
Brenner and Theodore (2005) gave seven propositions about neoliberalism, 
as is shown in Table 2.1: 
Table	  2.1:	  Seven	  propositions	  about	  neoliberalism:	  
1. Neoliberalism is a process of social, spatial and economic transformations 
rather than a fixed state or condition.  
2. Neoliberalism does not exist in a single pure form, instead, it is always 
articulated through historically and geographically specific strategies or 
institutional transformation in ideological articulation; 
3. Neoliberalism hinges upon the active mobilization of state power and does 
not entail the simple rolling back of the state and the rolling forward of the 
market. Instead, it generates a complex reconstitution of state-market 
relations in which state institutions are actively mobilized to promote 
market-based regulatory arrangements.  
4. Neoliberalism does not lead to identical outcomes in each context in which 
it is imposed. Rather, place-specific neoliberal regulatory projects collide 
with inherited regulatory landscapes, contextually specific pathways of 
institutional reorganization crystallize and reflect the legacies of earlier 
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modes of regulation and forms of contestation. (Path dependent)  
5. Neoliberalism is contested by diverse social forces that are connected to 
previous non-market or socialized forms of coordination that constrain 
unfettered capital accumulation.  
6. Neoliberalization exacerbates regulatory failure. The imposition of 
neoliberalism has not established a framework for stable economic 
development or social cohesion. Rather, Neoliberalization projects are 
deeply contradictory insofar as they tend to undermine the many of the 
economic and institutional preconditions for economic revitalization. 
Instead of resolving the political-economic crisis tendencies of 
contemporary capitalism, neoliberalism exacerbates them by engendering 
various forms of market failure, state failure, and governance failure.  
7. Neoliberalism project continues to evolve and the failures of neoliberalism 
have not triggered its abandonment as a project of radical institutional 
transformation and social rule. On the contrary, this project has continued 
to reinvent itself-politically, organizationally and spatially- in close 
conjunction with its pervasively dysfunctional social consequences.  
Source: Brenner and Theodore, 2005, pp. 102-103 
2.1.1 Neoliberalism in the UK  
The welfare system experienced its ‘golden age’ in Britain during the 1950s 
and 1960s, when the economic prosperity inflated people’s expectations 
about the life-long employment, decent payment, well-established social 
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security system as well as the policy makers’ ambition in eliminating poverty. 
However, the deindustrialization in the 1980s had cost millions of jobs and 
led to spatially concentrated long-term poverty, depopulation, social unrest 
and urban blight in many former industrial cities such as Manchester and 
Liverpool. Indeed, since the late 1970s, in spite of the economic reform, 
endeavors have been made by both the Conservatives and the Labour to 
reshape the old British welfare system, yet their policies and actions in 
retrenching the welfare state system were based on different ideologies. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, under the Conservatives it has seen the rise of the 
‘New Right’, which strongly challenged the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
welfare state system and put forward a series of radical changes aiming at 
departing from it. A considerable proportion of the state’s role in providing 
social security and services were either curtailed or transferred to private 
sectors. The prevailing measure for tackling spatial concentration of poverty 
at that period was property-led redevelopment, underpinned by a rational that 
improvements in the physical environment will naturally eliminate the poverty 
and uplift the poor. Although the Labour promised to restore cuts in public 
expenditure in the 1980s when they were in opposition, they had actually 
changed their tones after the 1992 defeat, with the realization that against the 
globalization, individuals are less likely to maintain life-long employment and 
‘the social welfare system should provide individuals with skills needed for 
the modern global economy’ (Fawcett, 2008, pp.453). In 1997, when Tony 
Blaire’s New Labour swept into power, a ‘Third Way’ between the ‘New Right’ 
and ‘Old Labour’ was advocated. With admitting the unsustainability of the 
old welfare system, ‘the discourse of ‘Third Way’ moved away from one of 
rights and entitlements to social protection, in favor of the welfare state’s role 
in social investment, facilitating a return to work, and thereby creating 
economic security and social protection’ (Fawcett, 2008, pp.455). New 
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Labour’s welfare reform was largely built on the foundation laid by the 
Conservative administration and welfare provision was used as incentives for 
individuals to join the Labour market.  
During the past three decades it has also seen shrinkage in the size and 
increasingly blurring boundaries of the ‘working class’ in the UK. The 
influences of the unions had declined as well. The deindustrialization has 
forced many of the previous industrial workers to readapt themselves to 
tertiary industries and there emerge both ‘underclass of the dispossessed 
and unfortunate and upper class with enormous wealth and power’ (Marwick, 
2008, pp.247, in Hollowell (eds.), 2008). The gap between the two had 
enlarged as both groups of people benefit disproportionally from the 
economic growth.   
2.1.2 Neoliberalism in China 
China is always seen as an outlier of the traditional notion of capitalism. For 
one thing, the country inherits a number of socialism characteristics such as 
the state ownership of land and nature resources and the state 
monopolization of key economic departments such as the finance and energy 
sectors. For another thing, the one-party system enables the government to 
be the regulator of the market and at the same time an active player in the 
market and the boundaries between the two roles sometimes can be fairly 
fuzzy. Taking the urbanization for example, the primary land market is 
monopolized by the Chinese government, which at the same time owns the 
power of regulating the land and housing market, municipal governments can 
therefore acquire farmland from peasants at a comparatively low cost and 
then lease it to property developers at a much higher price. In many cases, 
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the municipal government is as the market in driving the local economic 
growth. Several factors are frequently used to underpin the argument 
regarding the inappropriateness of using Neoliberalism to explain the 
Chinese situation. For one thing, Neoliberalism was mainly formed in reaction 
to the Keynesian that prevailed in developed countries after World War II, 
while in China the pre-1979 era was primarily dominated by socialism. 
Moreover, even after the 1978, the Chinese Communist Party still had a 
comparatively tight control over the society and leaves little room for the 
maturity and spread of liberal ideologies across the country, which is 
especially the case in the early 1990s after Tiananmen Square Incident was 
suppressed. Therefore, Nonini (2008, pp.146) argued that ‘the claims 
regarding the neoliberal capitalism and the dominance of neoliberalism in 
China cannot be justified and in fact are overstatements unsupported by 
evidences.  
Cahill (2014) argued that the rise of neoliberalism is founded in the micro 
economic policies such as privatization, marketization, and deregulation 
rather than in the innovation of neoliberal ideas. In this sense, some of the 
notions of the neoliberalism are of great relevance to the general trends in 
China over the past four decades (Wu, 2008; Anagnost, 2004; Rofel, 2007). 
Evidence can be found from the significant social, spatial and institutional 
transformations and the active mobilization of state power in reconstituting 
the state-market relations and to promote economic growth, such as the 
massive dismiss of former SOE employees (Zhang, W., 2006) and the reform 
of labour market (Meng, 2000; Meng and Zhang, 2001) with more flexibility, 
the opening up of housing market and the privatization of collectively owned 
assets (Chen and Wu, 2011; Lee and Zhu, 2006), the changing attitudes of 
the government towards capitalists and the creation of business friendly 
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environment (Ng, LFY and Tuan, 2001; Dunning and Narula, 2003; Ali and 
Guo, 2005) as well as the enlarging gap between rich and poor that was 
resulted in by ‘legitimized accumulation by disposition’ (Wu, 2008; He and 
Wu, 2009; Lee and Zhu, 2006). Although the CPC still holds the power in 
loosening or tightening the leash on the capitalism to reach its political 
achievements, it has to carefully evaluate the consequences before taking 
actions that may violate the market principles (McNally,C.A., 2008).  
The impacts of neoliberalism on China are also evidenced by its urban 
policies. Pursuing entrepreneurialism is widely accepted as the major way for 
a city to increase its competitiveness in the global economy’ (Hubbard and 
Hall, 1998). The Chinese government is now actively promoting economic 
growth, urbanization and globalization (Luo & Shen, 2008; Ma, 2002; Wei, 
2005). Until very recently, progress in facilitating economic growth has been 
a decisive factor for the promotion and demotion of local politicians who are 
usually the major decision makers in local affairs. With limited resources yet 
great pressure to develop local economy, disposition became an important 
means for the entrepreneurial municipal government to accomplish their 
‘primitive accumulation’ (Harvey, 2005a). The state ownership of urban land 
written in the Chinese Constitution (1982) and the monopolization of the 
government in the primitive land market enable the gap between the market 
price for transferring the land using rights to the developers and the 
compensation fees for expropriating land and property from the citizens to be 
collected by the municipal government. The Chinese government has long 
been proactively involved in converting inner city areas suffering long-term 
underinvestment into popular housing or commercial areas following the 
elites’ desire (Broudehoux, 2004) and hugely benefited from the process.  
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2.2 VARIGATED NEOLIBERALISM  
2.2.1 The Varieties of Capitalism  
The school of varieties-of-capitalism research (Berger and Dore, 1996; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001b) emerged from the early 1990s and was influential in 
cross-national comparative studies. One of the key focuses of the Varieties 
School is the interaction between free market and economic coordination. 
The Varieties literatures tend to make the case that economic coordination 
represents a key dimension of difference between national capitalism 
(Goodin, 2005). It is believed that in real world, ‘markets are vulnerable to 
failure, far from exhibiting a self-sustaining autonomous logic, depend 
critically on a range of nonmarket coordination mechanisms, governance 
regimes, and regulatory frameworks, within which they are deeply embedded’ 
(Peck and Theodore, 2007). And the embedding of market in non-market 
relations is one of the fundamental causes for the variety (Peck, 2005; 
Jessop, 2006; Deeg and Jackson, 2007). National scale is often selected for 
the comparative study as most of the structural reforms and isomorphic 
institutional adjustment occurs at this level, such as the opening up of real 
estate market, the restructuring of the central-local relationships, etc. 
‘National states have different trajectories of capitalist development in which 
there is considerable variation in the role of markets and other institutional 
arrangements and coordinating mechanisms’ (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 
1997b, pp.2). Moreover, against the background of globalization, national 
capitalisms build their competiveness on their unique comparative 
institutional advantages and will make a different reaction to ‘external shocks’, 
reflecting national cultures and institutional settlements (Peck and Theodore, 
2007, pp. 747).  
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However, ‘reading differentiation primarily through the lens of (national) 
institutional coordination runs the risk of exaggerating and reifying some 
forms of geographical differences, while obfuscating threads of commonality 
and interdependence ‘(Peck and Theodore, 2007, pp. 761). In spite of the 
differences in the form of non-market elements, two national capitalisms may 
have similarities in some aspects regarding the degree of intervention. 
Market, as the other main constitutive element of the bipolar system, also has 
its fundamental rules accepted by agents across contexts. Potusson (2005a, 
pp.166) argued that ‘we ought to be interested in explaining common trends 
as well as cross-national differences…[but] not only does the [varieties] 
approach fail to account for these common trends, it directs our attention 
away from them’. In this sense, the variegated neoliberalism provides an 
overarching theoretical framework for exploring the common trends as well 
as differences in a cross-national comparison.  
2.2.2 Variegated Neoliberalism 
Although neoliberalism represents a general trend of marketization, 
deregulation and privatization, etc., the appearances of neoliberalism actually 
vary from context to context. As is argued by Peck and Theodore (2007, 
pp.765): ‘neoliberalism as a concrete abstraction describes the prevailing 
form of institutional restructuring across multiple contexts and locales even 
though it exhibits a range of contingent and context-specific form…it indeed 
exists as a variegated hybrid, an international phenomenon, a facet of 
national politics and a networked local construction’.  
Neoliberalism as a polymorphic phenomenal could be understood from three 
perspectives (Brenner and Theodore, 2005): 1. It coexists with different 
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nonmarket elements, and has a variegated appearance across contexts; 2. 
Common trends and similarities could be found from different contexts as 
similar trajectories yield both divergent and convergent outcomes due to the 
intensity of intervention and implementation; 3. Neoliberalization happens at 
multiple scales and results in creative institutional destruction and challenges 
the old institutional variety.  
For one thing, Neoliberalization is driven by a set of social processes, collide 
in place with inherited political and institutional arrangements (Peck and 
Theodore, 2007). ‘Neoliberalism is not some generic operating environment 
for end-stage capitalism but a historically specific and hegemonic mode of 
regulation’ (Peck and Theodore, 2007, pp. 765). There are many interrelated 
versions of neoliberalism across different contexts, with divergences but also 
connections. For another thing, the process of Neoliberalization usually has 
specific impacts on particular places, institutional arrangements or particular 
local formations, rather than reverberating throughout the entire complex as a 
whole. One of the key features of neoliberalism is the spatially uneven 
development, which contributes to differences within and between cities, 
regions and countries. ‘Neoliberalism is not associated with simple 
convergence tendencies but complex and combined coevolution and the 
neoliberalism power shapes but not determines the selection of policy 
strategies and technologies of governance; neoliberalism characterize both 
the ‘internal’ orientation of some (national) institutional systems and the ‘rules 
of the game’ in which these systems are embedded’ (Peck and Theodore, 
2007, pp. 765).  Simple convergence should not be expected from even 
deep Neoliberalization (Peck, 2004; Sparke, 2006). Hay (2004, pp. 232) 
further notes that ‘common trajectories associated with neoliberalism that 
implemented more or less enthusiastically and at variable paces would result 
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in both divergent and convergent outcomes’ (Peck and Theodore, 2007, pp. 
758). Moreover, Neoliberalization is a ‘multidimensional process as specific 
reform measures are usually accompanied by a variety of outcomes and the 
impacts of Neoliberalization is more than often shaped by a wider institutional 
environment together with interactions that are spatially verified (Hall and 
Thelen, 2005. pp. 25). ‘When a particular analysis refers to identical 
institutional reforms, to speak as if they will have identical effects on all 
nations is misleading’ (Hall and Thelen, 2006, pp.27). 
2.2.3 The Applicability of Variegated Neoliberalism in the 
Chinese Context   
Peck and Zhang (2013, pp. 31) argued that the Chinese experiences could 
serve as ‘an affirmation to the entrenched nature of institutional 
path-dependence’. The one-party state had craved its own path using the 
opportunities offered by ‘neoliberal internationalism’ advocated in the 
Washington-consensus (McKay, 2013). China is now an integrative part of 
the ‘unevenly developed global system’ (Peck and Zhang, 2013). As the 
second largest economy in the world, the country’s progress in 
socio-economic transformation and development during the past 30 years 
has demonstrated that ‘there is no single development strategy or set of 
institutions that have to be adopted everywhere to foster’ economic growth’ 
(Whyte, 2009, p.388). Today, many of the economic sectors in China, such 
as the financial sector, energy, telecom, electricity and armaments, etc., are 
still dominated by the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). For another thing, 
the Chinese system is still featured with ambiguities regarding private 
property rights, the political monopoly of the CPC (McGregor, 2010) and the 
absence of ‘clearly defined state-firm boundaries’ (Nee and Opper, 2007, pp. 
94). Moreover, the one-party political system, the CPC’s experiments and 
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accumulation of experiences on how to govern the country and the party 
discipline together determine that the CCP harnesses capitalism with its 
political system in a unique way (Anagnost, 1997; Ng and Tuan, 2001; Lim, 
2014).  
The Chinese way of Neoliberalization, with its inner contradictions between 
the post-socialist and neoliberal features, is different from that of many 
developed countries and cannot simply be explained using the available 
model of ‘Variegated Neoliberalism’ that is primarily developed in the western 
context. I.e. 'the western-centric ways of categorizing national economies in 
the style of ‘methodologically nationalist, firm-oriented and comparative 
political economy practiced under the Varieties of Capitalism banner are 
challenged’ (Peck and Zhang, 2013, pp.3). However, the Chinese case 
provides an potential opportunity ‘both to realize and operationalize the 
notions of variegated neoliberalism (Peck and Theodore, 2007; Jessop, 
2012).  
2.3 NEOLIBERAL URBANISM 
Cities have now become the center of reproduction and reconstitution of 
neoliberalism, which in turn played a significant role in shaping the new 
spatial orders of cities. As is argued by Wu (2005, pp. 4), “the new urban 
realities have been created by the transfer of massive amounts of global and 
domestic capital to the built environment” while entrepreneurialism has 
replaced the managerialism to become the prevailing ideology for city 
governors (Hubbard and Hall, 1998). On the other hand, the ‘region-specific 
political, cultural and historical forces also played a crucial role in shaping 
urban spaces’ (Wu, 2005, pp. 9) as the design of neoliberal urban policies 
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and the implementation of urban projects are highly context-specific. An 
increasing number of cities have been dragged into the furious international 
competition for attracting investment, well-educated people with strong ability 
to consume. ‘Cities now must be sophisticated entrepreneurs-doing what it 
takes to attract wealthy investors, residents, and tourists' (Harvey, 1989, 
2000). Neoliberal urbanism has become a global phenomenal and is now a 
generalized strategy integrated with the circuits of global capital and cultural 
circulation (Lees, et al., 2013, p. 163). Brenner and Theodore (2002) argued 
that the mechanisms of neoliberal urbanization consists of both ‘moments of 
destruction’ of the old ‘embedded liberalism’ strategies and ‘moments of 
creation’ of new ones in comply with neoliberal ideology, as is summarized in 
Table 2.2: 
Table	  2.2:	  General	  trends	  of	  Neoliberal	  Urbanism:	  
 
Mechanisms of 
Neoliberal 
urbanization 
Destruction Creation 
Recalibration 
of Iner- 
governmental 
relations  
Dismantling of earlier 
systems of central 
government support for 
municipal activities 
1.Devolution of 
responsibilities to 
municipalities, without 
resources. 
2.Creation of incentives to 
reward local 
enterpreneurialism and to 
catalyze endogenous growth  
Retrenchment 
of public 
finance 
Imposition of fiscal austerity 
measures upon municipal 
governments  
Creation of new revenue 
collection districts and 
increased reliance on local 
revenues, user fees, and 
other instruments of private 
finance.  
Privatization of 
the local public 
Elimination of public 
monopolies for the 
1.Privatization of municipal 
services.  
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sector and 
collective 
infrastructures 
provision of municipal 
services 
2.Creation of new markets for 
service delivery and 
infastructure maintenance 
Restructuring 
urban housing 
makrets  
1.Elimination of public 
housing and other low-rent 
accommodation 
2.Elimination of rent 
controls and project-based 
construction subsides  
1.Creation of new 
opportunities for speculative 
investment in central-city real 
estate markets.  
2.Introduction of market rents 
in low-rent niches of urban 
housing markets.  
Labour market 
reform 
Dismantling of traditional, 
publicly funded education, 
skills training and 
apprenticeship programs 
for disadvantaged workers 
Creation of an new regulatory 
environments to encourage 
contingent employment. 
Expansion of informal 
economies. 
Transformation 
of built 
environment 
and urban form  
1. Destruction of working 
class neighbourhoods to 
make way for speculative 
redevelopment. 
(Gentrification) 
2. Retreat from 
community-oriented 
planning initiatives.  
1.Creation of privatized 
spaces of elite consumption.  
2.Construction of 
mega-projects to attract 
corporate investment.  
Re-presenting 
the city 
Performative discourses of 
urban disorder, ‘dangerous 
classes’ and economic 
decline 
‘Enterpreneurial’ discourses 
and representations focused 
on urban revitalization, 
reinvestment and 
rejuvenation. 
Source: Brenner and Theodore, 2002, pp. 369.  
Mayer (2007) argued that the social movements today no longer operate 
within the ‘Keynesian city’ but within ‘neoliberal cities’ that featured with 
pro-growth politics and dismantling of welfare state, undermined social and 
environmental justice and infringement of human rights especially of those 
struggling at the bottom of the society, such as migrant workers and 
underprivileged citizens. Indeed, ‘the Neoliberalization of the city has in many 
ways created a more hostile and more difficult environment for progress 
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urban movements.' (Mayer, 2012, p. 69)  
2.4 CRITICAL URBAN THEORY 
Urban ideologies are continuously used instrumentally to inform people’s 
understanding of the contemporary urbanization process and to legitimize 
and naturalize various urbanization processes. Smith (2002) argued that 'the 
neoliberal state is now the agent of, rather than the regulator of the market 
and neoliberal urban policies now express the impulses of capitalist 
production rather than social reproduction'. Inspired by Marx’s critique of 
political economy and the work of Frankfurt School of critical theory, since 
1968, it has seen a number of leftist and radical urban scholars, such as 
Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, Manuel Castells and Peter Marcuse, etc., with 
their writings categorized as critical urban theory, projecting a fundamental 
rejection to the instrumentalist, technocratic, and market-driven forms of 
urban analysis that promote the maintenance and reproduction of extant 
urban formations and social relationships’ (Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer, 
2012, pp. 19). Instead, they pursue social justice and sustainable 
urbanization in spite of the suppression of the dominant institutional 
arrangements, ideologies and practices. Critical urban theory offers a terrain 
that counters to neoliberalism for deciphering the prevailing urban ideologies 
and urban transformation. Neil Brenner (2009) gave five propositions about 
critical urban theory:  
Table	  2.4:	  Five	  propositions	  about	  critical	  urban	  theory:	  
1. Urban is a key site in which the social relations and contradictions of 
capitalism and modern political life are expanded and fought out. It is the 
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vessel of various political and economic initiatives and the arena for 
competing interest groups and players.  
2. The nature of urban changes in patterned rhythms in relation to cycles of 
capital accumulation and state regulation. The appearance of urban forms 
differs from places to place and is closely with the cycles of capital 
circulation and phases of capital accumulation as inner contradictions of 
every accumulation regime lead to the breakdown of itself together with 
the associated regulatory configurations and a period of reconstruction.  
3. The production of urban is mediated by historically specific forms of state 
power and regulations in the form of policies and planning, etc. Urban 
fabrics are mediated through state regulations and institutions at various 
scale and spatial locations and many of the state institutions and 
regulatory configurations have massive-scale impact on the form and 
transformation of cities. Whereas the state itself is a terrain of struggle in 
which diverse social forces engage and struggles over the form and 
pathway of urban development.  
4. The urban itself is a terrain of struggle since urbanization is not simply 
imposed from above by rule of capital or by state institutions, rather, it is 
produced and mediated by social movements. Urban social movements 
are central agents of urbanization processes.  
5. Urban social movements are not simply located within ‘cities’; they are 
qualitatively connected to the changing nature of urban development. And 
the nature of urban social movements changes and has to be understood 
in relation to accumulation regimes and modes of regulation. (The key 
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point is to understand how they are articulated towards neoliberal 
capitalism accumulation).  
According to Brenner, 2009.  
Critical theorists incline to position urban questions into a broader 
socioeconomic background with a time-space dimension and they ‘view 
knowledge of urban questions as historically specific and mediated through 
power relations (Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer, 2012, pp. 19). It is argued by 
the critical urban theorists that ‘capitalist cities are…themselves intensively 
commodified in so far as their constitutive socio-spatial forms-from buildings 
and the built environment to land-use systems, networks of production and 
exchange, and metropolitan-wide infrastructural arrangements-are sculpted 
and continually reorganized in order to enhance the profit-making abilities of 
capital…capital’s relentless drive to enhance profitability has long played, 
and continues to play, a powerful role in producing and transforming urban 
socio-spatial configurations’ (Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer, 2012, pp. 3.).  
For critical urban theorists, the urban is the site and the stake of struggles 
over the future of capitalism. The alternatives to the prevailing capitalist urban 
formation provided by most of the critical urban theorists, including Lefebvre’s 
‘right to the city’, are not ‘about inclusion in a structurally unequal and 
exploitative system, but more radically, about democratizing cities and their 
decision making process’ (Mayer, 2012, p. 70). Over the past several 
decades, as is pointed out by John Friedmann (1973, 1987), planning theory 
and practices ‘oscillates in its emphases between a radical, transformative 
intention and a role in maintaining the way cities function and governance 
works’ (Healey, 2012). During the 1970s, many of the social movements in 
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European cities used the slogan of ‘Let’s take the city’ (Lotta, 1972), while in 
the North America ‘Community Control’ (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1974) was 
frequently used for the campaign that demanded not only for the provision of 
basic infrastructure and social securities but also rights to participate in 
decision makings that would have an impact on their own interests. The 
community centers, autonomous media, and other self-managed projects 
thus emerged. Local spaces are increasingly viewed as key arenas for a wide 
range of policy experiments and political initiatives such as demolition of 
social housing, experiments in privatization of provisions of social services, 
the removing of social safety networks and etc. Without a sustainable 
regulatory fix at the national and global level, localities are continuously 
viewed as the remaining institutional arena in which economic growth could 
be reignited, despite the local resistance. A wide range of policy experiments 
have been implicated in order to unleash the supposedly latent innovative 
capacity of local economies, to foster an local entrepreneurial culture, and to 
enhance local Labour market flexibility and local competitiveness and 
place-specific location assets.  
2.5 THE AREA BASED INITIATIVES (ABIs) IN THE UK  
The Area Based Initiatives (ABIs) have a long history in the UK. Since the 
middle 1960s, urban policies in the UK began to shift away from physical 
development and the concept of ‘Urban Regeneration’ was introduced to 
address economic, social and environmental problems faced by deprived 
areas in many British Cities that were understood to have the following 
characteristics: ‘high level of individuals that are experiencing a range of 
negative or undesirable circumstances, such as unemployment, low incomes, 
lack of skills, poor health and bad housing conditions that significantly reduce 
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their wellbeing; a spatial concentration of ‘deprived households and 
individuals and the accompanied undesirable aspects such as poor physical 
environment, high crime level, lack of services, shortage of job opportunities 
that in turn reinforce the deprivation of community’ (Goodlad, 2005, pp. 923).. 
There were a plethora of regeneration initiatives with evolving assumptions 
and policy formulations in tackling one or some aspects of the difficulties 
faced by people in deprived areas, such as the Slum Clearance, Urban Aid, 
Sure Start, Action Zones, City Challenge, Single Regeneration Budget, etc. 
With the impacts of deindustrialization, the 1970s and the 1980s has seen 
sharp increase in the number of long-term unemployment in many traditional 
UK industrial cores. The conservative government came into power in 1979 
and articulated its urban polices based on the belief that marketization is the 
only way to deliver equitable and efficient solutions to urban problems (Nevin 
et al.,1997). Urban regeneration policies gave emphasis to property-led 
initiatives and the creation of entrepreneurial culture (Hall and Hubbard 1996; 
1998). Local authorities were believed to be incapable of leading the recovery 
of their cities and their powers in finance, housing, education, social services, 
planning and economic development were gradually striped away’ 
(Parkinson and Evans 1990, pp.65-66). ‘Wealth creation replaced the 
distribution of welfare as the aim of urban policy and efficiency was favoured 
as opposed to equity (Tallon, 2013, p49).  
When New Labour came into power in the late 1990s, high priority was 
attached to tackling poverty and social exclusion. At that time, a growing 
realization emerged that local communities had rarely benefited from 
previous property-led regeneration programs as the expected ‘trickle-down’ 
seldom happened. Moreover, as is pointed out by Hausner (1993, P.526) ‘an 
inherent weakness of former approaches to regeneration is they are 
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short-term, fragmented, ad hoc and project-based without an overall strategic 
framework for city wide development’. Besides, there was also a changing 
understanding of the origins of urban problems. In 1998, the Social Exclusion 
Unit (SEU) published the first SEU report1 arguing that after many years’ 
regeneration practices, the UK still have more than 4000 neighbourhoods in 
deprivation and a the problems in the deprived areas should be tackled so as 
to break the loop of deprivation. Against such a background, the New Deal for 
Community (NDC) was initiated in 1998 as New Labour’s flagship 
regeneration project to ‘reduce the gap between some of the poorest 
neighbourhoods and the rest of the country’ (DETR, 2001a, p.2). It aimed at 
attacking problems in five areas, namely: health, education, unemployment, 
crime and physical environment. The life span of the NDC was ten years, a 
regeneration fund of up to £2 billion from central government were given to 
39 selected neighbourhoods over the 10 years.  
2.6 CHINA’S INNER CITY POLICIES   
In China, during the past two decades, people’s long-depressed demands for 
a decent flat in areas where facilities and services are well equipped have 
been released due to the opening up of housing market and the impacts on 
the social and spatial formation of many cities were significant. Both farmland 
                                            
 
 
1 Bring Britain together: a national strategy for neighborhoods renewal (SEU, 1998) 
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and underused inner city land were cleaned out for tower blocks that not only 
accommodate citizens who were formerly squeezed in small public housing 
unites but also migrants from other parts of the country, as long as they can 
afford the market prices of a property. The booming housing market also 
attracted huge amount of speculative money from both large corporations 
and ordinary families that have no better venues for investment. In fact, from 
1991 to 2011, China’s urbanization rate had risen from 26.37% to 50% 
(NBSC, 2011). Over the past four decades, the ‘benefits of property-led 
development, such as added job opportunities, increased government 
revenues and profits generated from the increased tax bases made the 
government one of the biggest stakeholders of the inner-city redevelopment 
(Yu and Zhu 2009, pp. 217). 
However, this massive-scale urbanization resulted in many new challenges. 
For one thing, housing prices in the majority of Chinese cities had inflated 
dramatically and led to a overheat housings market, which undermined the 
government’s popularity among middle-to-low income owners. For another 
thing, inner urban areas, with social-economic challenges such as spatial 
concentration of poverty, dilapidated physical environment and long-term 
underinvestment on public facilities, are now facing mountain pressures from 
the government-led gentrification.  
So far China has not formulated any coherent policy framework to address 
inner urban issues. The highly decentralized executive power means local 
governments can formulate urban development policies within their own 
jurisdictions. Stimulated by the progress-based promotion mechanism for 
local governors, more stress is thus put on economic growth rather than 
social equity. ‘Land for money’ approach has been widely adopted and 
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property-led development has been prevailing in China’s urban regeneration 
process and is expected to play a dominant role for some time to come. At 
the same time, occupiers of inner city properties have also seen an inflated 
value of their dilapidated properties. Due to the state ownership of urban land, 
the majority of urban redevelopment programs are facilitated by a coalition of 
municipal government and private sectors and the irregular changes of land 
use rights have frequently been the focus of conflicts between local people 
and municipalities. In 2010, China was rocked by 180,000 protests, riots and 
other mass incidents—more than four times the tally in the previous decade 
(Orlik, 2011). 
2.7 GENTRIFICATION AND LOCAL RESISTANCE 
2.7.1 Gentrification in Developed Countries 
Given birth by the British sociologist Ruth Glass in 1964, gentrification is now 
widely known as 'the transformation of a working-class or vacant area of the 
central city into middle-class residential and/or commercial use' (Lees, et al, 
2008). ‘Gentrification is the reinvestment of capital at the city center, which is 
designed to produce space for a more affluent class of people than currently 
occupies that space’ (Smith, 2002,p. 294). Wyly and Hammel (2004, p.36) 
argued that 'the most durable result of gentrification may be its effect on new 
properties in the formulation of urban policy…It is gentrification that actually 
underwrites new configurations of highest and best use, reallocation of 
neighborhood public services and public space regulation. And the inherited 
landscapes and potential expansion of gentrification are now critical 
considerations in many domains of urban policy'.  
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As is argued by Smith (1982, pp.151-152), 'gentrification is the restructuring 
of capitalist urbanization and part of a larger redevelopment process 
dedicated to the revitalization of the profit rate’. Smith (1982) used 'rent gap' 
to explain gentrification as a product of investment and disinvestment in the 
urban land market. The rent gap is a ‘short fall between the actual economic 
return from a land parcel given its present land use and the potential return if 
it were put to its optimal, highest and best use’ (Lees, et al, 2008, p. 52) and 
the rent gap changes because of the various aspect of urban growth such as 
the improvement of accessibility and activities in its surrounding environment. 
Millard-Ball (2000, p 1688) finds the rent gap of limited use in understanding 
of the effects of state intervention and housing allocation in different 
political-economic contexts while Sykora (1993, pp. 287-288) projected the 
function gap, which he argued is 'caused by the underutilization of available 
land and building relative to their current physical quality and when centrally 
planned allocation of resources is replaced by allocation ruled by market 
forces, freely set rents influence the distribution of functions in spaces. 
Therefore, functions with an inefficient utilization of space may soon be 
outbid by more progressive functions with a highly intensive space utilization 
and in this way the function gap can be closed in a very short time without 
making huge investments.' The gap theories contribute to pin the explanation 
and interpretation of gentrification into a broader, critical perspective on 
capitalist urbanization and uneven development from the local scale to the 
globe.  
Neil Smith (2002) argues that gentrification is now a 'global urban strategy' 
linked to a new globalism and neoliberal urbanism. It is no longer restricted to 
the North America or Europe but rather a generalized strategy that is 
connected to the circuits of global capital and cultural circulation (Lees, et al, 
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2008, p. 163). The policy mechanism is favored by many city mayors and has 
been integrated with capital market process, public sector privatization 
schemes, global city competition, welfare retrenchment and workfare 
requirements as well as many other facades of neoliberal urbanism. However, 
contemporary gentrification practice is also polymorphic regarding the 
selection of specific strategies and intensity of policy implementation. Since 
the 1980s gentrification has been embodied with a broader meaning which 
goes beyond the rehabilitation of decaying and low-income housing and the 
'gentry' class is no longer confined to middle class. Gentrification is now more 
than often used to refer the process in which a group of people with similar 
social and economic background replaces another group of people that are 
relatively disadvantaged in certain spatial area. The process is accelerated 
by proactive state interventions in different countries and there is a new trend 
of state-led gentrification. According to Hackworth and Smith (2001), since 
the mid-1990s, interventionism governments have drifted away from merely 
passive support in the 70s and 80s and began to work with private sectors to 
facilitate gentrification. Powell and Spencer (2003) argued that the state 
intervention in facilitating gentrification is partly due to the devolution process. 
With increasing power devolved from the central, local government began to 
pursue economic development and housing policies that generally favor 
gentrification, and these efforts are now taking place in a national climate 
marked by the urban impact on national economic growth, creation of 
working opportunities, consumption of raw materials and absorption of 
surplus Labour forces as well as securing the investment from financial 
institutions.  
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2.7.2 Gentrification in China 
The foundation of China’s economic miracles since 1979 was laid in Mao’s 
era, when the state took the control of nearly whole elements for economic 
activities and left a number of unexploited areas which later became China’s 
strongest comparative advantages, such as the abundant cheap Labour 
force, in the international competition and helped the new generations of 
governments to accomplish ‘accumulation by disposition’ (Harvey, 2005b). 
Opening up of the previously enclosed areas for speculation brought 
enormous economic bonus and stimulated the post-1978 government to 
progressively open up new areas through easing both economic and 
administrative shackles. 
The development of housing market serves as an example. Between the 
1950s and the early 1980s new houses in China were mainly built and 
distributed by the state and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Systematic 
reform started from 1982, when ownership of urban land in China was 
separated from the use rights and nationalized. In 1983, Housing Reform was 
initiated and private property rights were formally written into the Constitution 
drafted by the State Council. In 1987, local authorities were allowed to lease 
urban land on behalf of the state to private enterprises (Wu, Xu and AGO, 
2006). The formal start of China's housing market boom was in 1997 (Zhou 
and Logan, 1996), when the down payment rate for residential properties was 
lowered to 30% and the limit was extended to 20 years. In 1998, public 
housing tenants were encouraged to buy the welfare properties they 
occupied and later the government made the growth of housing market the 
only provider of commercial properties while private sectors became the 
major deliver. Such a reform had greatly stimulated the housing market. In 
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2007, housing prices in many Chinese cities increased by three folder when 
compared with that in the 2003 (NBSC,2008).  
Against such a background, the state-led gentrification was particularly the 
case for China. Land prepared for the constructions of new residential 
properties in China is generally converted from three sources: farmland, land 
previously occupied by SOEs or public institutions and land previously 
occupied by private property owners. In practice, it is the municipal 
governments that acquire land from farmers, the SOEs and public institutions 
and private occupiers and sell it to private developers. In the process, value 
gap is mainly generated in three ways: the conversion of land use, the 
change of configurations regarding the developments on the land and the 
provision of public infrastructures. Since the market price for agricultural and 
industrial land is much cheaper than that of the residential land, the state can 
acquire the former two types of land at a relative low price and use its 
statutory planning power to convert them into land for residential and 
commercial use. Additionally, since many Chinese cities are following a 
high-density development pattern so as to reduce the erosion of farmland, 
the recycling of urban land occupied by old neighborhoods with low Floor 
Area Ratio (FAR) itself generates a huge value gap, of which a large 
proportion is occupied by the state using its administrative power in planning. 
Moreover, the government also uses the provision of public facilities to 
control the inflation of land prices in an area. Without exaggeration, 
gentrification is now an integrative part of many Chinese municipalities’ 
accumulation strategy.   
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2.7.3 The Resistance of Gentrification  
It is argued by some scholars that ‘the negative consequences of 
gentrification, such as the rising housing prices, the displacement and 
diminish of original characteristics of old communities are not simply isolated 
local anomalies but symptoms of the fundamental inequalities of property 
market that prioritizes the creation of urban environment for the aim of capital 
accumulation, often at the expense of the needs of home, community, family 
and everyday social life (Lees, et al., 2005, p.73). However, the resistance of 
gentrification at local level is shrinking. On the one hand, this is due to the 
fact that the local people's capacity of mobilization has been eroded. The 
majority of the recent resistances follow a trend that local people inclined to 
limit themselves to measures that seems feasible under the given 
circumstances.  Harvey (2005) accused such movement loses in focus they 
gain in terms of direct relevance to particular issues and constituencies. They 
draw strength from being embedded in the nitty-gritty of daily life and struggle, 
but in so doing they often find it hard to extract themselves from the local and 
the particular to understand the macro-politics of what neoliberal 
accumulation by dispossession and its relation to the restoration of class 
power was and is all about (Harvey, 2005a, p. 200). However the traditional 
social and political struggle theory in practice seems to offer little theoretical 
back up: 'struggle against accumulation by dispossession are fomenting quite 
different lines of social and political struggle. It is partly because of the 
distinctive conditions that give rise to such movements; their political 
orientation and modes of organization depart markedly from those typical 
social democratic politics' (Harvey, 2005a, p. 199). 
On the other hand, it is argued by some scholars (Newman and Wyly, 2006; 
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Marcuse, 1987; Lee, 2014) that the neoliberalism government had exerted 
too much institutional pressure at local level and had made challenges to 
gentrification extremely difficult to launch. As is argued by Harvey (2005, 
p.69): ‘one of the political problems of the neoliberalism is that 'individuals are 
not allowed to choose to associate to create political parties with the aim of 
forcing the state to intervene in or eliminate the market’. With the continuity of 
gentrification, the spatial concentration of working class has been gradually 
dismantled together with their social networks, and strengths therefore can 
not be easily gathered for the resistance (Smith and LeFaivre, 1984; Atkinson, 
2004).  
Public participation in many gentrification cases serves as a therapy 
(Arnstein, 1969) offered by the government to mitigate the tension resulted 
from the resistance. By doing this, local residents who are about to be 
gentrified seem to be offered with opportunities to fully express their thoughts 
and to defend their interests. However, more than often the participatory 
mechanism can exert very limited impact on the final decisions that are made 
in favor of the interests of the interventionism government and capitalists. In 
such a process, within pre-set conditions, local people usually are politically 
and economically disadvantaged and do not possess an equal position to 
bargain with the government or private sectors.  
2.8 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
The fundamental belief behind the idea of public participation in the discourse 
of participatory democracy is that ‘those who are affected by a decision have 
the right to be involved in the decision-making process and be able to make 
their input. Participants are able to obtain information that is needed for a 
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meaningful participation and will be informed with how their involvement 
would affect the final decisions’ (IAPP, 2015). Public participation for urban 
planning and development has an intention to shift the development 
paradigm, to promote a people-centred approach that prioritizes demand 
over supply mechanisms (Plummer, 2004). It is believed that public 
participation, especially starting from an early stage, in the urban 
redevelopment (regeneration) process could provide a channel for the 
residents to have a say regarding the future development of their 
neighbourhood and potentially bring more social sustainable solutions. The 
perceived benefits of public participation include added efficiency, 
sustainability, and collective community power, etc. (Jones, 2003). 
2.8.1 Public and their Motivations for Participation 
Public participation is seen by some scholars as a hegemonic project that 
can help to stabilize society and to create or maintain conditions for capital 
accumulation through achieving ‘relative unity of diverse social forces’ and 
resolving ‘conflicts between particular interests and the general interests’ 
(Jessop, 1997, quoted from Muir, 2004. pp.953) and the benefits of public 
participations accordingly draws more attention than the participatory 
democracy in practice (Atkinson, 1999). Some of the benefits of public 
participation are summarised by Lawson and Kearns (2010): 
1. Public participation in the form of community engagement is part of ‘good 
governance’ as it helps to make ‘better decisions (DETR, 2001) and to 
increase the accountability of service providers.  Public participation is a 
also an important exercise of citizenship rights that should form part of any 
due process (Burton, 2004). 
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2. Public participation is an important measurement to develop sustainable 
community. It also provides a contrasting perspective to the views of the 
professional or political elite (Burton, 2004) and their definition of needs, 
problems and solutions are different from that of planners (Burns and Taylor, 
2000) thus the design will endure longer.  
3. Public participation leads to better implementation and help to avoid 
conflict and competition for resources between established and newer 
residents.  
Generally ‘Public’ contains the following meaning: 
1. Public refers to interest groups (pluralism2) 
2. Public refers to those making decisions with rational (public choice3) 
3. Public is those who are delegated (from the legislators perspective)  
4. Public is the customers (public service)  
5. Public is the citizens. 
 
In real world, ‘public’ is far from a harmonious idea and usually contains 
multiple interest groups, and various motivations. Blakeley and Evans (2009) 
classified people’s motivation of participation into three categories:  
1. Personal rationality: i.e. only when the benefits generated from the 
                                            
 
 
2 Belief that there should be diverse and competing centers of power in society, so that there is a   
marketplace for ideas. 
3 http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicChoice.html 
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participation exceeds the costs (time, money, energy etc.) will they 
participate and the participation will probably be terminated when their aims 
are achieved.  
2. Citizenship: As is described by Clarke et al.,(2007), in contrast with 
consumers, citizens operate in the public realm, fulfil mutual obligations, 
deliberate collectively and pursue the public interest. It frequently appears 
that participation in public life frequently begins on the basis of ‘immediate 
interests and experiences’ and it leads to an understanding of common 
interest, and that by engaging locally people learn to think globally (Burns et 
al., 1994) 
3. Imagined community and social networks: Diani (2003) and Melucci (1996) 
use the social networks to explain the motives for participation. They also 
argue that embeddedness in a specific relational context is conducive to 
individual recruitment to a collective engagement and that activists are linked 
through ‘private’ and ‘public’ ties before collective identity develops. People 
are drawn to participation through friends, neighbours and contacts that 
sometimes result from previous participation (Blakeley and Evans, 2009). 
The strong desire of re-create a community also greatly motivate some 
people to be actively involved in the participation affairs.  
Fairclough (1992a, 1995) argued that relations of power within institutions 
and organizations are affected by discourses. Atkinson (1999, pp.62) further 
pointed out that ‘discursive rules establish the context in which the operating 
procedures and everyday practices of an organization take place’. With the 
prevalence of New Public Management (NPM) approach science the 1979, 
commercial models of organizations and management practice are widely 
 59 
transplanted to public sector services (Flynn, 2000). Barberis (1998) 
identified the characteristics of the NPM as ‘value for money, strong 
consumer orientation, business planning, performance management and 
“controlled delegation”’ (quoted from Rowe and Shepherd, 2002). Influenced 
by such an ideology, ‘partnership’ in New Labour’s regeneration policies is 
discursively constructed as the major vehicle for public participation and 
empowerment. In Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder of Citizen Participation, 
‘Partnership’ falls in the ‘Citizen Power’ category. According to her, power at 
this rung of ladder is ‘redistributed through negotiation between citizens and 
power-holders. ‘Partnership can work most effectively when there is an 
organized power-base in the community to which the citizen leaders are 
accountable; when the citizens group has the financial resources to pay its 
leaders reasonable honoraria for their time-consuming efforts; and when the 
group has the resources to hire (and fire) its own technicians, lawyers, and 
community organizers. With these ingredients, citizens have some genuine 
bargaining influence over the outcome of the plan (as long as both parties 
find it useful to maintain the partnership)’ (Arnstein, 1969, pp.221). In one of 
the most important document-Involving Communities in Urban and Rural 
Regeneration: A Guide for Practitioners (DETR, 1997), Partnership was 
defined as the important means to achieve ‘relative unity’ between central 
government and the civic society and serves an important arena where 
conflicts can be managed, consensus can be built and actions are about to 
be taken. In the NDC programmes, the 39 Partnerships Boards are 
legitimized as the major decision makers and facilitators of regeneration 
initiatives funded by central government at neighbourhood level. While 
central government have the ultimate rights to approve or reject the annual 
delivery plan submitted by the partnerships, the latter enjoy a considerable 
freedom in deciding the overall regeneration strategy and funding particular 
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regeneration projects. 
2.8.2 Two Arguments regarding Public Participation  
During the last several decades, research on public participation is enriched 
by theoretical and empirical studies from various angles, such as analyses 
focusing on the deliberative and collaborative planning practices (Fischer and 
Forester, 1993; Healey et al., 2003), the quality of participatory outcomes 
(Brody, 2003) and research concentrating on the roles and relationships 
between planners, politicians and citizen participants in political process 
(Bedford et al., 2002; Hajer, 2003; Tang Bright and Brody, 2009).Two 
arguments are of particular relevance to this research: 
1) Managerial Argument: this theory is based on observations of how 
managers make effective decisions. (Vroom&Jago,1978). As is suggested by 
Tomas (1990), this model can be applied to prescribe how an official charged 
with organizing a public participatory program could choose among a variety 
of participatory strategies.  
2) Procedure justice and participatory democracy: a considerable number of 
literatures in public participation concerns issues of fairness or procedure 
justice, which is considered as an important element in people’s satisfaction 
with decisions, perception of fairness, and support for authorities (Leventhal, 
Karuza & Fry, 1980; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1978). The theory 
is associated with a variety of criteria, including the use of accurate 
information, representativeness, participation in decision-making, and the 
suppression of bias. The research itself is also evaluated against procedure 
justice (Brockner et al., 1997). Empirical research on how people perceive 
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the procedure fairness of public participation processes have been done by 
many researchers (Lauber & Knuth 1997; Smith & McDonough, 2001)  
2.8.3 Participation as a Hegemonic Project  
Public participation as an activity is indeed loosely defined and can be held in 
the form of consultation, public hearing and all other participation activities in 
a wider definition. Arnstein’s (1969) seminal work ‘A ladder of community 
participation’ (Figure 2.1) formed the basis of many following studies. She 
categorizes public participation according to the distribution of power and 
argues that without the distribution of power, the participation will become an 
empty experience. The widely spread eight-point typology of the participation 
process still serves as a signpost.  
Figure2.1:	  The	  Ladder	  of	  Public	  Participation	  
Citizen Control 
Delegated Power 
Partnership 
Placation 
Consultation 
Information 
Therapy 
Manipulation 
Source: Arnstein (1969) 
Dargan (2009) argues that the idea of public or community that are frequently 
used by the government is far from homogenous and even lead to 
confrontation and naive policy expectations. It is worth noting that the rise of 
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the idea ‘public participation’ in western countries is associated with pluralism 
and direct democracy, which have risen over the last century or so at the 
expense of the managerial model of administration (e.g. Reich 1985; Laird 
1993; Dryzek 1997). Gramsci (1971) raised the concept of ‘hegemony’, in 
which he argued the importance of a consensual social structure that allows 
power to be maintained through the establishment and upholding of dominant 
ideological positions within civic society. Accordingly there are ‘hegemonic 
projects’ implemented to ‘stabilize society and therefore to maintain 
conditions for capital accumulation through achieving relative unity of diverse 
social forces and resolving conflicts between particular interests and the 
general interests (Jessop 1997, p62). Muir suggested that ‘public 
participation is such a hegemonic project that secure relative unity between 
the organizations of state and civic society and have contributed to a strong 
ideology of common interest. It also provides an arena in which social 
conflicts can be managed’ (Muir,2004, P.954).  
White (1996) holds the opinion that while participation may involve a degree 
of negotiation, it does not necessarily involve sharing of power. Evidences 
could be found from different contexts. In many British Area Based initiatives, 
the application of regeneration funding requires the involvement of local 
communities. Yet it has been discovered that in many practices the 
community representatives are often with marginalized power to influence the 
regeneration decisions and those who participate would sometimes have a 
feeling of being manipulated (Stiefel and Wolfe, 1994). As is questioned by 
Taylor (2000) ‘in the UK, there is a consensus that communities by and large, 
remain to be marginalized in most partnership programs to date, even when 
they are relatively well organized. In many cases participants from local 
communities are at the table but unable to influence central issues, which is 
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named as ‘peripheral insiders’ (Maloney, et, al., in Taylor, 2000, p. 1022).  
Additionally, participation is also regarded by many scholars as inherently 
disordered and internally contradictory in contrast to the quantitative and 
bureaucratic nature of ‘planning’ which attempts to contain the chaos of 
development (Stiefel and Wolf, 1994; Nelson and Wright, 1995). The 
contractions may have a negative impact on the formation and 
implementation of planning. The phrase NIMBism represents a prevailing 
attitude among citizens in many western countries towards proposals as well 
as implementation of new development. Projects likely to be opposed include 
but not limited to all new buildings such as new communities, power plants, 
schools, wind turbines, etc., even if some of them may significantly benefits 
the whole region or country. In the UK, such a public attitude together with 
the planning system which emphasises the importance of public participation 
makes the process of obtaining a planning permission comparatively time 
and money consuming with high uncertainty. As is argued by Hall (Imrie, et 
al., 2009, pp28):‘At some point you’ve got to have an authority that does 
things, particularly in the most problematic areas, and particularly since in 
many of those areas there is no one there, or very few people there, and they 
certainly make a hell of fuss… In King’s Cross, a few people hold up the 
development for months and they finally lose…there will always be someone 
who argue that you should go completely bottom-up and do it all through local 
inspiration. I don’t really believe that’s possible. What is at issue here is the 
right degree and form of local devolution’ 
2.8.4 Public Participation in Urban Regeneration Process  
After the post-war booming in the UK, the 1960s and the early 1970s has 
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seen considerable social upheavals around the issue of basic rights, justices 
and access to power. It has seen in the realm of urban affairs that the era of 
big plans and governmental programs, or at least their unquestioned 
ambition been brought down or substantially undermined by citizen 
participation in municipal and other related affairs as well as the proliferation 
of civil society. It was at that time the sentiments of ‘Not In My Backyard’ 
(NIMBY) together with a general layering on scrutiny of any public and private 
plans by local citizenry, became a new order of urban deliberation in the UK, 
if not elsewhere in the developed Western world (Rowe,2005,P.159).  
The idea of public participation in urban regeneration process has at least 
three tiers of meaning. 1. Public participation is a pluralistic concept and, at 
the same time, a dynamic process. Public refers to different, and are often 
competing interest groups, while participation is a process in which different 
participants interact, negotiate, bargain and, ideally, reach a final agreement 
on the outcomes. It is more than often a political process involving the 
distribution of power and resources, the creation of winners and losers, and 
the prioritization of some aims and objectives over the others. Urban 
regeneration project in many cases refers to both spatial and socio-economic 
changes in targeted areas and is currently integrated with neoliberal urban 
policies that are designed and implemented in particular context. Therefore, 
public participation in urban regeneration process is a micro political process 
involving multiple players and taking place in a particular environment with 
unique socio-political and economic features shaped by structural factors. 
Muir (2004, pp. 952) pointed out that public participation could be affected by 
the following factors at different scales:  
1. Micro level power relationships, primarily within formal structures (Lukes, 
 65 
1974; Clegg, 1989);  
2. Network and regimes, at the micro and meso levels, primarily outside 
formal structures (Stoker, 1995; Rhodes, 1997; Dowding, 2001); 
3. Macro-level forces which influence and maintain economic, social, political 
and cultural stability, through the structure of regulation theory (Jessop, 1990; 
Painter, 1995) 
2.8.5 Factors that may Affect Public Participation  
The institutional factors and networks are found to have a profound impact on 
public participation (Gittell & Vidal, 1998; Moser, 1989). The former refers to 
formal structures within which the boundaries of public participation are 
defined, including the forms and procedures of participation, degree of 
empowerment and the significance of the participatory activities as a whole. 
The informal structure, on the other hand, implies the relationships between 
interest groups and government involving resource exchange, which often 
takes place out of the formal structure (Rhodes, 1997). In particular projects, 
both formal and informal structures can exert great impacts on the results of 
public participation through shaping the prospect of the participation. Since 
for local people, ‘the prospect of control and self-determination is a motivator 
for community participation and is crucial to attracting and retaining 
high-quality participants and to motivating continued engagement.’ (Xu, 2007, 
p.624)  
The interactions between indigenous culture and imported values and 
thoughts may also have an impact on the public participation. Rowe 
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(2005,p.31) stressed that ‘in the East Asia there seems to be a cultural bias 
towards collectivism and the interests of family, or company, above those of 
the individual and consensus building rather than debates is the preferred 
way to reach agreement and to avoided the appearances of dissent and 
disputation’. On the other hand, in these countries there is also an obvious 
adoption of western thoughts and values, including the rising awareness of 
civil rights, the increasing demands for fairness, justice and transparency, the 
growing consensus in embracing competition among market forces and 
eliminating the social disparities. Different cultural traditions, thoughts and 
values may help to shape not only the way public participation is organized 
but also the participants’ behaviors in the participatory process. 
It is found in the western society that people with relatively higher social, 
economic and educational backgrounds are more likely to involve in 
organized community activities (Steggert, 1975). On the other hand, ‘it is 
difficult to arouse the poor from their apathy and indifference to development 
issues...’ (United Nations,1981, p.16).  People with deep roots in a 
community or have strong organizational links tend to participate more 
proactively (Rubin &Rubin, 2001; D.H. Smith et al., 1980). The beneficiaries 
of the community programs and people that are well entrenched in a 
neighbourhood group (e.g., political social, cultural, or sports related), are 
more likely to participate (Thomas and Hugh, 1990). It is also found that when 
the personality, situational variables, and professional interventions are 
statistically controlled, variables in relation to personal characteristics can 
actually exert very little influence on the public participation (C.S.Cohen & 
Phillips, 1997; Wandersman, 1981). 
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2.8.6 Public Participation in Britain’s Latest ABIs  
Public participation was one of the most important features of the NDC 
programme. With the argument made by the government in the National 
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (NSNR) (SEU, 1998, 2000, 2001) that 
‘lacking quality participation was one of the biggest flaw of the previous ABIs’ 
(Dargan, 2009), communities were placed at the centre of the NDC. All 
regeneration initiatives were subject to the management of partnerships and 
local residents were required to be involved in every aspect of 
decision-making (Hall and Nevin, 1999; Marinetto, 2003; Dargan, 2009). A 
NDC Partnership typically consists of representatives from local community 
organizations, local authorities, voluntary organizations, the private sectors 
and other statutory bodies (DETR, 1997, p.2). According to Lawless (2012, 
p.314), partnerships in the NDC programme were to ‘maximise their efforts to 
involve and engage all local residents and some residents would play a direct 
role in devising and implementing local strategies through their role as 
resident board members on one of the Partnership Boards, of which the main 
function was to oversee the 10-year strategies for each locality’. It is worth 
noting that  ‘community representatives on the Partnership Board are not 
delegates but representatives…where a partnership is registered as a 
company, then the directors have to act in the best interests of the company’ 
(DETR, 1997, p. 38).  
2.8.7 Public Participation in China’s Recent Regeneration 
Projects 
As distinct from that envisioned in the West, public participation in China’s 
urban regeneration projects must be understood contextually. As observed 
by Plummer and Taylor (2004), a primary difference in the operating context 
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and the background to participatory initiatives is that, unlike most other 
countries recently embarking on participatory processes, economic reform 
has preceded socio-political reform in China, and economic rights are 
prioritized over social and human rights. This places the participatory activity 
– which is fundamentally concerned with inclusion and social equity – on a 
different footing. Some scholars have linked participation in China with local 
governance (Benewick, Tong, & Howell, 2004; Chen & Zhong, 2002; 
Jennings, 1997; Shi, 1997). The phrase ‘public participation’ stems from 
neighbourhood mutual help and seldom involves decision-making (Xu, 2007). 
Before the 1980s’ reformation, people were mobilized to participate in social 
and political actions such as the Cultural Revolution, in which they blindly 
followed the government’s orders and relentlessly worshiped the leader. 
Later in the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 seriously dampened 
people’s enthusiasm to get involved in political related issues (Tang & Parish, 
2000). In 1993, with the initiation of Chinese community service agenda, 
community participation was raised again as an important issue. For one 
thing, the retreat of local government from social welfare obligations needed 
a succeeding institutional setup whereas the emerging community interest 
groups and organizations were looking for their position within the political 
system. For another thing, the limited community service budget required the 
authority to mobilize local residents to participate in the delivery of services 
(Shi, 1997). Public participation in China’s social regeneration programs is 
therefore primarily facilitated by the Local Residents Committees (LRCs) (Xu, 
2007), which is a neighbourhood-level, quasi-governmental organization 
present in all cities and towns across China. LRCs often work closely with the 
local government in carrying out various administrative tasks (Derleth and 
Koldyk, 2004), such as monitoring family-planning compliance and 
maintaining household registry rolls. 
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In contrast with the established networks of the LRCs is China’s premature 
civic society (Rowe and Peter, 2005) within which 
Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) are less well developed. In China, 
an NGO needs to find an official organization as its upper-level administration 
(Fan, 2014). Such a semi-official statues severely constrained NGOs’ 
function as a real civil organizations and they often distant themselves from 
confrontations between local people and the coalition of government and 
private sectors (Johnson, 2010). Which is to say, when it comes to issues 
such as property-led regeneration that involves the distribution of interests 
between local people and the government, NGOs are more than often in 
absence. Besides, in many of China’s recent physical regeneration programs, 
the institutional setup leaves little place for individuals to influence the 
decision makings. Alternative approaches, such as refusing to cooperate and 
acting as a “Nail Household” or repeatedly submitting petitions are frequently 
employed by local people to resist such programs.  
2.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for the research. It is argued 
that in conducting a cross-national comparative study, variegated 
neoliberalism could provide an overarching theoretical framework for 
exploring the similarities and differences existing between China and the UK. 
The theoretical framework accepts that capitalist system is unevenly 
developed and the degree and intensity of non-market intervention varies 
across spatial locations. Various forms of non-market interventions with 
different intensity may yield both divergent and convergent outcomes. 
Variegated Neoliberalism theory can help to decipher the formation of 
differences as well as common traits found in urban regeneration and the 
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related participatory practices in both UK and China through connecting them 
with the global trend of Neoliberalization, which is polymorphic, 
context-specific and happens at multiple spatial and institutional scales. 
Among the various aspects of the neoliberalism, this research focuses on 
urban regeneration and participation related activities. The notion of 
neoliberal urbanism helps to explain the general trends in regeneration 
policies while critical urban theory provides a different perspective to read the 
prevailing regeneration practices in both countries. Regarding the physical 
regeneration in both countries, the concept of gentrification serves as an 
effective instrument for reading the essence of the phenomenon to some 
extent.  
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 A Cross-National Comparative Perspective 
This research applies a cross-national comparative perspective in exploring 
the differences and similarities in urban regeneration and the related public 
participation activities in both UK and China. A cross-national perspective is 
frequently applied in observing social phenomenon and understanding the 
operation of social process in different countries and is also used for mapping 
experiences regarding best practices across different nations (Hantaris, 
1999). In doing a cross-national comparison, a profound understanding of the 
evolution of socioeconomic, political and cultural context is required. 
Generally there are three different understandings about the relationship 
between the social realities and the context. One is ‘universalism’ (Dogan 
and Pelassy,1990, p.19) with a belief that social realities are context free and 
generalizations from a particular context can be applied universally. Another 
one is the ‘culturalism’, which argues that social reality is context-bounded 
and the only way to get a proper understanding of the social realities is to 
position them within the context as experiences generated from one society 
are confined by temporal and spatial factors and can hardly be generalized to 
other societies (Hantaris, 1999), The third one takes a central ground 
between the first two perspectives and argues that ‘social realities are 
context-dependent, but the context itself serves as a important explanatory 
variable and a enabling tool, rather than constituting a barrier to effective 
cross-national comparisons and experience mapping’  (Hantrais,1999, pp. 
95), which is adopted in this research.   
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In spite of the many advantages in exploring the differences and similarities, 
the cross-national comparative methodology is notoriously time and resource 
consuming. Besides, the quality of the research is constrained by various 
factors regarding the research objects as well as the researchers (Hantrais, 
1999). For instance some of the data can be easily obtained through public 
venues in one country while in another country it might be confidential while 
the selection of case and indicators and the interpretation of the research 
findings are also highly constrained by the researcher’s knowledge and 
capacity. Comparative analysis can be easily overwhelmed by ‘large 
numbers of variables and lose the possibility of capturing the controlled 
relationships’ (Lijphart, 1971, p.690).   Based on Hantaries’ (1999) work, 
indicators that may need for conducting a cross-national comparison study 
regarding the urban regeneration and the related public participation activities 
are listed in Table 3.1:  
Table	  3.1	  Indicators	  for	  the	  Comparison:	  
1.Political institutions:  Political system, representation and power, interest 
groups; 
2.Administrative structures: Machinery of central and local government, 
public and private organizations; 
3.Economic systems: Housing policies, housing market;  
4.The legal framework: National legislations, planning laws and regulation, 
formalized structures in resolving the regeneration-related disputes; 
5.Social institutions and structures: Community organizations, social 
stratification; 
6.The cultural environment: Values, elite structures and media;   
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7.Socio-demographic variables: Ethnicity, socio-occupational groups, 
educational backgrounds 
Based on Hantrais (1999, p.101) 
 
Neoliberalism penetrates not only in various aspects of the social, economic 
and political life but also takes place at multiple scales. At the national level, it 
can be observed from the evolution of socio-economic policies and the 
reformation of institutional setup; at the intermediate level, which mainly 
refers to the city and regional level, it is embedded in the entrepreneurial 
municipal governments’ strategies and actions in promoting local 
competiveness against the background of intensive global competition. At the 
community level, the process and impacts of Neoliberalization can be 
examined more closely from the behaviors of social groups that are affected 
by the privatization of municipal services, the retrenchment of social benefits, 
the restructuration of the urban housing market, and various policy incentives 
in driving people to undertake working opportunities in both formal and 
informal sectors. Moreover, the resistances against neoliberal polices from 
those who are negatively affected can also be observed at the community 
level. In this research the cross-national comparison is designed to cover the 
three levels: the national level, the city/regional level and the community 
level.  
Nation as a contextual frame reference provides a convenient reference 
system for comparing the characteristics of culture, politics, legislation as well 
as the administrative system in different countries (Hantrais, 1999, pp. 98). 
The national level also provides a proper scale for examining the formulation 
and implementation of social and economic policies. The comparison 
conducted at a city/region level, however, helps to reduce the impacts 
exerted by the internal diversification of a country on specific cases and at the 
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same time to lower the risk of inappropriate generalization of the research 
findings. The community level provides an ideal arena for obtaining empirical 
data for the comparative study. It is believed that a perspective focusing on 
how individuals perceive, experience and take actions in the regeneration 
practices can help to explain the contemporary social realities. 
The comparison of this research is therefore divided into three major parts. 
Firstly, the context of the two countries are introduced and compared at the 
national level, including the geographical and demographical features, the 
politics and institutional setup, the social and economic challenges they are 
respectively facing (Table, 3.2). Besides, the evolution of urban regeneration 
and public participation-related policies and practices in both countries are 
also closely examined and historical moments of destruction and 
reconstruction in both countries are reviewed, including the reconstruction of 
former accumulation regime, the recalibration of central-local government 
relations and devolution, privatization and dismantling of the welfare state 
and urban housing market restructuring and physical environment 
transformation. How did the fusion of the old political system and 
neoliberalism take place at a national level in both countries was probed.  
Table	  3.2:	  The	  comparison	  conducted	  at	  a	  national	  level	   	  
 UK China  
Major 
Features  
Territorial area;  
Demographic 
feature; 
Industrial sectors; 
Administrative 
Configuration;  
Politics and political 
Territorial area; 
Demographic features;  
Industrial sectors; 
Administrative 
configuration;  
Politics and the CPC; 
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parties;  
Intergovernmental 
relations; 
Intergovernmental 
relations  
Economic 
Changes  
Economic 
development and 
challenges;  
From Keynesianism 
to Neoliberalism;  
Labour and 
Conservative’ 
economic policies - 
consistency and no 
uniformity;  
The major 
institutions for the 
implementation of 
the initiatives; 
Economic development 
and challenges;  
From command 
economy to market 
economy;  
The CPC’s economic 
policies- evolution and 
mutation; 
Political turmoil and its 
socio-economic impact;  
China’s progressive 
opening up of areas for 
speculation;  
Political 
System  
British Political 
parties and the 
First-past-post 
democracy 
The central 
central-local 
relations; 
 
China’ tradition as a 
centralized state and its 
first 30 years as a 
authoritarian country 
since 1949;  
China as a authoritarian 
regime since 1978;  
The structure of CPC 
and its entanglement 
with the government;  
Central-Local relations;  
Social 
Changes  
Dismantling of 
welfare state and the 
shrinkage of ‘working 
class’;  
Pluralistic Society; 
The retrenchment of 
welfare system and 
the ‘Third Way’ 
(argument between 
Left and Right);  
The consequence of 
Cultural Revolution and 
the surging protest 
regarding economic 
issues in recent years; 
The argument between 
leftists and rightists and 
the reflections on urban 
policies;  
China as pluralistic 
society and players in 
regeneration process 
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Evolution of 
Urban 
Regeneration 
Policies 
From slum clearance 
to Area Based 
Initiatives (ABIs) – 
changing 
understanding about 
the causes and 
solutions for urban 
decline and poverty;  
Central-local 
relations reflected on 
regeneration projects  
The changing priorities 
of urban policies over 
the half century;  
Typologies of urban 
regeneration policies in 
China – experiment and 
diffusion of regeneration 
models;  
Social housing and the 
new wave of slum 
clearance. 
Delivery of 
Urban 
Regeneration 
Projects 
The top-down model 
of national 
regeneration strategy 
and the delivery 
through planning 
system;  
Typologies of urban 
regeneration projects 
and the delivery through 
planning system;  
The focus of the research was then shifted to the city level. In introducing the 
history of the development of the two cities selected from each of the 
countries, it is intended to show how neoliberal urbanism is embedded in 
urban policies and how its appearances at the city level vary across contexts. 
Several aspects are compared at the city level, as is shown in Table 3.3:  
Table	  3.3:	  The	  comparison	  conducted	  at	  a	  city	  level	  
 KNDC and KHMRI (UK) DTMD (China) 
Profiles of the 
cities  
History and current status of 
the city 
History and current status of the 
city 
Socio-political and economic 
challenges 
Socio-political and economic 
challenges 
The on-going transformation  The on-going transformation 
Regeneration history and 
progress 
Regeneration history and 
progress  
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Overview of 
the prevailing 
regeneration 
policies 
Back ground of the NDC 
program 
The recent trend of physical 
regeneration across the country 
Public participation and the 
discourse of partnership 
 
 
In the third part, the comparison is conducted through examining two 
regeneration projects taking place at the community level. The strategies 
adopted by different players and the discourses used by them to legitimize 
their activities were examined and compared. Special attention is given to 
examining and comparing how the conflicts resulted in by the neoliberal 
urban policies and practices are resolved within different contexts.  
3.3 A CASE STUDY APPROACH  
3.3.1 The Advantages of a Case Study Approach  
According to Yin (2013, pp. 16), ‘a case study research is an empirical inquiry 
that investigate a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within 
its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context may not be clearly evident’. Yin and Davis (2007) argued that 
case study is frequently adopted for striving a better understanding of a 
real-world phenomenon with the assumption that significant contextual 
conditions in pertinent to the case are likely to be involved. Unlike other 
research methodologies such as experiment that would deliberately separate 
phenomenon from context and strive to define the contributions of several 
narrowly defined variables, case study enables the researcher to have a 
holistic view, in-depth examination and interpretation of a social phenomenon 
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and has already reiterated its appropriateness for dealing with a process or 
complex real-life activities in great depth (Noor, 2008). Yin (1989) pointed out 
that a case study is a suitable strategy for researchers to probe the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions when they have very little control over the event. A case 
study approach also contributes to a better understanding of the interactions 
between different participants together with their strengths and weaknesses 
in relation to the context and time. To obtain an in-depth understanding of 
real-life activities, empirical work is necessary for exploring not only what 
happens contemporarily but also in the near past due to the consistency of 
the players and the context.  
In a case study, one result usually relies on multiple factors. Which implies 
that: 1, data covering a range of related aspects should be collected; and 2, 
the traditional variable-based analysis methods are constrained by its 
capacity in revealing the holistic picture of the relations between various 
factors and the result (Yin, 2013). Therefore a theoretical proposition is 
needed not only to guide the data collection from the beginning but also for a 
better interpretation of the data collected form empirical works. As is noted by 
Rosenbaum (2002, pp. 277-279), ‘a complex pattern of expected outcomes 
should be elaborated in the preferred theoretical statements-the more 
complex the better’. Having the theoretical propositions in the first place also 
plays a critical role in generalizing the lessons from the case study in an 
analytical manner in the later stage (Yin, 2013, p. 40). The ‘analytical 
generalization may be based on either (a) corroborating, modifying, rejecting 
or otherwise advancing theoretical concepts that was firstly referenced in 
designing the case study or (b) new concepts that arose upon the completion 
of the case study’… and ‘In either situation, the generalization would be at a 
conceptual level that is higher than that of the specific case (Yin, 2013, p. 41).  
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As is suggested by Kohn (1987, p.716) ‘intensive comparative analysis of a 
few cases may be more promising than a more superficial statistical analysis 
of many cases’. According to Yin (2013, p. 52), there are generally five 
reasons for selecting a single case: ‘1). The case can represent the critical 
test of a significant theory; 2). The case represents an extreme case or an 
unusual case, deviating from theoretical norms or even everyday 
occurrences; 3). The case is common and can represent the circumstances 
and conditions of everyday situation; 4); the cases is revelatory while the 
researcher has the opportunity to observe what is previously unavailable; 5). 
The case is longitudinal which could be studied at two or more different points 
in time’.  
In this research, the context of the UK and China serve as a pair of unique 
cases that are highly contrasted against each other. The current policies and 
practices of urban regeneration are largely shaped by contextual factors and 
have variegated appearances across the two countries. It is therefore proper 
to use case study as a means to examine the variegated appearances of 
neoliberalism reflected in urban regeneration and public participation policies 
and practices in both UK and China.  
It is worth noting that ‘case study is not the best method for assessing the 
prevalence of phenomena and a case study would have to cover both the 
phenomenon of interest and its context, therefore yielding a large number of 
potentially relevant variables which in turn requires large number of 
potentially relevant works that are beyond the capacity and means of the 
researcher to explore’ (Yin, 2013, p. 59). The pros and cons of case studies 
are summarized in Table 3.4:  
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Table	  3.4:	  The	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  case	  studies:	  
Pros:  
1. Case studies enable the researcher to have a holistic view of a small 
phenomenon and have in-depth examination and interpretation.   
2. The evidence and data of case study comes from various sources of real 
life and therefore are more convincing.  
3. Case study is also useful in capturing the emergent and immanent 
properties of life and the ebb and flow of the governing system in a fast 
changing social-economic context.  
Cons:  
1. As case study is selected from particular context and has unique features, 
it is hard to generalize the research findings based on single case study. 
2. The difficulty of analysing the cases is correlated with the complexity of the 
context. 
Source: Noor, 2008 
3.3.2 The Potential Constrains for Applying a Case Study 
Approach in the Cross-National Comparison 
It has to accept that attempts to show the full picture of the current urban 
regeneration practices in both countries and to compare them through single 
case study is too ambitious as both countries are internally diversified. While 
in the UK there is a clear north-south division regarding the economic 
development and population density, in China a similar division can be found 
between the west and the east part of the country. Moreover, cities in both 
countries not only vary in size but also have unique histories and 
characteristics regarding the indigenous culture, micro political environment 
as well as development strategies. Even within a city, spatial inequalities 
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exist among different communities. All the factors listed above have an 
impact on the unique features of a single case and the research findings may 
only reflect a façade of the whole picture.  
However, this doesn’t mean a cross-national comparison based on studying 
a single case selected from each of the countries is meaningless. Firstly, 
although micro environment plays a significant role in shaping the 
characteristics of a particular regeneration case, such as the interactions 
between different players, structural factors such as institutional setup and 
national policies plays are playing an equally, if not more, important role in 
deciding the patterns of the regeneration programs as well as the delivery 
procedures. Secondly, within a country, similar patterns can be found from 
regeneration programs initiated across cities and communities as the mutual 
learning process helps to facilitate the diffusion of models of regeneration 
programs that are thought to be ‘effective’ by decision makers. Therefore, 
comparing single regeneration cases in a cross-national comparative study 
does not only have the potential of revealing the differences and similarities 
existing in the structural factors between different countries but also enables 
the research findings to be generalized to a certain pattern of regeneration 
program that is prevailing in particular country. More importantly, through 
analysing the context and real cases, it is able to have a better understanding 
of the social dynamics in both countries and to seek opportunities for 
mapping experiences from one context to the other.  
3.4 CASE SELECTION 
In exploring how the polymorphic appearances of neoliberalism are revealed 
in recent inner city regeneration initiatives that address both physical and 
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social problems in inner city areas in the UK and China, there are some 
general criteria for the selection of the case studies. Firstly, the selected 
cases should be able to reveal some common features of the prevailing 
regeneration practices in each of the countries. Secondly, the geographical 
location of the regeneration projects in the urban areas and the size of the 
community within which the two selected cases took place should share 
some similarities. Additionally, it is appropriate to add another criteria that the 
selected cases should include physical regeneration projects in relation to 
urban neighborhoods and are accompanied by resistances and conflicts as 
this research aims at exploring answers to the questions of how the recent 
urban regeneration process is affected by the neoliberalism urbanism and 
how the process is resisted by those who are affected and in what ways are 
the conflicts resolved within the given institutional setup.  
Bearing in mind the criteria listed above, a number of regeneration cases in 
both UK and China have been reviewed. Regarding the numerous Area 
Based Initiatives, the New Deal for Community (NDC) and the Housing 
Market Renewal Initiatives (HMRI) in the UK were given particular attention. 
A number of Chinese regeneration projects took place in old urban 
neighborhoods across the country were also reviewed. Finally two cases 
were selected for the comparison.  
3.4.1 The Selected British Case and the Rationale  
The British case selected is the Kensington New Deal for Community (KNDC) 
area and the Kensington Housing Market Renewal Initiative (KHMRI). The 
physical boundaries of the two projects are almost overlapped. Detailed 
information regarding the two projects is given in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.   
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The NDC program is New Labour government’s flagship regeneration project 
with great importance attached to public participation. All the 39 NDC projects 
had well defined boundaries regarding the duration, population and spatial 
area and most of them share similar features regarding the amount of funding 
they received and the number of population they covered. The KNDC shares 
common features with other 38 NDC programs regarding the regeneration 
aims, contents and delivery strategies, etc. and it serves as a common case 
for observing the general features of the British regeneration practices under 
New Labour. However, to some extent the KNDC is also a unique case as it 
had received the largest amount of funding among all the NDC programs yet 
yield rather moderate improvements to the communities. Besides, the KNDC 
area overlaps with and another national regeneration project - the KHMRI. 
While the KNDC aimed at deliver a holistic regeneration covering both social 
and physical aspects, the KHMRI mainly focused on regenerating old 
residential properties and the large-scale demolition proposed by the KHMRI 
was resisted by some of the local residents. The two projects together 
provide a perfect opportunity for studying the reality of contemporary 
regeneration practices in the UK.  
3.4.2 The Selected Chinese Case and the Rationale 
In China, the majority of the inner city regeneration projects involve significant 
change of social structure. The prevailing property-led redevelopment model 
often not only replaces the old inner city poor with gentry class, but also 
change the original residential properties into commercial use. Moreover, 
many of the inner urban regeneration projects in China are propelled by 
powerful municipalities, which is to say resistances from the local 
communities more than often make no differences. The selected Chinese 
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case for further study is the Drum Tower Muslim District (DTMD) 
regeneration in Xi’an City, Shanxi Province. On the one hand, the DTMD 
regeneration is a common case that share similar features with many other 
inner city regeneration cases that follow the prevailing regeneration model in 
China, i.e. property-led regeneration dominated by the municipal government. 
The case is a manifestation of how neoliberal urbanism is materialized 
through the existing institutional setup and how it as resisted by the 
communities that are affected by it. From the DTMD case the dynamics of 
current Chinese urban regeneration practices can be observed. On the other 
hand, the DTMD regeneration is unique for its process and outcomes. 
Although in many cases there are resistances from local people against the 
regeneration initiatives with a nature of ‘accumulation by disposition’, very 
few of them can actually hold the municipal government back for nearly a 
decade. Local residents in the DTMD have their own features that are 
distinguishable from other inner city communities. The interactions between 
the DTMD residents and the municipal government serve as an extreme case 
for understanding what resources and power are held by the municipal 
government and local residents and how do they utilize the resources to 
maximize their interests during the interactions. 
3.5 RESEARCH METHODS  
In 2012, a preliminary data collection was conducted in the DTMD area. 
Informal interviews were given to local people and around 40 questionnaires 
designed based on the Structural Equation was distributed.  It was found 
that data collected through the quantitative research methodology was 
ineffective in telling the whole story of the regeneration case. Besides, the 
educational background of the residents in the DTMD area was generally low, 
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which directly affected their completion of the questionnaires. On the country, 
interviews conducted with local residents brought more valuable information.  
The formal fieldwork took place in the Xi'an DTMD in November 2013. 15 
semi-structured interviews were taken with people who deeply involved in the 
redevelopment process, ranging from planners, politicians, local residents, 
and relocates that are currently living outside the area. The local residents' 
living conditions and community-oriented activities organized by the 
Residents' Committee and supported by the volunteers were observed. In 
terms of the KNDC case study, from April to July 2013 and in October 2014, 
semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 11 interviewees that had 
directly or indirectly participated in the KNDC regeneration, ranging from local 
residents, councillors, community activists, academicians and managers of 
social enterprises. Local government officials in the DTMD case and former 
members in the KNDC partnership were absent from the interviewees as 
requests for an interview were either neglected or refused. Their opinions and 
attitudes were mainly interpreted based on previous documents, including 
official announcements, newsletters, annual progress reports, etc.  
In comparison with other research methods, semi-structured interviews are 
accompanied by a number of challenges. Perhaps one of the biggest 
challenges for both cases was to find the proper interviewees who had not 
only deeply involved in the regeneration project but were also willing to offer a 
talk. It has been approved in both case studies that finding a gatekeeper can 
be effective for approaching people that have a deep knowledge about the 
cases. Before going to the DTMD, a local elite that had a number of 
publications regarding Hui people's ethnic culture was visited. Indeed he was 
also born in the DTMD and was then a high-rank official in the Xi'an city 
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government. At that time although he could not directly undertake a interview, 
he actually showed great interests to the research topic and gave the 
researcher some of the local activists' cell phone number. One of these 
activists was Mr. Ding, who had deeply involved in the resistance. According 
to him, a important reason for him to make the determination of giving a 
detailed description about the implementation and resistance of the 
West-DTMD regeneration projects was that this research would be written up 
in English and he hoped to let more people out of the country to have a sense 
of what had happened in his community. These activists then introduced the 
researcher to some of the people they are familiar with for a talk about their 
own experiences regarding the regeneration process. Generally interviewees 
that were approached through the referees appeared to be more outspoken 
when answering questions regarding some quite controversial issues. Mr. Ma 
at that time was refurbishing his property on the street. The researcher saw 
the refurbishment and asked whether he would like to undertake an interview 
and he gladly accepted, as he hoped that his financial difficulties brought by 
the refurbishment could be understood by they government, which would 
then provide him with an interest-free loan in support of his rebuilding 
activities. Although the researcher had explained that there was less likely to 
have a connection between undertaking the interview and receiving financial 
support, the interviewee still acted quite proactively. There was an obvious 
concern from his wife regarding his outspokenness, and she attempted to 
stop him from taking too much. Yet it appeared that many of the local Hui 
people's family were male-dominated and a female can hardly influence the 
decisions made by her husband. Mr. Ma interrupted his wife abruptly when 
she attempted to stop him and continued to complain about his situation. His 
wife did not make any further argument.  
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In the UK case, Jerry Spencer, a professional working for the Liverpool Vision 
was firstly introduced. After the interview, he wrote an email to Allen Tapp, 
who gladly undertook the interview and introduced Steve Faragher… While 
some of the interviewees, including the politicians and scholars were 
contacted through emails. The two selected cases are compared form the 
following aspects, as is shown in Table 3.5. 
Table	  3.5:	  Aspects	  that	  are	  compared	  through	  the	  two	  case	  studies	  
 KNDC and KHMRI (UK) DTMD (China) 
Profile of the 
selected 
regeneration 
cases 
Major features of the 
regeneration area 
Major features of the 
regeneration area 
Source of funding  Source of funding 
Delivery strategy and the 
dominant body 
Delivery strategy and the 
dominant body 
Regeneration aims and the 
priorities  
Regeneration aims and the 
priorities  
Forms of public participation  Forms of public participation  
Evaluation of 
the 
regeneration 
outcomes 
Statistic changes regarding 
economic and social figures  
Statistic changes regarding 
economic and social figures 
Effectiveness of public 
participation  
Effectiveness of public 
participation 
Opinions of 
the 
participants 
and observers 
about the 
regeneration 
Challenges faced by the 
area and the causes 
identified by local people;  
Diversified opinions about 
the area; 
Challenges faced by the area 
and the causes identified by 
local people;  
Diversified opinions about the 
area; 
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projects  Local people’s perceived 
political and economic 
reasons for the initiation of 
the regeneration project; 
The effectiveness of 
partnership as the delivery 
body;  
Costs and benefits of the 
regeneration project for local 
residents; 
Local residents’ reactive 
strategies towards physical 
regeneration and their 
rational behind it; 
The gap between the 
expectation and reality;  
Unsustainable social 
regeneration programs and 
the reasons; 
Inequality created by the 
area-based features of 
regeneration projects; 
Partnership as a 
mal-functional delivery body 
that facilitate alienation 
rather than participation;  
Deep embedded political 
reasons behind the 
formation of partnership and 
political struggles within the 
micro-environment; 
Difficulties to facilitate real 
Local people’s perceived 
political and economic reasons 
for the initiation of the 
regeneration project; 
The effectiveness local 
government as the predominant 
deliver of the regeneration 
project; 
Costs and benefits of the 
regeneration project for local 
residents; 
Local residents’ reactive 
strategies towards physical 
regeneration and their rational 
behind it; 
The gap between the 
expectation and reality;  
Social regeneration programs 
and the delivery mechanism; 
Inequality created by the 
area-based features of the 
regeneration projects; 
Municipal government’s role in 
manipulating public participation 
to realize its primitive 
accumulation 
Interactions between local 
residents and the municipal 
government in the regeneration 
process;  
Difficulties to facilitate real 
participatory democracy;  
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participatory democracy;  
Local residents’ resistance 
against the unwanted 
outcomes  
Local residents’ resistance 
against the unwanted outcomes  
 
In this research, the discourses used by different players involved in the 
regeneration projects are analysed and compared. According to Jacobs 
(2006, pp. 44), discourses used by different players that involve in one 
particular social event can be viewed as a ‘complex set of competing ideas 
and values’. Discourse analysis is often accused for its interpretative nature 
and limited utility in a practical context (Jacobs, 2006). Indeed discourse 
analysis is more than often employed by scholars (Lemke, 1995; Rydin, 1998; 
Dean, 1999; Fairclough, 2000) to ‘highlight organizational inequalities and 
contested dynamics of power’ (Jacobs, 2006, pp.46) yet seems to have little 
contribution to changing the inequalities. Moreover, the effectiveness of 
discourse-related approaches are also likely to be undermined by bias and 
distortion in selecting evidences that are used for analysis. Goodchild and 
Cole (2001, p.195) raised the concern that discourse analysis ‘risk 
degenerating into a confusing set of episodic narratives that cannot be put 
together’. 
In spite of the shortcomings listed above, discourse analysis is still an 
effective instrument in exploring the rationales and power-relations behind 
different players involved in the inner city regeneration projects. It is argued 
by Foucault (1980b) that language plays an instrumental role in establishing 
‘Regimes of Truth’ which determines the formations of social problems as 
well as their solutions that are acceptable. A study of language can provide 
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‘significant insights that are not always evident from other research 
methodologies’ (Jacobs, 2006, pp. 40). Connolly (1983, p.1) argued that ‘the 
language of politics is an institutionalised structure of meaning that channels 
political thoughts or actions in certain directions’. Discourse analysis has 
been employed by Skillington (1998) as an instrument to study inner city 
development projects in Dublin and it was argued that ‘symbolic and 
referential discourses have created an insular hegemonic paradigm that 
promotes a tight demarcation of public and private space, thereby making it 
difficult to establish progressive or alternative visions of urban renewal’ 
(Jacobs, 2006, pp. 43)  
In conducting the discourse analysis, Fairclough (1992a, 1995) provided a 
three-layer framework (Jacobs, 2006, pp. 41)  
-Text analysis: Studying the structure of the text, vocabulary and grammar 
cohesion;  
-Discursive practice: Analysing the process in which texts are framed, I.E, the 
context in which statements are made and feed into other debates;  
-Social Practice: Relating the discourse to wider power structures and 
ideology.  
3.6 SUMMARY 
This research adopts a cross-national comparative perspective and use case 
study as the major research methodology. The selected British case study is 
the KNDC and the KHMRI in in Liverpool and the Chinese case study is the 
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Drum Tower Muslim District regeneration in Xi’an. Both cases provide unique 
opportunities for observing the social dynamics and interactions between 
different players in urban regeneration practices. Research methods include 
literature review, semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE EVOLUTION OF 
URBAN REGENERATION IN THE UK 
SINCE 1945 
In the first part of this chapter the major features of the UK are outlined and 
the socio-economic and political changes since 1945 are reviewed. In the 
second part the evolution of the concept of Urban Regeneration policies and 
practices in the UK are introduced. 
4.1 MAJOR FEATURES OF THE UK  
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland locates to the 
North-western coast of continental Europe and consists of the island of Great 
Britain, the North-East part of the island of Ireland and some smaller islands. 
With a total territorial area of 2430,610 km2 and a population of around 62.3 
million in 2010 (ONS, 2010), it ranks the sixth-largest economy in the world 
and the third largest in EU by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Service 
sector accounts for around 70% of the national GDP in 2006.  
The United Kingdom consists four countries: England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, of which the last three have their own devolved 
administrations. The politics of United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy 
with a parliamentary government. Instead of a having a codified constitution, 
much of Britain’s constitution is written down in the form of Acts of Parliament, 
secondary legislation, charters, judge-made case law and international 
treaties, etc. The UK parliament has the political power to change almost all 
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the components of the constitution by passing Acts of Parliament, yet no law 
passed by one parliament can be exempted from modifications imposed by 
the future parliament.  
The parliament of the UK has the House of Commons with democratically 
elected MPs and the appointed House of Lords. Elections of councilors and 
MPs in the UK adopt a First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) voting method, which is 
also known as the ‘winner-takes-all’ or ‘simple plurality’. Normally the 
candidate with the highest number, not necessarily a majority, of votes is 
elected when there is only one vacancy. When there are more than one 
vacancy, the positions are filled by candidates in a order of the highest votes. 
There are three major political parties in the UK: Labour Party, the 
Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats, of which the last one is 
comparatively new (formed in 1988) and had never been form the 
government independently. Besides, there are also some small parties such 
as Scottish National Party, Green Party and UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
etc. The head of the UK government (prime minister) is separated from the 
head of the country (the monarch) and is usually undertaken by the leader of 
the party that has won the majority seats in the parliament (Over 50%). The 
parliament holds the power to defeat the government with a ‘motion of no 
confidence’.  
With a territorial area of 130,395 km2, England accounts for around half of the 
total area of the UK and accommodates over 80% of the British population. It 
is by far the largest economy among the four countries. Unlike Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, England does not have a devolved parliament 
and is directly ruled in almost all matters by the UK government through 
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different departments and the regional offices.  
4.2 ECONOMIC CHANGES  
The internal and external economic situation for Britain has experienced 
several major changes over the period since the World War II, so did the 
dominant ideology and rationales behind the formulation of economic policies. 
Immediately after the WWII, UK faced extremely difficult economic situations. 
The country was suffering great losses in population, industrial basis, 
housing stock and foreign exchange reserves. The post-war revitalization of 
the UK was triggered by the Marshall Plan, a Europe Recovery program 
based on the US aid with the belief that a prospering Europe is in the interest 
of the U.S. Rising from the 1930, Keynesianism became the orthodox for the 
formulation of British economic policies from the late 1940s to the early 
1970s, when priority was given to maintaining full employment through 
demand management and direct state intervention. Against such a 
background, the Labour government (1945-1950) nationalized some key 
industrial departments ranging from finance, energy, telecommunication, 
transportation and heavy industries while adopted highly interventionism 
approaches for those remained in the private hands (Broadberry, 2008, in 
Hollowell (eds), 2008). Although under the Conservative government 
(1951-1964), some of the previously nationalized industries such as steel and 
road haulage were denationalized from 1953 and competition was 
encouraged, state owned industries were still in a dominant position and the 
interventionism remained strong.  
Generally the 1950s and 1960s saw great progress in the British economy 
with comparatively high productivity and low unemployment and inflation 
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rates. The welfare state that was put in place since the late 1940s by the 
Labour government also experienced its ‘Golden Age’ as the Conservative 
(1951-1964) continued Labour’s policies such as the high-level public 
expenditures and high proportion of state economic entities, in preventing 
poverty and low payment. Although long-term and large-scale unemployment 
as was experienced in the 1980s and the associated social changes were not 
envisaged (Fawcett, H., 2008), the efficiency and sustainability of the welfare 
state were questioned by politicians and scholars linked to the ‘New Right’ in 
the middle 1960s. Welfare state policy was not only accused for consuming a 
large proportion of public expenditures that come directly from taxation, but 
also thought to have cultivated a culture of dependency (Broadberry, 2008, in 
Hollowell (eds.), 2008).  
The British economy was seriously affect by the first oil shock in 1973 and 
suffered great inflation pressures and large payment deficit in the early 1970s. 
One of the significant consequences was the abandonment of the Keynesian 
system that has been playing a dominant role for around three decades since 
the 1940s focusing on maintaining full employment through demand 
management. The swinging took place partly due to the fact that the inflation 
and deficit was pushed up by Keynesian policies such as expansionary fiscal 
policies since the early 1970s endeavoring to lower unemployment rate. 
However, it was not easy for policy makers from both Labour and 
Conservatives to turn away from the welfare state policy due to pressures 
form the then strong unions. The dramatic depreciation in 1976 led to 
borrowing from International Monetary Fund (IMF) at the expense of tough 
deflation conditions which made the unemployment even worse in short term. 
With the inflation continued to rise, a limit for wage increase was put in place 
by the Labour government, which led to a series of strikes and was 
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undermined by the second oil shock in 1979. 
The Conservative party was elected into office in 1979 and remained in 
power until 1997, with Margaret Thatcher as the prime minister for the first 11 
years until 1990. The 1980s inherited the high inflation and unemployment 
from the 1970s and saw a tide of deindustrialization driven by 
containerization and globalization and the decline of many cities in Britain’s 
former industrial heartlands, especially in the North England. Economic 
policies under the conservative changed consistently yet were with 
unexpected continuity and coherence. One of the major features of the 
Conservative’s economic policy was its commitment to restraining inflation 
with instruments ranging from money generated from the North Sea oil, 
squeezing on public spending and imposing restrictions on the rise of wage 
and connecting pensions to prices rather than incomes. Another significant 
feature of the Thatcherism economic policy was the privatization. Thatcher 
was committed to limit the state intervention as ‘it created more problems 
than it solved’ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009, pp. 40). One of the privatization 
initiatives that had profound impacts on the British’s lives was the ‘right to 
buy’, which was passed as a component of the Housing Act 1980 and 
enabled council tenants to get access to home ownership through acquiring 
their council house at a discounted price. Although the privatization has 
paved the way for the economic recovery since the late 1980s, some of the 
initiatives such as privatization of British Rail in 1994, the British Gas in1986 
and devolution (1985) and privatization (1995) of the bus services seems to 
be too radical from today’s perspective, as it makes it very hard for the 
government to use public transport system as a effective tool in mitigating the 
increase of private car use.  
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Economic policies under the Conservative government of John Major 
(1990-1997) remained largely consistent to that of his predecessor, so did 
that under the Labour Party of Tony Blair since 1997. Fundamentally, ‘New 
Labour has accepted that there is simply no alternative to the Neoliberal 
orthodoxy’ (Hay and Watson 1999: 150) and the ‘Old Labour was wrong 
while Mrs Thatcher was right’ (Driver and Martell, 2006, pp. 73). By the end of 
the 2000s, both ‘right’ and ‘left’ had reached a consensus to some extent that 
‘large social security systems are unsustainable and need to be retrenched’ 
(Fawcett, H, 2008). For one thing, globalization has made capital increasingly 
mobile and demands to some extent are no longer manageable by the state 
(Bevir, 2005). To cope with the international competition, public funding 
needs to be spent in a more productive way, i.e. to make the economy more 
attractive to footloose investors. For another thing, it was economically 
unviable to maintain the demand through government intervention as ‘budget 
deficit manipulation only disturbs the natural rhythms of the economy, and all 
government debt eventually becomes monetized and contributes to the 
inflation’ (Hutton, 2003b: 116). 
One of the major features of the New Labour’s economic policies was that it 
followed a ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1998, 2000) philosophy in connecting 
economic efficiency with social justice. In response to socio-economic 
changes in the British society since the late 1990s, New Labour combined 
neoliberalism with the revival of civil society and viewed the state as a 
enabler to ‘promote civic activism and endorse engagement with the 
voluntary and community sector to address society’s needs’ (Haugh and 
Kitson, 2007, pp. 983). Compared with the Conservatives, New Labour 
moved away from the belief that private ownership was the only alternative to 
state ownership. Alternatively, it combined elements from both neoliberalism 
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and socialism and adopted a middle road between the Old Labour’s state 
interventionism and the Thatcherism’s prioritization of free market. Since 
1997, the ‘Third Sector’, which was defined as ‘business with primarily social 
objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the 
business or community’ (Office of the Third Sector, 2006A, p. 10), has 
received great support from the government (Kendall and Almond, 1999) and 
since played a increasingly important role in Britain’s economic, social and 
political life.  
New Labour saw the third sector as an active agent of change for the public 
sector and an important source of knowledge of the needs of users (Haugh, 
H. and Kitson, M., 2007). The ‘Social Enterprise’ was an important form of the 
‘third sector’ and was heavily funded by New Labour’s New Deal for 
Community program with the aim of helping extend the role of market in 
public sectors. Sharing the same characteristics with ‘non-profit’ 
organizations in pursuing positive social objectives rather than monetary 
profits, social enterprises under New Labour were defined as: ‘any private 
activity conducted in the public interest, organized with an entrepreneurial 
strategy but whose main purpose is not the maximization of profit but the 
attainment of certain economic and social goals, and which has a capacity of 
bringing innovative solutions to the problems of social exclusion and 
unemployment’ (OECD, 1999, p. 10). 
4.3 POLITICS 
4.3.1 The Political System 
Since 1945, for most of the time Britain’s politic has been a two-party game. 
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The ‘first-past-the post’ electoral system decides that it is very difficult for the 
third party to win seats, not to mention elections. Since the World War II 
Labour party and the Conservative party held the power alternatively until 
2010, when a coalition government was formed by the Conservatives 
together with the Liberal Democrats. The Conservatives had remained in 
power for long terms respectively in the period of 1951-1964 and the 
1979-1997, while Labor under the lead of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown had 
stayed in power between 1997 and 2010. Long administration terms for both 
parties had enabled the consistency of policies and guaranteed the quality of 
implementation.  
The two parties are organized under different principles. Within the 
Conservative party, normally two candidates of the party leader will be 
selected by Conservative Members of Parliament and presented to the 
membership of the whole party for a vote following the ‘one member one 
vote’ principle. The elected leadership has a control over the policy 
formulation, construction of manifesto and the decisions on election 
strategies. While the Labour party leaders were elected by the electoral 
college, which gives Party Members, MPs/MEPs and Unions a third of the 
votes each before 2014, when the policy was abolished in favour of ‘one 
member, one vote’, and only full party members rather than trade union 
‘affiliated supporters’ will have the right to choose candidates for parliament 
and councils. Power within the Labour party was dispersed among the 
National Executive Committee (NEC), the Annual Conference, and the 
parliamentary Labour Party, of which the former two are responsible for 
formulating policies while the latter is in charge of implementation (Heffernan, 
2000). However if parliamentary leaders can gain support from the trade 
union leaders who are in procession of large block votes, then they may be 
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able to control over the conference. The Labour party had seen the ‘strongest 
and most centralized form of leadership’ under Blair, who ‘on the one hand 
encouraged the membership participation in the policy-making process while 
on the other hand ensured that the process was mediated through party 
gatekeepers who were appointed and accountable to the party leader 
(Heppel, 2013, pp.4 in Strangio, et al (eds.), 2013).  
4.3.2 Relations between the Central and Local Government  
Immediately after the war, to meet the demand of housing became an 
important issue for central government and housing delivery accordingly 
became one of the most important measures for the government to win 
support from the general public. Central government, however, had to rely on 
municipalities to accomplish the massive scale housing constructions. By 
1957, of the 2.5 million new houses flats that had been built, three quarters 
were delivered by local authorities. Indeed, the first 20 years since the end of 
the war saw high aspiration and surge in funding among British local 
authorities, which also enjoyed considerable power and freedom in 
implementing national policies. The relationship between the central and 
local government, however, has drifted away from partnership since the late 
1960s, when local authorities’ revenues were unable to cover their expanded 
functions and a reliance on the central aid has been cultivated. At the same 
time, local autonomy has been frequently overridden by the power of 
ministers and changes to the local authorities were no longer premised on 
consent but to a large extent the will of central government. Under the 
Thatcher government, it has further seen a wholesale centralization of power 
where as local authorities’ responsibilities regarding housing were 
accordingly striped away and many of the housing stock that were previously 
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owned by local government together with the management responsibilities 
were transferred to housing associations.  
Indeed since the late 1970s, both Conservatives and Labour were struggling 
with restricting local expenditures and centralizing the fiscal rights, and ‘by 
the late 1990s, no more than one fifth of total local expenditure was met by 
locally raised taxes’ (Rao, 2008, pp. 202 in Hollowell (eds.), 2008). Although 
the fiscal rights of British local government are constrained by central 
government, their power in regulating local development, which was ascribed 
by the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, was retained. Currently the 
power is exercised following the Planning and Compulsory Purchas Act 2004. 
At regional and local level, the spatial planning system consists of Regional 
Spatial Strategies (RSSs) and the Local Development Framework (LDF), of 
which the latter encompasses a collection of both compulsory and optional 
planning and development documents prepared by the local planning 
authority.  
4.4 THE EVOLUTION OF URBAN REGENERATION 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE UK 
4.4.1 Neoliberal Urbanism and its Impact on the British Urban 
Policies 
The 70s and 80s had witnessed traditional UK industrial cities declining 
dramatically in terms of manufacturing. This deindustrialization brought sharp 
increase in the numbers of long-term unemployed concentrated in 
manufactory as well as the polarisation of the economic depression in many 
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UK cities that were former manufacturing heartlands. 
The Conservatives’ swept into power in 1979 had brought sea change to the 
urban policy and regeneration in the UK. Budgets on public housing were 
slashed and privatization of the currently occupied public housing was 
encouraged through the policy of ‘right to buy’. Thatcher government 
accomplished a progressive replacement of direct public capital expenditure 
on social housing by private finance. Direct housing expenditure dropped 
from £13.1 billion in 1980 to £4.9 billion in 1996 (in 1998/99 prices). The 
share of housing expenditure in the central government's budget declined 
from 5.6% in 1980 to 1.3% in 1999. As can be seen from figure 4.1, stepping 
into the 1990s, new houses delivered by the public sector had decreased 
dramatically to an insignificant level while the private sector became the 
major supplier in the housing market. It was followed by the housing 
associations, which shared a much smaller proportion at the supply end. 
Figure4.1:	  UK	  housing	  provisions	  (Housing	  Unites)	   	  
 
Source: UK Housing Review 2010/11. 
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Generally, the shifts in the UK government policy comprise a number of 
strands (Heywood, 2011): 
1. An decline in direct housing expenditure as a proportion of government 
expenditure involving a shift from supply-side to demand-side subsidies 
(housing benefit); 
2. A move away from provision of homes by local authorities towards 
housing association, and from the provision of homes for general needs to 
provision for the most disadvantaged;  
3. A strong emphasis on the promotion of owner-occupation for all but the 
most disadvantaged and an overall shift away from the provision of new 
public/social housing in favor of private homes mainly for 
owner-occupation. 
Central to this change of policy was the idea “urban entrepreneurialism” in 
which greater emphasis was placed on the private sector. Indeed, from the 
1980s, the government formed its urban polices based on the belief that the 
marketization was the only way to deliver equitable and efficient solutions to 
urban problems (Nevin et al.,1997). Moreover, urban regeneration policies 
placed a strong emphasis on property-led initiatives and the creation of an 
entrepreneurial culture (Hall and Hubbard 1996; 1998). Borrowing 
experiences from the U.S, public-private partnerships became another key 
characteristic of the Thatcherism urban regeneration policies during the 
1980s (Harding 1990). ‘The main role for the public sector was to attract and 
accommodate the requirements of private investors without unduly influence 
of their development decisions’ (Tallon, 2013, pp.46). The central -local 
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relationship was also restructured through the introduction of five processes:  
Table	   4.1:	   Five	   processes	   of	   restructuring	   the	   relationship	   between	  
central	  and	  local	  government.	  
1. Displacement involving the transfer of powers to non-elected agencies, 
thereby by passing the perceived bureaucracy and obstructiveness of local 
authorities. 
2. Deregulation, involving a reduction in local authorities’ planning controls 
to encourage property-led regeneration (Enterprise Zones). 
3. The encouragement of partnership between central government and the 
private sector. 
4. Privatization, incorporating the ‘contracting out’ of selected local 
government services, housing tenure diversification and provision for 
schools to ‘opt out’ of local education authority control. 
5. Centralization of powers through a range of Quangos 
(Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations). 
Source: Pacione, 2005, P.178 
Behind the changing urban policies was the government’s belief that ‘local 
authorities are incapable of leading the recovery of their cities and is 
gradually stripping off a wide range of their powers in finance, housing, 
education, social services, planning and economic development’ (Parkinson 
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and Evans 1990, P.65-66). ‘Wealth creation replaced the distribution of 
welfare as the aim of urban policy and efficiency was favoured as opposed to 
equity’ (Tallon, 2013, P.49). 
4.4.2 Urban Regeneration Policies  
Being informed by the modernist philosophies, planning and urban 
construction during this period was characterised by the introduction of 
modernist architectural styles, functional zonings, the development of tower 
blocks and shopping centres. On the one hand, the massive scale of the 
developments and constructions helped to accommodate people that 
desperately need decent housing with basic facilities. Furthermore, between 
1955 and 1974, around 1.2 million dwellings were demolished during the 
Slum Clearance which resulted in a need to re-house 3.1 million people 
(Tallon, 2013). On the other hand, these local authority-led strategies raised 
several issues. The first one is the compatibility of new buildings within 
existing urban fabrics, as it was criticized that the modern buildings, such as 
poorly designed inner-city commercial complexities, often show no respect to 
the surrounding environment. Moreover, the former businesses and residents 
were displaced by Compulsory Purchase Orders and had to pay higher living 
costs if taking rents and transportation fees into account. Secondly, the 
post-war urban planning was featured with demolition, clearance and 
redevelopment at a large scale yet with little understanding of the 
consequences. It is often accompanied with demolition of old 
neighbourhoods and the creation of spatial concentration of socially and 
economically disadvantaged people in the council houses. 
Those living in deprived areas were often separated from proper services 
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such as education, health care as well as social security provision. Many of 
the residents choose to leave council housing in deprived communities once 
they can afford houses in more prosperous communities with high quality 
services and low crime rates. Consequently, the vacant properties would be 
filled by other disadvantaged people, which led to further issues of local 
disadvantage (Atkinson and Moon, 1994a). Helping the poor together with 
mitigating the growing fear of social unrest thus became the major concern of 
the urban policies.  
The concept of ‘Urban Regeneration’ emerged in the 1960s as a reaction to 
urban decline. The term has been used together with a number of other 
phrases such as urban revitalization, urban redevelopment, urban renewal 
and urban renaissance by government, media or academics to characterize a 
similar process, as is defined by Roberts ( 2000, p.17) 
“A comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to 
the resolution of urban problems and seeks to bring about a lasting 
improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental 
conditions of an area that has been subject to change”. 
Revitalization goes beyond restricting the physical fabric and focused on 
conservation and preservation of historically important buildings and 
rehabilitating buildings in deteriorating conditions while redevelopment is 
usually pushed forward by profit-oriented private sectors that treat the dealing 
with minority groups and lower income as a tactical compromise rather than a 
strategic goal (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983). Thus the process is based with 
scarce inner city land resources and is business- dominated. It is always 
seen the social linages that support community and small local business 
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been destroyed by such a way of development. 
Urban renewal mainly refers to the physical change in the use of land or 
buildings stemming from prevailing economic forces (Public Affaris 
Committee, 2010). It is described as actions that rebuild the city, clear away 
vacant sites and obsolete buildings and produce new building design and 
forms (Healey, et al., 1992) It may involve different parties yet is not 
comprehensive and proactive enough to facilitate neighbourhood growth. 
(Tang, et al, 2011) 
Urban Regeneration represented a more careful, sensitive, harmonious 
development that adopts means such conservation and rehabilitation, re-use 
and new development (Wise, 1985). Turok (2005, P.57) gave three 
distinctive characteristics to current urban regeneration programs: 
"1. It is intended to change the nature of a place and in the process to 
involve the community and other actors with a stake in its future. 
2. It embraces multiple objectives and activities that cut across the main 
functional responsibilities of central government, depending on the area’s 
particular problems and potential. 
3. It usually involves some form of partnership working amongst different 
stakeholders, although the form of partnership can vary. 
After the World Commission on Environment and Development released its 
report, Our Common Future, about sustainable development in 1987, Urban 
Regeneration became a jargon that implies multi-dimensional urban 
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revitalization (Healey, 1991) with an emphasis on maintaining the continuity 
as well as history and natural embedded within the community (Lynch,1981). 
The scope of urban regeneration goes beyond revitalization of old structures 
and consists of “radical urban rebirth” and “sustainable self-renewal” as its 
final goal (Furbey, 1999).  Couch (1990) states that while urban renewal is a 
process of physical change mainly led by government or states, urban 
regeneration represents a wider process within which the state or local 
community seek to attract investment, employment, consumption going back 
to an urban area and improvement the quality of urban life (Couch, 1990). 
Regeneration also aims to improve the appearance of a place so as to attract 
people and business. At personal level, regeneration aims to enhance 
individual skills, capacities and provide them with opportunities so as to 
enable them to participate and benefit from the process (Turok, 2005). It tries 
to get a balance between social, economic and environmental elements. 
(Turok, 2005) 
With the passing of the Local Government Grants (Social Need) Act as well 
as the following Urban Aid Programme4, urban regeneration models were 
introduced from the US as an explicit strategy which initiated four decades of 
continuous central government intervention in urban affairs (Johnstone and 
                                            
 
 
4The Urban Aid Programme was launched in 1969 by the First Wilson Government to provide 
community and family advice centers for the elderly, money for schools and other services, thereby 
alleviating urban deprivation. 
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Whitehead 2004b). During this phase, the emphasis of Urban Programmes 
was on small-scale community projects and social schemes (Atkinson and 
Moon, 1994b; Cullingworth and Nadin, 2006). Even given the changes, what 
specifically constitute deprivation and what issues should be addressed by 
the proposed projects still remained unclear. Subsequently, the second 
generation of key area-based policies were the Community Development 
Projects5, which were action-based research projects. This policy promoted a 
way of examining the poverty, which could result in changes within the 
economic, educational and housing markets allied to the weak bargaining 
position of the poor (Atkinson and Moon 1994b). Moreover, the Inner Area 
Studies6 (1977) arrived at similar conclusions to that of the Community 
Development Projects in terms of developing the argument that the root 
cause of deprivation was the poverty of the residents. Moreover, the 
inadequate social security provision for disadvantaged groups resulted in low 
personal incomes and reduced the chance of social mobility. 
                                            
 
 
5Community Development Projects (CDPs) were set up in areas with high levels of deprivation to 
encourage self-help and participation by local residents in order to improve their communication and 
access to local government, together with improving the provision of local services. 
6 In 1977 three major Inner Area Studies were completed, analysing in detail the nature of inner area 
problems in Birmingham, Lambeth and Liverpool. 
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4.4.3 Urban Regeneration Programs and the Area Based 
Initiatives (ABIs)  
4.4.3.1 Urban Regeneration Programs before the 1990s 
From 1945 to the middle 1960s, the lack of housing provision combined with 
poor quality of existing properties, urban sprawl, and urban blight were 
tackled largely through public funded projects such as ‘Comprehensive 
Redevelopment’, ‘Slum Clearance’, ‘Urban Area Renewal’ and ‘City 
Revitalization’ (Wise, 1985). Generally these programmes were criticised for 
the lack of public participation, over reliance on the property-led regeneration, 
over emphasis on profit generate and insensitivity to local needs (Healey et 
al., 1992).  
Among the plethora of urban policies, the creation of Urban Development 
Corporations (UDCs) was the flagship urban regeneration programme of the 
Conservative government in the 1980s and 1990s in terms of amounts of 
money invested, the political and media attention received, and the extent to 
which they embodied the ideology of New Right (Anderson, 1990) 
Table	  4.2:	  The	  UDCs	  
The UDCs were government agencies or Quangos, implanted directly in 
designated areas where they are responsible to regenerate. They were run 
by appointed boards consisting largely of representatives from the local 
business community and typically exhibited little representation from the 
local resident community. They aimed to encourage the private sector back 
to run-down inner city areas through a market-oriented and property-led 
approach. UDCs were given substantial power to achieve these aims, 
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including to acquire, hold, manage, reclaim and dispose land and other 
property; carry out building and other operations; enhance the environment; 
seek to ensure the provision of water, electricity, gas, sewerage and other 
services; provide a transport infrastructure; carry out any businesses or 
undertakings for the purpose of the objective of urban regeneration; and 
provide financial incentives for the private sector. 
 Source: Imrie and Thomas,1999 
With the nature of negating local democratic accountability, it was hoped that 
UDCs would facilitate redevelopment swiftly. The total 12 UDCs were 
scattered in places, including London Docklands, Merseyside, Trafford Park, 
Black Country, Teesside, Tyne and Wear, Central Manchester, Leeds, 
Sheffield, Bristol, Birmingham, Heartlands and Plymouth. Projects subject to 
the UDCs actually helped to promote the physical as well as the economic 
environment. However, the communication between the UDCs and the local 
authorities was not always smooth. Criticisms to the UDCs mainly 
concentrated on an over reliance on the property-led regeneration and 
mega-projects, the high-end nature of the housing development and the lack 
of legitimacy, community involvement as well as the natural environmental 
concerns (Imrie and Thomas 1993; 1999; Rowley, 1994). According to 
Hausner (1993, P.526), ‘an inherent weakness of approaches to regeneration 
is they are short term, fragmented, ad hoc and project-based without an 
overall strategic framework for city wide development’. 
4.4.3.2 The Area Based Initiatives (ABIs)  
In the 1990s it has seen the centrally planned urban regeneration regime shift 
 112 
to a local-based cooperation containing local authorities, local organizations 
and local people (Oatley, 1995). Policy-making began to focus on community 
engagement in regeneration. An emphasis on multi-sectorial partnerships 
emerged during the 1990s and the rediscovery of community became the 
main characteristic of the urban regeneration policies. This was a result of a 
growing realization that the local community in the regenerated area had 
obtained few benefits from the property-led regeneration as the anticipated 
‘trickle down’ process seldom happens. In practice, this change of direction 
was embedded by two flagship-programs: the City Challenge7 and the Single 
Regeneration Budget8 (SRB) Here, communities were given central role in 
the competition for the allocation of urban regeneration resource. Indeed, to 
successfully bid for the regeneration funding, the coalition of local 
government, private sector and local communities were expected to 
demonstrate that the project can lever in extra private sector investment, add 
value to current public-private investment, stimulate wealth and an enterprise 
culture and widen social provision, benefit the local community, improve the 
quality of life and create long-lasting multi-level partnerships (Oatley and 
Lambert, 1998). After two rounds’ biding benefiting 31 areas, the City 
Challenge was replaced by the SRB, which consisted of six rounds of bidding 
                                            
 
 
7 Started in 1991, City Challenge innovatively introduced competition as the methods of allocating 
regeneration funding.  
8 The SRB was launched in 1994 with a core principle that local people should be engaged in and 
benefit from regeneration.  
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between 1994 and 2000 and funded 1027 schemes with £26 billion in total. 
Overall, SRB funding accounted for only 22 per cent of the total expenditure 
with the other 78 per cent coming from local authorities, Training and 
Enterprise Councils, the voluntary and private sectors and European funding 
(CLG, 2007d) According to the evaluation by (CLG, 2007b), SRB contributes 
to improving the household income, employment level, perceptions of 
security, satisfaction with the housing and the physical environment, 
community cohesion and social capital. Criticisms of the SRB are mainly 
focused on three issues: finances available for urban regeneration; the real 
extent of community participation in the regeneration projects; and the 
co-ordination of urban policy (Tallon, 2013). Between 1990 and 1996 urban 
funding was cut by 40%. Due to the uneven distribution of power and 
resources, community participation in the City Challenge and SRB schemes 
were largely manipulated. Although the City Challenge and SRB brought the 
former 20 programs together, introduced some organizational changes and 
brought local authorities back onto the stage, urban regeneration policies at 
different levels of governance remained fragmented and confusing (Atkinson, 
2004) 
New Labour returned to the power in 1997. The urban regeneration policies 
under the Blair government was mainly defined by two key policy documents: 
the Towards an Urban Renaissance (Urban Task Force, 1999) and Bringing 
Britain Together: A national strategy for neighbourhood renewal (Social 
Exclusion Unit,1998). In the Towards an Urban Renaissance, it was believed 
that inner city areas should be more attractive so that people will choose to 
live within it. Urban-Regeneration-Companies (UDCs) were proposed to be 
set up by local authorities, hosing associations, private developers, local 
community representatives and the Regional Development Agencies. Three 
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pilot Urban Regeneration Companies were firstly established in Liverpool, 
Manchester and Sheffield. Generally the Towards an Urban Renaissance 
aimed at improving the quality of a city or town as a whole rather than 
emphasising on particular area based actions. Many design principles and 
measures proposed in it still function in today’s UK city regeneration 
programs, among which public participation is particularly emphasised as a 
useful way to improving the design quality. The Bring Britain Together: A 
national strategy for neighbourhood renewal, on the other hand, focuses on 
the problems of people in the most deprived neighbourhoods. It firstly review 
a number of lessons learned from the past, as is criticised:  
‘Often huge sums of money have been spent on repairing buildings and 
giving estates a new coat of paint, but without matching investment in 
skills, education and opportunities for the people who live there’ (Social 
Exclusion Unit 1998, Foreword by the Prime Minister).  
However, Cameron (2001) pointed out that: 
‘although the switch from bricks and mortar to people-focused action was 
carried through, it was largely achieved through a further proliferation of 
special zones and funding programmes such as New Deal for 
Communities, which is heavily funded but concentrated on a few very 
small areas but also a wide range of special-purpose zones’ (Cameron, 
2001,p.4).  
The Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy Action Plan: A New Commitment to 
the Neighbourhood Renewal: National Strategy Action Plan(Social Exclusion 
Unit, 2001) represented that the policy focus has shifted from the area-based 
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special funding initiatives to mainstream public services delivering targets for 
improvement in the most deprived neighbourhoods, and from the ‘challenge 
funding’ approach in which local areas competed for funding—extensively 
used in the area-based programs of the Conservative government towards a 
‘contract’ approach (Cameron, 2001,p.6). The local Strategic Partnership 
(LSP), which was essential to the development of the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Strategy, was set to bring together local stakeholders from public, 
voluntary and private sectors and provide a vision and strategy for the 
development and regeneration of the area and a framework within which 
other programmes wand partnerships will operate at the more local level. 
Being different from the earlier attempts, New Labour’s Area Based Initiatives 
(ABIs), including Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) (5th and 6thround), New 
Deal for Community (NDC), Sure Start9, and Employment, Education and 
Health Action Zones, were co-ordinated by the Social Exclusion Unit and the 
eighteen Policy Action Teams (PATs) (Chatterton and Bradley, 2000). 
Working within such a framework, practitioners, academicians and residents 
from deprived neighbourhoods were brought together to collectively address 
issues such as unemployment, neighbourhood management, derelict 
housing, anti-social behaviour and community self-help. Additionally, nine 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) were established in 1999 to 
                                            
 
 
9Sure Start was launched in 1998, with the aim of "giving children the best possible start in life" through 
improvement of childcare, early education, health and family support. 
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develop a regional strategy to tackle the urban problems. Further, in 2000 the 
Indices of Multiple Deprivation were introduced. A number of indicators such 
as income, chronic unemployment rates, education, skills and training, crime 
and living environment were selected to measure the deprivation level of a 
small areas and help to target communities and small areas most in need.  
In practice, the SRB project was retained for three years in spite of some 
refocusing. The publication of Towards an Urban Renaissance (Urban Task 
force 1999) and the Urban White Paper 2010 (DETR 2000a) set out the 
strategy for achieving an urban renaissance for the first time in 23 years. It 
was backed up by £1 billion government investment in urban areas. 
Meanwhile, the 2000 Urban White paper placed more accents on 
architectural aesthetics and planning design, while urban poverty and 
disadvantage are no longer the major concern of urban policies (Lees 2003a; 
2003b; Hoskins and Tallon, 2004). The SRB was ceased in 2007 due to the 
shortage of replacement funding. In the final review, it was clearly 
emphasised that the priority of the SRB was to enhance the involvement of 
the private sector in local urban regeneration (CLG, 2007). 
One of the flagship regeneration projects under New Labour was the New 
Deal for Communities (NDC) initiated in 1998 to eliminate competition and 
give long-term grants (up to £2 billion been distributed in 10 years) to 
community-based partnerships. The initiatives helped to regenerate the 39 
most deprived neighbourhoods the UK from 6 aspects, which are 
respectively unemployment, health, education, crime and community safety 
and housing and environment. 
Another key regeneration program of New Labour was the Housing Market 
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Renewal Initiatives (HMRI) initiated in 2002 and operated in the selected 9 
North and Midland Pathfinder areas with failed housing markets and low 
housing demands. The programs were initiated to curb the consistent falling 
housing prices in the area and reconnect the area to the demands from the 
main stream housing market. The major means it used was to demolish the 
terraced houses in the selected areas and replaced them with new buildings. 
The nine Pathfinder areas were: Birmingham/Sandwell, East Lancashire, Hull 
and East Ridging, Manchester/ Salford, Merseyside, Newcastle/Gateshead, 
North Staffordshire, Oldham/ Rochdale and South Yorkshire. It was planned 
to be a 15-year program with an initial funding support of £1.2 billion between 
2002 and 2008. There was a further £1billion channelled in from 2008 to 
2011.  
4.6 THE DELIVERY MECHANISM OF REGENERATION 
PROJECTS IN THE UK  
The planning system in the UK has two major characteristics. On the one 
hand, it is strongly based in local government, which holds a considerable 
discretionary power in guiding and regulating local development. One the 
other hand, the British Central government plays a significant role in 
preparing national guidance, which is now known as the National Planning 
Policy Framework (NPPF)–a replacement to the former national and regional 
guidelines such as Planning Policy Guidelines (PPGs) and Regional Planning 
Guidance (RPGs). The latest trend in the UK is to further devolve planning 
power to local level, which is realized through the Neighbourhood Planning 
with its statutory identity given in the 2011 Localism Act.  
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The current landscape of the British urban planning system is complex and 
fragmented due to the devolution of power to the national assemblies of 
Scotland and Welsh, both of which have their own system of planning policy 
guidance. The Central government’s planning guidance is therefore mainly 
prepared for England, where local authorities produce the Local 
Development Framework-a statutory planning document in guiding local 
development affaires. 
Regarding specific development project, planning proposals are usually 
submitted to local planning authorities by the private sectors or individual 
property owners. Planning officers will then produce an evaluation document 
with their discretionary judgements and recommendations. The planning 
committee composed by councillors holds the power of granting permissions 
to or rejecting the proposal while the applicants together with local people 
who are potentially to be affected by the planning decisions have the right to 
appeal to central government when they are dissatisfied with the outcomes. 
Once an appeal is made, an inspector from central government will be sent to 
re-evaluate the planning proposal and to make the final decision. The 
applicant as well as those who will be affected, however, still holds the right 
to make the case a lawsuit if they are still unconvinced.  
For local authorities, the planning gains are mainly realized through the 
Sections 106 Agreement, which allows private sectors to make concessions 
in return for the planning permissions during the bargaining process. The 
system is greatly different from regulatory systems, such as zoning, that are 
prevailing in the U.S and China. The Section 106 is often accused for lacking 
transparency, causing delays and contributing to uncertainties.  
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4.7 CONCLUSION  
In the first part of this chapter, some major features of the UK are depicted. It 
then moves on to examine the evolution of British regeneration policies since 
the World War II. Special attention was given to the shifting rationales behind 
urban regeneration initiatives and New Labour’s Area-based Initiatives.  
It is found that the economic and political changes in the UK had a significant 
impact on the evolution of urban regeneration policies. Against the 
background of globalization and deindustrialization in the 1970s, both the 
‘left’ and the ‘right’ reached a consensus on the unsustainability of large 
social security systems and it has seen national polices gradually drifted 
away from Keynesianism and the welfare housing system was reformed 
through marketization under the Thatcher government. ‘Urban 
entrepreneurialism’ later became the predominant ideology in the formation 
of urban policies and the relationship between the central and local 
government was accordingly restructured with an emphasis on the 
central-local partnership and the role played by private sectors. New Labour 
considered ‘Social Enterprises’ as one of the most important vehicles for 
delivering its economic and social targets, which to some extent camouflages 
its intention for the centralization of power.  
The factors listed above together set the context for the evolution of British 
urban regeneration polices. There were numerous regeneration initiatives 
implemented in the UK. With a changing understanding of the causes for 
deprivation, it has seen British regeneration policies shifted away from 
physical-regeneration centric since the 1990s. In New Labour’s flagship 
regeneration policy- The New Deal for Communities, social regeneration was 
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attached with great significance. Greater emphasis was also given to public 
participation in New Labour’s regeneration initiatives.  
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CHAPTER 5 THE EVOLUTION OF 
URBAN REGENERATION IN CHINA 
SINCE 1949 
In the first part of this chapter the major features of China are depicted and 
the political and socio-economic changes since 1949 are reviewed. It then 
moves on to introduce the evolution of urban regeneration policies and 
practices in China over the past half-century.  
5.1 MAJOR FEATURES OF CHINA  
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) locates in East Asia with a territorial 
area of around 9.6 million km2, which makes it the second-largest country by 
land. With over 1.35 billion population, it is the world’s most populous country. 
Although in 2011 China became the second largest economy, the real GDP 
per capita of in 2013 only ranks the 93rd, far behind that of the UK (the 21st) 
(IMF, 2013). In China, tertiary industry accounts for less than half of (46%) of 
the total GDP, only slightly higher than that of the secondary industry (NBSC, 
2013). 
At subnational level, China is divided into 22 provinces, five ethnic minority 
autonomous regions, four direct controlled municipalities and two special 
administrative regions. Taiwan is also claimed to be part of the country, 
although it is temporarily governed by a separated political entity due to 
historical reasons. Excepting for Taiwan and the two special administrative 
regions- Hong Kong and Macao, the rest of China is usually called as 
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Mainland China. The PRC is one of the few countries today that still claims 
socialism as its orthodox ideology and it is a single-party state ruled by the 
Communist Party of China (CPC). The country’s polity is ‘National People’s 
Congress’ (NPC), which theoretically holds the power of legislation, to 
supervise the operation of the government and to elect the key officials of the 
government. However, in practice such a one-party leadership more than 
often makes it a ‘rubber stamp’ for legitimizing the decisions that were 
premade by the government. The CPC is organized following the Leninist 
principle of ‘democratic centralism’. The highest body of the CPC is the 
National Congress held every five years, and the Central Committee is 
instead the highest body when the former is not in session. Most of the 
powers and duties of the committee are further centralized to the Politburo 
and its Standing Committee chaired by the leader of the party, who is also the 
president of the state and holds both military power and the office of General 
Secretary in dealing with the party-related affairs. The premier, normally one 
of the high-ranking members from the standing committee of the Politburo, is 
the head of the government, presiding the State Council composed by four 
vice premiers and the heads of ministries and commissions. Excepting for the 
CPC, there are eight small political parties without real power but serving only 
consultative roles in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC). 
Contemporarily in China, the economic power is highly decentralized to local 
level. Governments of the provinces, autonomous regions, direct controlled 
municipalities, special administrative regions and cities all enjoy a 
comparatively high-degree autonomous right as long as their social, 
economic and political policies are consistent with that of the central. 
However, central government retains a tight control of the nomination and 
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removal of local cadres and legitimate rights in making national policies and 
granting permissions for strategically important spatial plans, projects and 
industries.  
5.2 ECONOMIC CHANGES 
The Communist Party (CCP) won the civil war (1945-1949) against the 
Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP) and found People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
in 1949. The first 30 years of the post war period saw an economically and 
politically enclosed China with ‘command economy’ (Naughton, 2007). The 
command system, ‘through central planning, centralized budgetary 
processes, and state monopoly over the production and distribution systems, 
rendered all economic activities being state-managed’ (Mantzopoulos and 
Shen, 2011, pp.250). Since 1951 the CPC accelerated it pace in taking 
control over all means of production and distribution of goods and services 
following a socialist ideology. The process began with the land reform in rural 
areas between 1951 and 1952 together with the campaign against 
‘counter-revolutionaries’, of which the former was mainly about forcefully 
depriving land and properties from their previous owners and redistribute 
them to impoverished peasants in return for their support. By 1955 “the 
foundation of the regime had been consolidated” (MacFarquhar, 1974, P. 16). 
The state then moved on to the socialist transformation of non-agriculture 
sectors between 1955 and 1957. Capitalism industries, businesses and 
bourgeois were the major targets of the political movement, by the end of 
which the majority of the secondary and tertiary economic sectors were 
nationalized. Since then market economy was progressively curtailed and the 
state began to hold a panoramic control of the production. ‘Producers 
depended on the state to dictate to them as to what, when, where, and how 
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much to invest, produce, and deliver, while consumers were limited to how 
much of what each person was permitted to purchase per specified time 
period’ (Mantzopoulos and Shen, 2011, pp.250) The state was thus able to 
mobilize enormous resources to support the post-war recovery. By the end of 
the first Five-Year Plan (FYP) 1953-1957, with the help from the former 
Soviet Union, the foundation of Chinese modern industry was preliminarily 
established. Between 1958 and 1960, the PRC further controlled rural 
economy through a series of socialism policies, including the Hukou system, 
the establishment of Commune, the unified purchase and sale system and 
restrictions on commercial activities. The Hukou system is an 
identity-registration system that not only records the socio-economic eligibility 
and residential location of the Chinese People but also categorized them into 
‘Agricultural’ and ‘Non-Agricultural’ groups. While people in the former 
category were legitimized to get access to land as the means of production, 
only Non-Agricultural identity could guarantee the holder a job in factories 
and other non-agricultural sectors. Initially in some areas people actually had 
an opportunity to choose the Agricultural/Non-Agricultural identity and the 
later seems to be more promising because of the distribution of land 
ownership, yet it was later clear that in the following three decades surplus 
from the first industry was consistently extracted to compensate the 
development of industries. The entrenchment between ‘peasants’ and 
‘citizens’ regarding their rights and incomes continued to be enlarged and few 
venues were left for peasants to make a change of their life. The 
establishment of Commune was such a process in which the state deprived 
the land ownership through a movement from peasants who previously got 
their share of land in a similar way. And the establishment of unified purchase 
and sale system and restrictions on commercial activities in practice enabled 
the state to predominate the production and distribution of agricultural 
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products while peasants were left with little choice but working like thrall. 
However, it was later realized that eliminating private ownership had 
seriously dampened peasants’ enthusiasm for working and undermined the 
productivity. Since 1958, decentralization was also adopted by central 
government to empower provincial and municipal governments to develop 
local economy. The central government’s spending in 1958 had declined by 
14% while the figure for provincial governments increased by almost 150%, 
accounting for over half of the total government spending in the same year 
(MacFarquhar, 1983, P. 59).  
From 1958 to 1961 Mao initiated the ‘Great Leap Forward (GLF)’. It has later 
seen the ambitious targets for economic development and the aggressive 
exploitation on peasants and over-investment on heavy industries caused 
severe shortage of food, services and basic commodities in cities and 
unprecedented famine in rural areas. Population increased by 13 million 
people between 1958 and 1962, yet agricultural production decreased by 
13.9 percent in 1959 and decreased further by 11.2 percent in 1960 from the 
previous year and did not regain its 1958 production total until 1962 
(Mantzopoulos and Shen, 2011, pp. 13). It was estimated that the wrongly 
headed economic policies caused an extra death of around 40 million people 
in China between 1958 and 1961 (MacFarquhar, 1997, p. 10). The erratic 
fluctuation of population is shown in Figure 4.1.   
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Figure	  5.1	  Birth	  and	  mortality	  rates	  in	  China	  (1949	  –	  2008).	   	  
 
Source: China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
Because of the overexpansion of industrial basis, urban population had 
increased dramatically from 99 million in 1957 to 130 million in 1960, 
including around 24 million industrial workers. Due to the pressure on food 
supply, in June 1961 central government drafted a plan to reduce the urban 
population. Newly enrolled full time workers, apprentices and part time 
workers together with their Hukou were sent back to rural areas where they 
came from. A census conducted in the middle of 1964 showed that the urban 
population had shrunk dramatically to 98 million and the urbanization rate in 
China dropped by 6.3% (Liang and White, 1996).  
In 1962, realizing the devastating consequences of the Great Leap, central 
government began to review and modify its economic strategies. At the 
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Central Working Conference held in May 1962, three principles regarding the 
economic development were announced: 
1. Giving priorities to agriculture, increasing the distribution of steel and wood 
products by 13% and 16% respectively; 
2. Slashing the targets for the output from heavy industry by 5%-20%; 
3. Curtailing investment on infrastructures by 25%; 
The formerly decentralized economic powers on investment, allocation of 
resources, energy, Labour and salaries were reclaimed by central 
government and the economy had seen a steady recovery between 1962 and 
1964. From 1957 to 1964, the Chinese economic reality had demonstrated 
how bitter the consequences of state monopoly on economy could be. The 
devastating consequences had also shaken the legitimacy of the regime and 
left it with no choice but to step back to some extent. The tight control of 
peasants was later loosed and rural families were allowed to undertake 
private jobs as long as their duties for the collective have been fulfilled. The 
Commune as the basic unit of rural economy, however, was retained and 
was later transformed into collectives that were rendered with ownership of 
rural land and the rights to retain residuals from some of the rural economic 
activities, which was previously monopolized by the state in the age of the 
Commune. One of the economic policies that had a great impact on the 
urban economy was the ‘Three-line Strategy’ proposed by Mao in the middle 
of 1964. With a concern of the national security, resources were channelled 
into West-China cities that were far away from the East Coast region and 
would be less vulnerable if a war is declared against the US. A number of 
inland cities such as Xi’an and Lanzhou therefore received unprecedented 
opportunities of development, at the expense of the anemia of many 
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traditional economic centers. It once again reverted the upward momentum 
of China’s economic development after the GLF. 
The radical economic policies of the Great Leap and the devastating 
consequences almost excluded Mao from the small circle of top-tier party 
cadres. He then allied with some secondary-class cadres, including his 
ambitious wife Jiang, that were known as the ‘Gang of the Four’ and initiated 
the Cultural Revolution using his personality cult (1967-1976) among the 
general public to eliminate his political enemies and regain his power. The 
movement caused turmoil and disrupted the pace of economic recovery. The 
establishments of the PRC at municipal level were severely subverted and 
the daily operations of many institutions were severely interrupted. In many 
cities, the civil government was paralyzed because of attacks from Red 
Guards and the power was temporarily taken over by the army, which seldom 
intervened into the daily operation. Workers in factories were polarized into 
two or more factions due to the divisions of their views on the ‘Revolution’, 
and together with their allies from other institutions they attacked on each 
other violently. Similar situation could also be found in rural areas. Students 
were one of the major sources of the rebels while teachers were their targets. 
The whole society was mobilized to participate in the movement and the 
economic development was inevitably affected. Up to 1976, the average 
consumption of grain per capita was 190 kg, 7kg lower than that in 1952; in 
1978, 250 million people were still struggling under the bread line and there 
was insufficient provision of housing, education and health services (Ma, 
2002). Purchasing necessities for everyday life such as food did not only 
need money but also special vouchers that introduced to control the overall 
consumptions. The shortage of goods lasted for nearly one decade and the 
voucher system was loosened in the middle of 1980s and finally abolished in 
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1993. 
In spite of the negative consequences, during the ten years, progress has 
been made in some areas. Industries with strategic importance, such as 
national defense, energy, transportation, steel and machinery manufacture, 
were heavily invested by the state with money extracted from the first 
industry and saved from curtailing welfare and the provision of social 
products. Between 1952 and 1978, ‘industry output grew at an average 
annual rate of 11.5% and industry’s share of total GDP climbed from 18% to 
44%, while the figure for the share of agriculture declined from 51% to 28% 
(Naughton, 2007, pp. 56). Progresses were also made in research areas. 
The perception that the ‘severe economic backslide’ was solely resulted in by 
the Cultural Revolution was to some extent inaccurate.  
The Cultural Revolution ended immediately after Mao’s death in 1976 and the 
Gang of Four were detained in the same year. Hua was designated as Mao’s 
successor but soon lost the support from other senior members within the 
party for his commitment to Mao’s left-leaned policies. Actually, during the 
last few years before the end of the Cultural Revolution, a consensus had 
gradually formed within the Communist Party that the chaotic political 
movement must cease and economic development should be prioritized. 
China in the late 1970s was still an underdeveloped country and has fallen 
behind some of its Asian neighbors such as Japan and the ‘four tigers’-Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. The country was struggling with 
problems such as over-centralization, low productivity, distorted production 
relationship and ineffective administrations. Moreover, many Chinese people 
were still addicted to Mao’s socialist fantasy and capitalism and private 
ownership were deeply resented and a considerable number of cadres 
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remained vigilant to the possible erosions from the capitalism. Additionally, 
China has long been isolated both economically and politically for its ideology 
and direct confrontations with some of the western countries such as the U.S. 
For Mao’s successor, the status quo was no longer an option.  
Deng came to power in 1978 with sufficient support as well as authority to 
propel the reform and opening up - a paradigm shift he believed could find 
China a way out. The recovery of diplomatic relations with the U.S and Japan 
brought China great opportunities to develop its economy. The globalization 
and upgrading of industries in advanced countries enabled China to combine 
its abundant Labour resources with their technologies and equipment to 
accomplish the primitive accumulation. Table 4.1 shows the increasing rates 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1978 to 2008. Excepting for 1981, 
1989 and1990, the Chinese GDP growth rates remained at above 7.6% 
science 1978. The first drop in 1981 was due to the macro-economic 
adjustment to lower the risk of getting an overheated economy. The second 
sharp drop between1989 and 1990 was resulted from the Tiananmeng 
Square Incident and the consequential sanctions from the western countries. 
During this period, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has dramatically 
dropped to only $ 4 billion per year and it was followed by an estimated job 
loss of around 20 million between 1989 and 1990. From the mid-1980s, 
central government gradually loosen the tight control of development rights at 
local level and the responsibilities of promoting local economic growth thus 
fell onto the shoulders of local administrators, whose promotion was also 
based on their progress in stimulating the local economy (Wu, 2005).  
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Table	  5.1:	  The	  Growth	  of	  GDP	  in	  China	  between	  1978	  and	  2008:	  
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1988 1989 1990 
Growth 
Rate 
11.7
% 
7.6% 7.8% 5.2% 9.1% 10.9% 11.3% 4.1% 3.8% 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Growth 
Rate 
9.2% 14.2% 13.5
% 
12.6
% 
10.5
% 
10.0% 9.3% 7.8% 7.6% 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Growth 
Rate 
8.4% 8.3% 9.1% 10.0
% 
10.1
% 
10.2% 11.6% 11.9
% 
9.0% 
Source: Wu, 2005, p.362 
Since 1993, the vast market and cheap Labour force continued to attract 
international capitals into China. From 1992 to 2003, China had drawn 
$ 264.2 billion foreign investment. In 1994, township enterprises had also 
experienced fast growth and accounts for 38% of the overall GDP growth. On 
the other hand, the SOEs were suffering. In 1997, the return on invested 
capital of the state owned company was only 3.29%, and deficit existed in 18 
out of 39 industries. Developing real estate market was central to the 
economic policies in response to the Asia finical crisis and China’s high 
saving rates. Lowering the down payment rate to 30% and extending 
repayment period to 20 years had effectively released public’s potential in 
purchasing houses. The strong economic growth and booming housing 
market in China had greatly benefited the state owned companies, most of 
which are now monopolizing key upstream industries relating to energy, 
resources and crucial products for the society.  
It is worth noting here that the structural changes do not always happen in a 
top-down, command-and-do model that is pushed by the central government. 
Rather, the driven force sometimes arises from the bottom and the change of 
policies was rather reactive. For instance, it was estimated that from 1978 to 
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the first few years of the 1980s, more than 20 million young people went back 
to cities, which was accompanied by increasing unemployment and social 
unrests. To mitigate these negative consequences, small business was once 
again promoted to absorb labours and this ignited the renaissance of tertiary 
sectors in Chinese cities (Kraus, 1991).  
5.3 POLITICS 
China’s politics is unique and sometimes difficult to understand, not only for 
its opacity, but also for its complexity as a combination of elements from the 
ancient empire China, the attempts and practices to build a socialist country 
between the 1950s and 1970s and the imported conceptions and managerial 
means from western countries after 1978.  
5.3.1 Pre-1978 China as a Totalitarian Country  
The Confucianism forms the basis of Chinese culture and influences its 
political practises. China lacks the tradition of constraining and 
counterbalancing the power of the state as individual power is created and 
given by the country (Huntington, 1999). Moreover, the centralized power 
and hierarchical system in China since the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC) leaves 
little space for social organizations and municipalities to gain political 
legitimacy to counterbalance the power of the central government. Although 
local governors have a considerable freedom in handling the local affairs, 
they have to an unconditionally obey orders from the upper-level government. 
With such a tradition, the Confucianism’s internal resistances towards 
democracy was part of the reason why the one-party dominant political 
system was chosen by both the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP) and the 
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CPC when either of them obtained military advantage. In such a society, the 
dominant party does not only hold the power of government but also 
shoulders responsibilities for the people.  
The traditional concept of Chinese ‘city’ and ‘country side’ are often used for 
defining people’s behaviours rather than geographical dimension with clear 
boundaries. Rural areas and cities were governed under a combination of the 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ structures. The ancient China’s bureaucracy ends 
at town level while the vast countryside, on the other hand, was actually 
under the governance of indigenous elites, who are influential on local affairs 
and could facilitate the mutual communications. They are advocators for the 
mainstream value of the society and effectively the representatives of the 
local people (Schwartz, 2009). The Government continuously absorbed local 
elites through imperial examinations, which in turn seeds the ideological and 
symbolic-hierarchical conceptions into the local elites’ minds and so as to 
help control the whole society.  
The first 30 years since the establishment of the PRC has seen China as a 
totalitarian country with the state holding total authorities over the society and 
endeavoring to penetrate into every aspect of the public and private life (Linz, 
2000). The regime was with typical features of elitist rule (Bo, 2004), 
hierarchical institutions, ruthless measures in maintaining the domination and 
tight control of ordinary people’s public and private life. The control was 
exerted through nationalization of property rights, ideological education and 
continuous mobilization. Guo (1998, p.65) listed three traits of the classical 
totalitarian model, which well depicts the features of the pre-1978’s PRC:   
1) An official ideology or a set of convictions to which the society is to be 
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committed and everyone is supposed to adhere. The party or the state 
defines a goal for the whole society. 
2) A hierarchical and centralized single party system completely intertwined 
with the state. The dictatorial party carries out its politics not within but 
beyond the framework of the state, and in fact employs the state as tool 
to realize its goals.  
3) The exercise of power is based on the monopolistic control over the state, 
the media of communication, education and cultural processes, 
economic activities, military forces and weapons;  
Although the inner-party democratic setup up such as the political bureau, the 
national congress and the standing committee were designed to facilitate 
debates, in the 60s and 70s they were more than often paralyzed by the 
individual authorities of the party leaders together with various cliques.  
5.3.2 The Post-1978 PRC as an Authoritarian Regime  
From 1978 the CPC has initiated economic liberalization, which was fruitful. 
Yet it still held the authoritarian control over the country (Shambaugh, 2008). 
The CPC monopolizes the sovereign power of China and intertwines itself 
with the state and undertakes a large share of the governmental functions. At 
both central and municipal level, party power overrides the governmental 
power and the state has been turned into an instrument for the party to 
exercise its domination (Guo, 1998, p. 68). Excepting for turning the 
government and state power institutions into its executive body, the CPC also 
extend its branches to non-governmental organizations, from large State 
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Owned Enterprises (Zheng, 2014), higher educational institutions to 
communities and neighborhoods. Without the predominance of socialism 
ideology, the Chinese people’s life is still saturated with the great influence of 
the CPC as the regime in China to a large extent is still authoritarian (Xie, 
2008; Ortmann and Thompson, 2014; Lai, 2010; Landry, 2008; Weatherley, 
2006) with the following features: an official ideology, a single elitist party, 
monopolization on the military power and state apparatuses, and a ultimate 
control of mass medias. 
The philosophical absolutism of the socialism no longer serves as an 
effective instrument for the CPC to maintain its legitimacy and gain public 
support. The ‘class struggle’, as the previous priority of the CPC, was 
replaced by  ‘economic development’. Performance legitimacy began to play 
an increasingly important role in the post-1978 China’s politics. Friedrich 
(1968, pp.233) defined legitimacy as ‘a very particular from of consensus, 
which revolves around the question of the right or title to rule’. Apart from the 
legal-electoral route that prevails in the western democratic countries, 
historically the legitimacy of a regime can also be obtained through ideology 
(the case of Soviet Union), the leader’s charisma (the case of North Korea) or 
the ruler’s performance. It was argued by some of the scholars (Han and Lin, 
2007) that East Asian Cultures are incompatible with liberal democracy as 
traditionally there is not a western-style contentious politics and people’s 
understanding about the society was hierarchical. Therefore performance 
remains an important means for the ruling class to gain support. Zhao (2009) 
pointed out that in ancient China, performance legitimacy was widely 
accepted by the Chinese people and served as an effective complementary 
part for the charismatic legitimacy of the emperor. The performance-based 
state legitimacy ‘shaped people’s understandings of the relationship between 
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the rulers and the state in Chinese political culture’ (Zhao, 2009, pp. 420) and 
cultivated the Chinese people’s pragmatic rationale. The emperor was 
expected to fulfill his duty in managing the state well and at the same time 
take responsibilities for the failure of the government. In spite of the counter 
factors from the democratic transformation in Taiwan and South Korea, 
experiences from Singapore were repeatedly referenced, where progress 
legitimacy and moral leadership, rather than political competition, were 
emphasized. Political opposition is seen as detrimental to the state and 
society (Lewis and Litai, 2003; Zhao, 2008). Today the Chinese government 
is still alert to any civil movements demanding for more civil rights and 
democracy. Public participation is worried to have a potential to open a 
‘Pandora’s box of grievance’ (Johnson, 2010) and is only ‘acceptable when it 
is irrelevant to power sharing’ (Fan 2014, p. 4).  
5.3.3 The Communist Party of China (CPC) 
The Chinese one-party-ruling system is hierarchical and has a dualistic 
structure: the governmental bureaucracy and the party apparatus. The two 
bodies are highly intervened regarding the promotion of cadres and the 
administrative power. At the state level, the party leader is the president of 
the country that holds the military power and the Central General Secretary. 
He also ranks the first order in the standing committee of the Political Bureau, 
which holds the collective power of ruling the party and managing the country. 
The secondary member of the standing committee is normally the Premier 
who presides over State Council and the State Departments. The rest of the 
members are respectively in charge of the National People’s Congress, the 
National Political Consultative Conference, the Central Propaganda 
Department and other committees that thought necessary to be in charged by 
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a standing committee member. 
Although the term in office for a Standing Committee member is a maximum 
of ten years, some of the high-profile party leaders sustained their political 
influence after their retirement. Members of the Standing Committee are 
usually handpicked by the their predecessors from a number of candidates, 
which enables the retired continue to exert political influence either as 
consultants or, in extreme cases, as direct decision makers (Deng and other 
senior party member played a crucial role to dismiss Hu Yaobang and Zhao 
Ziyang respectively in 1987 and 1989). The rational for the selection of the 
Standing Committee members is opaque and is usually seen as a result of 
mutual reconciliation among different factions within the party.  
For candidates of the standing committee, the competition is extremely 
furious, as all candidates have normally accumulated considerable political 
capital as well as working experiences in different tiers of the 
party-governmental system and have made remarkable progresses that are 
sufficient to convince the decision makers and the rest of the party members. 
Once the decisions are made, it will be handed to the People’s Congress for 
‘voting’, which renders the selected with legitimacy. The process is replicated 
for the designation of party cadres at both provincial (Provincial Party 
Committee) and municipal (Municipal Party Committee) level of the 
party-bureaucratic political system. The party leader enjoys high 
discretionary power to position his political allies onto the crucial posts to 
eliminate opposition and enhance his authority, so do other standing 
committee members. Lower ranked cadres have to be enthusiastic about the 
tasks they are allocated so as to impress their upper-level leaders and all 
candidates should pass various tests against their capacities and loyalty and 
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censorships on their morals and ethics. The promotions of local cadres are 
generally in a spiral uprising model (Feng, 2010), i.e. they may firstly be 
promoted from positions in the ruling party to that in the government and then 
come back for a higher position in the ruling party. The economic progress 
during their term in the government usually serves as important evidence for 
their promotion (Feng, 2010). It is a pyramid-shaped power structure within 
the party, which is crucial for maintaining the efficiency of the party machine, 
as any strategic plan needs to be accomplished by the lower officials with 
loyalty and obedience. Although the mechanism is thought to be 
undemocratic, it arguably helps to match crucial posts with the appropriate 
candidates. Additionally, it also helps to understand the reality of Chinese 
politics and partly explained why municipal cadres are so enthusiastic about 
local economic growth.  
Legislation and judicial system in China cannot distance themselves from the 
party power either. The judges and prosecutors are themselves party 
members that subordinate to higher level party leaders. Legislation and law 
implementation to a large extent serve as means of the party power and 
embody the ‘rule by law’ rather than ‘rule of law’. This enables the inner-party 
patronization, and in some cases perverting of the course of justice. 
High-ranking cadres, with a concern of being involved in the scandals or 
criminals, may give a hand to his followers who are in trouble.  
5.3.4 Central-Local Relations 
Landry (2008, pp.3) argued that in the Post-Mao Era China combines both 
political authoritarianism and economic decentralization, which was rare 
across political systems. Immediately after 1978, central government 
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decentralized fiscal rights in return for local support regarding the Reform and 
Opening up. Provincial governments were given freedom to keep extra fiscal 
revenues after turning in a fixed quota. The policy has lasted for a decade, 
during which local economy, especially in southern China, had saw a rapid 
development. In the middle of the 1990s, however, the central’s extracting 
ability was seriously constrained by such a fiscal arrangement and the 
shrinking central revenues and rocketing budget deficits of central 
government were sharply contrasted by the fiscal surplus in local authorities. 
The second round fiscal reform took place between 1993 and1994, which in 
essence was an overridden of local interests by the central through a partial 
recentralization of revenue collection (Yang, 1996: 430-431). The reform 
divided the source of tax into two sections: the Value Added Tax, 
Consumption Tax and Corporate Income Tax would go to the national 
treasury while the rest are collected by local governments. The reform, 
however, further stimulated the local governments’ motivation to enlarge their 
tax base and to explore new sources of revenues. 
In 2002, Chinese local government accounted for nearly 70% of all 
government spending (Ministry of Finance of the PRC, 2003), which is rare to 
see under an authoritarian regime. Even in many democratic countries, local 
expenditures are normally kept at a comparatively low level (from 20% to 
50%). For instance in 2000 the proportion of local expenditure in the UK was 
around 25% (IMF,2000). The degree of fiscal decentralization in China is 
even higher than that in many federations such as Germany and the U.S. 
‘China’s observed level of decentralization is consistent with the behavior of a 
federal democracy’ (Landry, 2008, pp.9) 
While decentralization can greatly stimulate economic growth at local level, it 
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can also lead to demand for further decentralization among local leaders. 
However, so far it has rarely seen the appointed provincial leaders publicly 
defy the central government, and those who dared to do so were either 
dismissed from the position or terminated with their political careers, such as 
the elimination of Cheng Xitong (former party secretary of Beijing), Cheng 
Liangyu (former party secretary of Shanghai) and Bo Xilai (former secretary 
of Chongqing), that were all accused for corruption and abuse of power. The 
CPC has managed to stabilize growth through economic liberalization and 
decentralization of decision-making power, and at the same time to 
perpetuate its rule through ‘strengthening and institutionalizing mechanisms 
of administrative and organizational controls’ (Deng, 1983: 324). The 
Chinese central state ‘has maintained a degree of legitimacy and rule-making 
capacities in shaping local outcomes in spite of the ongoing process of 
decentralization’ (Solinger, 1996, quoted from Landry, 2008, pp. 14). Today 
the state still holds decisive power on granting permissions for large projects, 
master plans of strategically important cities and so on. The monopolization 
on the nomination of lower-level leaders enables the upper level government 
protect its authority from the erosion of decentralization and is a key weapon 
for ‘maintaining organizational discipline and for structuring principal agent 
relationships between local party institutions and the officials that they seek 
to manage in a manner that enhances the cohesion of the political system’ 
(Landry, 2008, pp.18) 
5.3.5 The Relationship Between the Government and the 
People 
Since China had a centralized political system for more than 2000 years, the 
relationship between individuals and the government is unique and 
significantly different from that in many western democracies. For the 
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majority of Chinese people, the government does not only hold the authority 
but also shoulder responsibilities for maintaining justice, providing basic 
social security and various public services. For the government, performance 
legitimacy and strong state apparatus has been frequently used, either by 
former emperors or today’s top officials of the CPC to consolidate the regime. 
In spite of the devolved features of the central-local relationship, since the 
late 1970s the bureaucratic system built by the CPC has been efficient in 
maintaining the social stability as well as facilitating the economic 
development and local government has played an important role. On the one 
hand, local governors and officials are the representatives of central 
government that is expected by local people to deliver social justice and 
public services. On the other hand, with the Neoliberalization and central 
government’s strong intendancy in maintaining performance legitimacy, local 
officials are commissioned to strengthen the state’s authority while strip away 
the government’s responsibilities for its people. They have to act more like 
entrepreneurs to mobilize resources they have and to seek opportunities for 
growth. In the majority of urban regeneration projects, officials or governors 
involved usually face high-level pressures from the top with an expectation 
for better performances. It has therefore frequently seen local official trying to 
obtain as more discretionary power as possible and to control rather than to 
cooperate with other stakeholders. More than often local officials are 
hesitating in supporting public participation with real empowerment.  
Despite the superficial noises and contentions, the Chinese society remained 
stable and some scholars (Zhao, 2009；Weatherley, 2007) attribute the 
phenomenon to the performance legitimacy. They believe that the great 
achievements in economic development and the improved living standards of 
ordinary people had convinced the majority of the Chinese that the CCP is 
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eligible for governing the country. Bing influenced by the Confucianism, the 
government’s performance is mainly evaluated against the following criteria: 
1) Economic development such as unemployment rates, CPI, average 
income; 2) Provision of basic social security for disadvantaged groups; 3) 
National security and territorial integrity; 4) The efficiency of the bureaucracy 
in responding people’s demands; 5) The cadres’ morality. Performance 
legitimacy is inherently unstable as underperformance is highly likely to 
trigger immediate social and political crisis. So far the state is still under 
careful management by the Chinese government with a highly efficient 
bureaucracy. 
However, today’s China is far more pluralistic than 30 years ago (Guldin, 
1997), when capitalism was eliminated and every aspect of the society was 
dominated by the communist party with its power bases rooted in the 
proletarian class that are mainly constituted by workers and peasants. The 
opening-up did not only bring back capitalism but also enable the penetration 
of universal values and western cultures, which together melted down the 
predominant position of the socialism ideology and social structures formed 
under the planned economy. There are various interest groups cooperated or 
conflicted with each other using resources and power they can obtain within 
the structure, which has been consistently changed and, in turn, reshapes the 
way different players interact with each other. For the Chinese government 
led by the CPC, it is now impossible to exert a holistic control over the society 
in the same way it once did. The party is now confronting some major 
challenges led by the social and economic transformation:  
1. Rising discontent regarding the enlarging social inequality; 
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2. Rising middle class that are more sensitive to civil rights and boundaries 
of the state power; 
3. Spreading corruptions and the accordingly damaged reputation of the 
government; 
4. The losing control of people’s public and private life through former 
institutional arrangements such as work unit due to economic and social 
transformation; 
5. The official medias with low credit;  
Human rights in today’s China to some extent are still lower than that in 
western democracies. For instance, Chinese people have few political rights 
in electing their national leaders and local politicians and against the 
authoritarian regime, when their property rights are infringed by the 
government, they are left with little space to bargain. 
5.4 CHINESE CITIES AND URBAN POLICIES 
5.4.1 The Post War Housing Shortages and Urban Policies  
Before 1979, the PRC government adopted an “anti-urbanization” path if 
compared with previous regimes (Lin, 1998; Chan, 1992). Most of the cities 
during the first 30 years of post-1949 period were identified as ‘Industrial 
Centers’, while other functionalities were depressed. Even in cities like 
Shanghai, service and commercial sectors that used to be flourishing during 
the Pre-Civil War period had declined dramatically since the socialist 
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transformation starting from 1952. In terms of urban population, many cities 
in 1949 were crowded with refugees and facing great pressures in housing 
provision and food supply. PRC government began to evacuate refugees 
soon after it was in power. It was estimated that in 1949, from May to 
September, around 400 thousand people were evacuated from Shanghai 
(Shanghai Liberation Daily, 1950.7, pp12). However, these measures had 
contributed little to mitigating the pressure on housing. Evidence showed that 
in the same year, around 1.2 million people were still living in slums, 
accounting for around 23% of the total population. 
In the central area of Shanghai, around four million people jammed in old 
properties. In 1952, in response to Chairman Mao’s calling for ‘resolving 
housing problems faced by workers in large cities within several years’, the 
first ‘Workers’ Village’ was initiated by the Shanghai municipal government. 
Within two years, 20,000 households together with matched facilities were 
accomplished to accommodate the working class. This development model 
soon diffused to the rest parts of China and became one of the major patterns 
of housing provision initiated by municipal governments from the 1950s to the 
late 1970s. Within a framework of planned economy, land, construction 
materials and money for the implementation of these projects all came from 
the government, who also decided the distribution of these properties. In fact, 
candidates eligible for accessing to these properties were highly selective. 
Apart from an urban Hukou and a permanent job, the candidate had to be 
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‘politically advanced’ and can play as a role model to motivate the others in 
terms of his/her contribution to the collective. The task of constructing 
‘workers’ villages’ were decentralized to Work Unite10, together with the rights 
to distribution of the accomplished properties. 
However, due to the extreme scarcity of construction materials and a 
disparity of investment between heavy and light industries, the local 
government was not capable of implementing large-scale construction of 
‘workers’ village’ to cover all workers, only a few projects for demonstration 
could be implemented. Table 5.2 shows the change of average living space 
per capita in Shanghai from 1950 to 1979, which reflects the general situation 
across the country: 
Table	   5.2:	   The	   change	   of	   average	   living	   space	   per	   capita	   in	   Shanghai	  
(1950-­‐1979)	  
Year  Living space per 
capita (m2/person) 
Year Living space per 
capita (m2/person) 
Year Living space per 
capita (m2/person) 
1950 3.9 1963 3.8 1972 4.6 
1954 3.3 1967 3.9 1975 4.3 
1959 3.8 1969 4.2 1979 4.3 
                                            
 
 
10 Work units are state-owned companies and institutions. They are not only economic entities for production but 
also the principle organization for the CPC to implement its plan and realize its control over the society. Work units 
did not only provide worker with a life-long full time job but were also in charge of providing the workers with housing, 
child care, schools, clinics, shops, services, post offices, etc. Under the planned economy, the resources needed by 
the work units for production and providing social services were allocated by the government.  
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Source: Chen (2012) 
As can be seen, housing construction in Shanghai stagnated during the three 
decades and the living standard measured by the area of housing per capita 
had only seen a minor increase from 1950 to 1979.  
For the majority of citizens living in slums, refurbishment was the only 
practical measure to improve their living conditions. During the first several 
years of the new regime, public funded slum renovation projects were 
implemented. In Shanghai, from 1950 to 1953, 188 slums in Shanghai were 
renewed, accounting for 83% of the total number of slums regenerated from 
1950 to 1958 (Shanghai Academy of Social Science, 1962). Public funded 
regeneration programs were postponed in the following several years due to 
the Great Leap. Later the government adopted a different strategy following 
three principles that had dominated the Chinese urban regeneration practices 
for nearly three decades from the late 1950s to the early 1980s: 
1. Lowering the standard of materials and technical parameters used in the 
refurbishment and reducing the reliance on the government; 
2. Adopting an incremental regeneration strategy and avoiding large scale 
demolition and reconstruction; 
3. Dividing the responsibility into ‘public’ and ‘private’, which means the 
government, was responsible for the modification of the public realm such as 
roads and sewerage system while occupants took the responsibility for the 
refurbishment of their property.   
With constrained capacities, the government was not capable of 
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implementing large-scale regeneration programs to cover the majority of the 
citizens. Urban regeneration was carried out in an incremental way and the 
majority of these projects were co-funded by citizen and municipal 
government. Additionally, cities in East China were inevitably affected by the 
‘Three Line’ strategy and the consequential austerity. Therefore the 
regeneration practices adopted in these cities, such as the slum clearance 
and construction of workers’ villages, and the group of beneficiaries were 
narrowly focused and confined within a relatively small scale. Figure 5.2 
shows the major players and beneficiaries in the construction and distribution 
of urban housing in China from the 1950s to the 1980s.  
Figure	  5.2:	  The	  delivery	  model	  of	  urban	  houses	  from	  the	  1950s	  to	  the	  
1980s	  in	  China.	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5.4.2 Cultural Revolution and its Impacts on Chinese Urban 
Policies    
The brutal political struggle in China during the Cultural Revolution had a 
profound impact on Chinese cities regarding the physical and social aspects. 
In many places people were mobilized to overthrow the regime in the name of 
‘defending Chairman Mao’. The prevalence of anarchistic invalidated laws 
and regulations. Technicians and officers were disgraced and replaced by 
Red Guards. Academicians in universities were humiliated and exiled. Urban 
development-related management and research in China had thus been 
interrupted for a decade. Urban land was divided into small ‘cells’ and 
controlled by different work unite and institutions that can decide what to build 
and how to distribute within their domain. This radical bottom-up 
development model had greatly contributed to the physical fabric of Chinese 
cities at that time and its legacies can still be found today.  
The major force in the Cultural Revolution was the ‘Red Guard’, consisting of 
youngsters from universities and high schools who believed that ‘the rebel is 
justified’ and ‘Chairman Mao need safeguard’. Fuelled by the zealousness of 
‘breaking down an old world and building up a new one’, they destroyed 
numerous historical sites, archives and artifacts, as these were identified as 
‘the symbol of the old’. In the later stage of the Cultural Revolution, with the 
objective of purging political rivals being achieved, Mao encourage these 
young people to move to the rural area for ‘new challenges’. It was estimated 
that around 16 million youngster were mobilized to migrate from cities to the 
rural areas yet most of them returned to cities after 1979. The movement had 
a great implication for China’s following urban policies. For one thing, the 
return of these young people exerted great pressure on the provision of 
working opportunities and housing unities in cities in the late 1970s and early 
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1980s. For another, without been properly educated, the majority of these 
people became particularly vulnerable in the phase of China’s marketization 
and most of them were trapped in poverty in their later life.  
As is argued by Chen (2012), one of the positive consequences of the 
Cultural Revolution, if any, was that the movement dismantled the vested 
interests across the country before the advent of Reform and Opening up, 
which greatly reduced the chance for the former elites in the government to 
monopolize the benefits of the reform. Additionally, many of the Chinese 
people that had experienced the ten-year-long turmoil were tired of the 
leftists’ radical thoughts and actions. The whole society reached a consensus 
on the necessity of adopting a different way when Deng came into power. 
5.4.3 Neoliberal Urbanism in China since the 1980s 
5.4.3.1 The Opening up of Land and Housing Market 
Since the late 1980s, a series of urban policies with distinguishable features 
of neoliberal urbanism was initiated in Chinese Cities. In 1983, central 
government stressed the significance of cities as: ‘economic, political, cultural 
and educational centres, and places where modern industry and working 
classes gathered and will play a leading role in the socialistic modernization 
process’ (Shi, et al, 2010, p.20). In the same year, the Housing Reform was 
initiated and private property rights were formally written into the Constitution. 
The ban on the circulation of land use rights were removed in 1987, when 
Shenzhen was firstly designated as a ‘special district’ for a series of 
experimental policies. After nearly 40 years’ administrative allocation, the use 
right of state owned urban land was allowed to be leased out by local 
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authorities to private sectors at a market price, which later became an 
effective instrument for municipalities to accomplish their primitive 
accumulation and to attract investment. Initially the transition fees in some 
cases were decided through negotiation, yet from August 31, 2004, it was 
required by the Department of Land and Resources as well as Ministry of 
Supervision of the PRC that all land transactions should go through public 
auction.  
Since the late 1990s, housing market became one of the major engines for 
the Chinese economic boom. On the 4th Plenary Session of the 8th National 
People’s Congress Council on the 5th March 1996, The National 
Development and Reform Committee adopted the 9th FYP in which it was 
formally required to include the content of urbanization in national economic 
and social development plans in order to achieve a favourable investment 
environment and to improve economic efficiency. Residents were formally 
allowed to trade private properties in the Ten-Year-Reform Strategy 
published in 1988. The marketization and housing reform made the housing 
market the predominant source of housing provision and diluted the 
percentage of public housing to an insignificant level (Chen, et al, 2011) and 
it was the formal start of the massive urbanization progress in China. It was 
estimated that from 1990 to 1998, Beijing demolished 4.2 million square 
metres of housing in the old urban areas (Fang, 2000). In Shanghai, from 
1995 to 2004, more than 745,000 households were relocated and over 33 
million square metres of housing were demolished (Shanghai Statistical 
Bureau, 2005). By 2001, private owned housing has accounted for over 80% 
in China (The people’s Bank of China, 2002). Land selling revenue 
contributes significantly to local government’s income, which was roughly 
27% in 2006 and has now grown to 60% or even higher in some cities 
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(Tospur, 2013) 
In the 10th FYP adopted in 2001 it was also proposed to remove the 
institutional and policy obstacles for urbanization and was declared that 
China will reform the urban household registration system, improve urban 
land-use system, set up standards for constructing cities and towns and 
modify the administrative system. 
The massive urbanization took place in the past three decades has 
profoundly changed the landscape of many Chinese cities. It has not only 
seen horizontal expansion of city territories at city fringes but also vertical 
growth in inner urban areas, where land value had rocketed. The trend is 
likely to continue throughout the next 20 years due to the forecasted 260 
million new urban residents to be accommodated (United Nations, 2011). 
According to Hsing (2010, pp10), China’s current urban development follows 
three major trajectories: 1. Inward contraction of the inner city areas that 
command the highest property value; 2. Outward expansion to villages at the 
urban fringe of the metropolitan region where the potential for increases in 
property value are the greatest; 3. At rural fringe of the metropolitan region, 
where townships and villages convert and lease out farmland for scattered 
industrial and commercial projects. According to the Constitution of People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), the country has the exclusive ownership of land in 
urban areas while farmland and rural areas are owned by the collectively of 
peasants. Among the three types of urban expansion listed above, generally 
the latter two follow a relatively simple procedure: (1) Land use attributes are 
designated in master plan; (2) Detailed plan further gives specific indications 
on the utilization of each plot; (3) Rural land is acquired from peasants at a 
comparatively low price by the government; (4) Massive demolition and 
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provision of infrastructures following the master plan (5) Leasing out the land; 
(6) Development commercial properties; Conflicts in these two types thus are 
mainly around the monetary compensation given to villagers for land 
acquisition at the early stage.  
For many local governors, urbanization became the most efficient instrument 
for accelerating local economic growth. It has seen various policies 
promulgated to drive indigenous citizens and migrants into the housing 
market. Among them, the Hukou system that inherited from the socialism 
China had played a significant role. Barriers created by the ‘Hukou’ system 
helped to push up the demands for commercial properties and to legitimize 
the uneven distribution of social services and public products and alleviated 
municipal government’s burden in providing social services and public goods. 
The provision of social housing, however, has long been neglected before 
2007 (Chen, et al., 2013) as it was not in municipal governments’ interests to 
reduce the demands for commercial properties in the housing market. 
5.4.3.2 Forced Eviction  
he great achievements regarding the economic development and 
urbanization in China during the past four decades were built on the 
comparative advantage of ‘low human rights’ regarding: (1) rights to get 
access to social security and services, such as education and medical 
services etc.; (2) property rights; (3) other civil rights and political rights such 
as freedom of speech and association, etc. Such a comparative advantage is 
inherently unstable, as the accumulation of grievance and sense of relative 
deprivation (Walker and Smith, 2002) among the disadvantaged could trigger 
turmoil at some point if the gap between the rich and poor continues to 
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enlarge.  
State apparatus were used to speed up the urbanization process. Before the 
publication of the Regulations on the Expropriation of Houses on 
State-owned Land and Compensation (REHALC) in 2011, local governments 
were given discretionary powers by the Urban Property Demolition 
Regulations (UPDR) to forcefully demolish citizens’ properties. Such an 
arrangement frequently resulted in the infringement of citizen’s property 
rights and resulted in conflicts and it has seen long-term litigation and petition 
carried out by the residents. The official number of protest in 2004 was 
74,000, up from 10,000 in 1994 and 58,000 in 2003 (The Economist, 2005). 
The Ministry of Construction also revealed that between January and July 
2002, 26 deaths were caused by the residents’ protest against the forced 
demolition (China Daily, 2003).  
5.4.3.3 Routinized Protests and the Government’s Reaction 
The reform and opening up since 1979 undermined the significance of the 
CPC’s ideological propaganda, the dismantlement of work units had created 
an institutional vacuum for the CPC to mobilize and control its citizens while 
the massive urbanization process since the late 1990s had created millions of 
migrant workers who are beyond the reach of both rural collectivises and 
urban Local Residents Committees. The enlarging middle class group was in 
parallel with the emergence of pluralistic interests and the pursuit of 
individualism. 
Over the past few decades ‘protests for economic reasons in China did not 
only increase, but also begun to be normalized’ (Chen, 2014, p4). Perry and 
 154 
Selden (2003, p.17) argued that ‘under the reforms, economic protests have 
become increasingly routinized’. It is difficult to find such a relatively long 
period in the Chinese history when routinized petitions and protest so 
frequently happened across the country. The protests may vary regarding the 
causes and process, yet the majority of them are usually accompanied by 
‘trouble making’ tactics. Based on data collected from the Hunan Province, 
Chen (2014, p. 33) argued that the urban related protests are mainly 
concentrated on ‘land expropriation, housing demolition and organized 
migration related disputes between local people and the government in the 
process of inner city regeneration and slum clearance, the construction of 
new towns and the construction of large-scale infrastructures.  
To mediate the situation, central government published the Expropriation of 
Houses on State-owned Land and Compensation 2011, in which the 
expropriation of state-owned land and property is required to take place after 
the compensation and any forced eviction will be seen as a violation against 
the law. Yet it is also addressed that once the boundaries of an expropriation 
area is defined, any new buildings are illegal and will not be compensated. 
This is due to the fact that many citizens will increase the floor space on their 
sites years before the initiation of demolition so as to gain more 
compensation. 
According to the 13th article in the P.R.C’s Administrative Compulsory Law 
(ACL) 2011, the local government can request the court to approve the 
administrative compulsory execution. During the period of censorship, the 
court can consult the participants, hold public hearing or conduct field survey 
for evidence collection. Being different from the former regulations, in which 
the scope of censorship is confined to the appropriateness of the 
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administrative procedure, the ACL 2011 has additional articles addressing 
equity.  According to the law, if one of the following conditions exists, the 
enforcement implementation will not be approved:  
(1). Insufficient evident basis;  
(2). Insufficient legal basis; 
(3). Violation of the principle of equity; infringe the subjects’ rights.  
(4). Severe Infringement on the public interests;  
(5). Infringement on the procedure legality or properness; 
(6). Activities beyond the administrative authority;  
(7). Conditions that are treated by laws, regulations as not suitable for 
enforcement. 
5.5 URBAN REGENERATION POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES SINCE THE 1980S  
Inner city residents’ property rights are diversified. Within a given area, there 
are native residents, long-term tenants, residents from former work units 
living in social houses etc. Some of the old inner city areas are of great 
historical significances. ‘The preservation of heritage is crucial for 
communities to identify their cultural identity the character of a place’ 
(renewal. net, 2005). Profit-oriented new constructions are often featured with 
high density, standardised design, and little respect paid to the surrounding 
environment. Many Chinese inner city areas have already seen a great loss 
of their distinguishable characteristics due to the diminishment of their 
original physical and social fabrics. Moreover, in some cases the whole 
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community could be completely wiped away with nothing left.  
5.5.1 Typologies of Community-Related Regeneration 
Projects in China (1990s -2000s) 
5.5.1.1 Property-led Redevelopment 
Property-led redevelopment soon became the major instrument for the local 
authorities to attract international and domestic capital to solve their own 
financial problems and reimage the city. He and Wu (2007) examined two 
types of property-led redevelopments in China based on empirical studies in 
Shanghai. One of them is represented by the ‘Liangwangcheng’, which 
replaced the dilapidated multi-floor urban houses with high-rising blocks. The 
other type of regeneration programme is ‘Xingtiandi’ which transformed the 
area from a welfare-housing district into a high-end commercial area. 
Historical exteriors of the old buildings were retained while the interior 
functions were changed from residential use into a ‘new heaven and earth 
‘for leisure, shopping and tourism.  
It was argued that the property-led redevelopment has sharply increased 
neighbourhood inequalities and exerted negative social-spatial impacts on 
the neighbourhoods. Gentrification has been found in both projects and in 
Xingtiandi it was also found functional transformation of urban space (He and 
Wu, 2007). Local residents in both projects were not capable of influencing 
the decisions made by the local government and private developers, who are 
‘the dominant force shaping the social-spatial changes in neighbourhoods’ 
(He and Wu, 2007, P.207) 
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5.5.1.2 Historical Area Conservation 
Another type of urban regeneration project in China during the past three 
decades was related with historical area conservation. ‘The preservation of 
heritage helps to retain the cultural identity of the community as well as the 
place. Better utilization of these areas can significantly contribute to the 
sustainable development (WCED,1987) of the a city. The identification of 
historical areas are often entangled with identification of historical buildings 
following the procedures listed in table 5.3:  
Table	   5.3:	   The	   procedure	   of	   identification	   and	   abrogation	   historical	  
buildings	  in	  China:	   	  
In China, buildings with historical significances are classified as a 
sub-category of the historical heritages that are protected by the Chinese 
Historical Heritage Preservation Act. The identification and abrogation of 
historical buildings normally follow the listed procedures: 
(1). Recommendation：The task will be delegated by a qualified design or 
research institution in terms of historical preservation. A preliminary list 
together with a report will be accomplished. This progress will be organized 
collectively by the planning administrative office, the historical relic 
management office and the construction bureau. 
(2). Consultation: The list as well as the report will be discussed by the 
planning administrative office together with a committee formed by experts 
selected by the provincial or municipal government. A written report will then 
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be produced for reference.  
(3). Approval: The agreed materials will be submitted to the provincial 
government for approval. For the designation and dismiss of national 
registered buildings, the materials need to be forwarded to national historical 
building administrative office for approval.  
Once a building is designated as a national/provincial/municipal historical 
preservation unit, any exterior or structural change has to be approved by the 
corresponding administrative office.  
In the 1980s, the focus on preservation of historical buildings has gradually 
extended from individual buildings to their surrounding environment, which is 
usually divided into Conditional Construction Areas and non-new construction 
areas. The style and texture of new buildings have to echo the old ones 
especially those with historical significances while in the later area, no new 
constructions are approved and the refurbishment of the old buildings 
requires permissions from the related administrative offices.  
The approval of conservation plans as well as planning proposals for new 
development within the conditional construction areas normally falls into two 
processes, namely the normal process and the special process. The former 
refers to the procedures of obtaining the Permission Notes for Location, Land 
Use Permit and Building Permit while the later refers to the additional 
approval from the historical building administrative office at different tiers of 
the government. 
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Ruan and Gu (2004) found that many of these conservation-related projects 
are still property-led and involve large-scale resettlement of local people and 
they categorized the current regeneration projects that are related to 
historical area conservation into five patterns according to the measures and 
procedures applied: 
(1). Massive scale demolition and redevelopment, which wipes away the 
original physical and social fabrics of the community. It is believed to be a 
disaster to areas with historical significances;  
(2). Redevelopment with respect to the historical context of surrounding 
areas and following certain design codes that echoes the physical 
environment. However, the original social networks have been destroyed due 
to the high price for moving back.  
(3). Conserving the exterior environment while adapting the interior of 
buildings for innovative use. Such projects may not generate financial returns 
directly yet they contribute to the promotion of land value in surrounding area.  
(4). Holistic conservation and regeneration of old towns with special 
characteristics funded by tourism revenues. New buildings strictly follow the 
traditional patterns of the area. There are several examples such as ‘Wu 
Zheng’, ‘Tong Li’ in Jiangsu Province. In this pattern the style of new 
buildings strictly follows the traditional patterns of the area. No developers 
were involved and the funding mainly comes from tourism revenue and public 
funding. The majority of the local residents are retained and the social fabric 
was thus preserved. Some scholars even argued that urban regeneration 
only exist in area-based conservation programs in which the local residents 
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together with the social fabric can be retained (Yip, 2011)  
(5) ‘Organic regeneration’, which was firstly projected by Wu, Linagyong 
(2001) with the belief that the scale and speed of a regeneration project 
should be controlled for the aim of sustainable development. The idea was 
later implemented in the ‘Nan Chizi’ project in Beijing, which was funded 
solely by the local government. The local residents were encouraged to sell 
their property rights to the collective group, which dominated small-scale 
regeneration with the guidance and compensation from the government. In 
this pattern, local residents proactively involved in the regeneration process 
with the information and technique support from the government, and the 
urban fabric is also well conserved. The majority of Chinese redevelopment 
projects still fall into urban renewal or reconstruction focusing on exchange 
values while neglecting the function and social capital offered in the urban 
areas (Hong Kong Institute of Planners, 2010).  
5.5.2 The New Policy Trend: Social Housing and Slum 
Clearance   
Up until the early 2000s, eliminating urban poverty was not central to the 
Chinese regeneration policies that are implemented on the ground, due to the 
reasons that:  1. Government lacks the capacity, only a few demonstration 
projects are implemented every year; 2. Resources are so demanding and 
need to be invested on pro-growth sectors while the numbers of poor urban 
families are huge; 3. Urban poverty is somewhere between the better off and 
rural poverty, of which the later was given more attention due to their political 
significance. By the end of 2006, it was estimated that around 10 million 
low-income households with an average living floor space of less than 10 m2 
were jammed in Chinese cities, accounting for around 5.5% of the registered 
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households. In the 11th FYP adopted in 2006, it was stressed that China will 
stick to the principle of land conservancy, intensive development and 
reasonable planning so as to promote the urbanization progress actively and 
steadily. Urban agglomeration will be the main form of promoting 
urbanization. Areas with conditions to develop urban agglomeration shall 
reinforce consolidation and planning, focusing on mega-cities and large cities, 
exerting the functions of central cities, so as to build new urban 
agglomerations using a small amount of land resources, creating more job 
opportunities, gathering key production elements with a reasonable 
population distribution. China will speed up in removing institutional barriers 
preventing urban and rural integration of a healthy urbanization. In August, 
2007, the State Council published ‘Several opinions on solving the housing 
difficulties of low-income families in urban area’ (PRC State Council, 2007) 
with a public housing funding of 7.7 Billion RMB, which was the largest public 
expenditure on social housing for decades. The policy was expanded in 2010 
to cover groups that could neither afford housing in the market nor be 
qualified to apply for social housing. The total social housing funding flew 
from central government mounted to 129 Billion RMB by the end of the 11th 
FYP (2011). However, it only accounts for less than 10% of the money 
required for building 10 million social housing national wild. The social 
housing program was thus primarily funded by local governments, who also 
own the property rights of these buildings. The funding from Central 
Government was mainly distributed through the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Department of Housing and 
Construction (DHC), which are also responsible for setting annual targets for 
local governments as well as supervising their progress. According to the 
targets published by the DHC in 2011, 10 million social housing that were 
going to be accomplished by the end of the 11th FYP, 40% are built for 
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relocatees; low-rent housing accounts for another 40% while the affordable 
housing makes up the rest 20%. 
The social housing policies seemed to demonstrate the central government’s 
determination in adjusting the housing market and improving social equity. 
Yet, as is pointed out by Liu, et al. (2012), municipal government had 
consistently played a significant role in the urbanization and economic 
development in the post reform era. It was the local authorities that really 
facilitate the urban development and pushed up the land prices since the 
1990s. By expropriating land resources and providing infrastructures through 
the planning system, the local authorities made dramatic progress in 
attracting investments and reimaging cities with modern buildings and 
advanced public infrastructures. The central government’s policy may yield 
passive response or even alternative strategies among local officials.  
5.5.3 Social Regeneration and the Local Residents’ 
Committee (LRC) 
In China the focus of current urban regeneration policies and practices has 
largely been put on physical regeneration projects while the social 
regeneration is comparatively neglected. Social programs are mainly 
delivered through the Local Residents’ Committees (LRC) in collaboration 
with various functional institutions targeting specific social aspects such as 
crime, employment and social welfare (Bureau of Labour and Social Security) 
and the provision of public goods and services (Sanitation Bureaus) etc.  
The LRC, according to the current institutional setup in China, is the 
mandated basic institution of the Chinese political hierarchy (Xu, 2007). A 
LRC usually contains several core members who act as the interface 
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connecting the government and local people (Mok, 1988; Lu and Li, 2008; Lin 
and Ma, 2000) and is the delegate of the municipal government at the 
community level. In spite of its nominal status as a grassroots organization 
that should be operated by the local residents automatically, LRC has a long 
history of serving for the government and carrying out various urban 
administrative tasks allocated from top-down (Xu, 2007) and is the primary 
deliver of the government-sponsored public initiations (Derleth & Koldyk, 
2004)  
5.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF REGENERATION 
PROJECTS WITHIN THE PLANNING SYSTEM 
5.6.1 The Framework of Legislations and Regulations 
After the 1949, China quickly entered a period in which law was override by 
the power of the CCP, which firmly controlled the government and army. By 
the end of 1970s, there were only two codes of law— the P.R.C. Constitution 
and the P.R.C. Law of Marriage. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution-a massive political purge initiated by Chairman Mao between the 
1966 and 1976 had left China long term recession and sank the country in 
turmoil. Like Germany, China applies Civic Law system. As is show in Table 
5.4, the laws and regulations can be categorized into three tiers: 
Table 5.4: The hirerachy of Chinese law and regulations: 
National 
Level 
The P.R.C. Constitution 
Basic Laws  e.g. Criminal Law; Urban Planning Act. 
Administrative 
laws and 
regulations 
Administrative laws 
and regulations made 
by the China’s State 
Council. 
e.g. China’s Petition 
Letter Regulation 
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Administrative laws 
and regulations 
produced by different 
departments of the 
central government. 
e.g.Regulation on 
Land Resources 
Evaluation and 
Management Process 
(drafted by the 
Chinese land and 
resources 
department) 
Provincial 
Level  
Provincial 
regulations  
e.g. The Provincial planning regulations. 
Local Level Local 
regulations  
e.g. Local complementary planning 
regulations. 
 
The P.R.C.’s Constitution and basic laws are passed by the People’s 
Congress and signed by the president. The constitution and the basic laws 
should not be violated by other legislations and regulations. The national 
administrative legislations and regulations are separately drafted by different 
departments of central government under the inspection of the State 
Council’s legislative office, which will produce a report. The draft together 
with the report will be handed over to the Prime Minister for the final decision. 
In January 2011,the ’Property Acquisition and Compensation Act’ was 
promulgated, with an emphasis on procedural justice, protection of the 
property rights of citizens and ban on the ‘forced demolition’.  
In China, the statutory planning—including the urban-rural system planning, 
master planning of city/town/country, regulatory planning and site plan, can 
only be produced by authorized institutions, of which, the majority are 
Quangos subordinated to either provincial or municipal planning bureaus. 
Currently the institutional reform stops at provincial level and the introduction 
of market mechanism within these institutions does not fundamentally 
change their relationship with the local planning administrative department. 
For them, planning making usually goes beyond a design contract and 
 165 
becomes a political task in which the government’s intention will be clearly 
reflected.  
5.6.2 The Delivery Model of Regeneration projects in China 
Currently urban regeneration projects are mainly delivered by the coalition of 
local authorities and private sectors. The local authorities’ statuary power 
enables them to acquire land use rights from the citizens, redefine the 
indicators of constructions on the land based on the regulatory planning, 
release land use rights to developers through auction or negotiation and 
control the development through detailed planning. Once the land use right is 
transferred, private developers will take the responsibility to make detailed 
plan for the project and submit it to the planning bureau of the local authority 
for approval. They are usually driven by the aim of maximizing the profits and 
shortening the development cycle. Negotiations between developers and 
local authorities happen during this process while local communities are 
excluded.  
For planning institutions, local authorities are one of their major clients. They 
are usually commissioned by the government to produce statutory planning 
such as master plan and control planning, and non-statutory planning such 
as urban design. They are also commissioned by private developers to 
produce detailed planning. According to the China’s Town and Country 
Planning Act 2007, the public’s opinions should be taken into account when 
producing the statutory plans, yet for most of the time they can exert very little 
impact on the final outcomes. 
Figure 5.3 shows how different types of regeneration projects in China are 
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delivered within the framework provided by the current land policies and 
planning system. The diagram also shows the main participants together with 
the roles they play in regeneration programs. The delivery model of historical 
area conservation programs is slightly different from that of the property-led 
ones in terms of funding sources, the key facilitators and final outcomes. 
Financial sources for this type of regeneration projects mainly consist of 
public funding and revenues generated from tourism. Without the 
involvement of private developers, local communities usually play a more 
significant role in formulating the regeneration strategy and implementing the 
program. With the majority of old buildings being retained and refurbished, 
the original physical environment will be conserved. Low relocation rates also 
enable the social fabrics to be preserved. However, when compared with the 
nationwide property-led regeneration surge, conservation related projects 
only account for a very tiny fraction.  
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Figure	  5.3.	  The	  current	  delivery	  model	  of	  regeneration	  projects	  in	  China	  
 
Soruce: Produced by the Author 
5.6.3 Governments’ Control of Construction Activities  
Within such a system, local governments control construction activities 
mainly through issuing planning permissions according to the Planning Act 
2008:  
‘Planning permissions should be issued by the government to 
constructions taking place within the city’s or town’s planning areas. 
Supplementary documents such as land use right certificate, detailed site 
planning proposals should be submitted. Planning permission will be 
issued by the planning administrative office under the condition that no 
violation is made against the regulatory plan and other related 
regulations.’ (Urban and Country Planning Act of the P.R.C 2008) 
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The ‘related regulations’ mainly refer to the National Building Fire Safety 
Regulations, Provincial Urban Planning Codes as well as Environmental, 
Transportation and Infrastructure Provision plans and regulations.  
For the implementation of construction/reconstruction activities, there are two 
key documents required before the start of a construction:  
1. Permission Notes for Location (PNL) (which is only required by 
constructions on allocated land);  
2. Land Use Planning Permit (LUPP) 
3. Building Permit (BP) 
 
The procedure of obtaining of these documents can be seen from Table 5.5 
to Table 5.7: 
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Table	  5.5:	  Procedure	  of	  getting	  the	  PNL	  
 
[1] The documents include: application form, approved project proposal, 
related documents and maps (according to the requirement of the local 
planning bureau); for middle and large projects, the report for location 
assessment is required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The developers submit documents [1] for the 
application of the PNL to the planning 
administrative office.  
If the application is not 
approved, a written 
report will be given.  
The Report for Location 
Assessment should be 
accomplished by qualified 
institutions.  
The PNL will be issued under the condition that the application 
meets all criteria. The boundaries of the planned area and design 
codes will be addressed in the PNL.  
The PNL will serve as the key guidelines for the detailed design 
in later stages; The PNL will also serve as the evident basis for 
the assessment of the project by other administrative offices. 
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Table 5.6: Procedure of getting the LUPP 
[1] The documents here refer to the PNL, the master plan of the site (map 
and documents) and other related documents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[2] In China the Land Use Permit is issued by the land administrative 
department — a separate department managing the land within the 
jurisdictional boundary of the municipal government. According to the law, 
the land use right in China lasts for 70 years from the moment it is obtained.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The developers submit documents[1] for the 
application of the LUP to the planning 
administrative office.  
Documents will be examined by 
the planning administrative office.  
Opinions from other 
administrative  
departments such as 
Environment, Transport, 
Historical conservation 
and Firefighting.  The LUPP be issued by the 
planning administrative office.  
The developers use the LUPP to apply the Land Use Planning Permit [2] 
from the land administrative department.  
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Table	  5.7:	  Procedure	  of	  getting	  the	  BP	  
Bargains and compromises between the government and the developers 
usually happen in the process of obtaining these permissions, if not to 
mention the corruptions accompanied. For developers, the exterior designs 
of the buildings are subordinate to maximizing the floor area ratio through 
Opinions from offices of 
environment, firefighting, 
hygiene, etc.  
Projects involving the change of 
land use attributes, land 
acquisition or transfer of the 
using right. 
Projects without changing the 
land attribute 
The developer buy survey map 
from qualified institutions. 
The developer applies for confirmations 
on the planning area and design codes 
from the planning administrative office.  
The developer obtain the PNL 
and LUPP.  
The developer submits the design 
proposal.  
The planning administrative office 
confirms the planning area and provides 
design requirements.  
Proposal produced by 
qualified institutions.  
The planning office approve the 
proposal 
Opinions from offices of 
environment, firefighting, 
hygiene, etc.  
The developer applies for the BP.  The design of construction 
plans   
The planning administrative office 
issue the BP.  
Preparation for constructions. 
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design. To avoid censorship from the upper level administrative offices as 
well as complains or even lawsuit from the local residents, the inspectors in 
planning bureau are quite sensitive to a series parameter such as the 
building heights, the floor space ration, the sunlight time calculation11 as well 
as the commercial/residential floor ratio.  
5.7 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN REGENERATION 
PROJECTS  
5.7.1The Evolution of Public Participation in China  
The appearance of public participation in China can be traced back to the 
‘tenant movement’ in Shanghai in the late Qing dynasty (around 1910s) with 
primarily economic demands (Zhang, S., 2010). The major participants 
consist of small retailers and individuals with relatively high social status. The 
movement was backed by local celebrities, organizations as well as 
commercial unions in the form of public declarations and donations. The 
attitude of the municipal government was that both sides should negotiate 
peacefully and priority should be given to maintaining the harmony. 
                                            
 
 
11The sunlight time calculation is widely used by Chinese planning administrative system to make sure 
the newly built/old builds can receive the minimum direct sun light during winter. For new development 
projects with high density, the master plan of the site is usually determined by the result of the 
calculation. 
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According to Zhang (2010), due to the various backgrounds of participants, 
negative news emerged after the initiation of the movements, rumours 
spread among the tenants that the local authorities had allowed them to cut 
back their rents if no agreements can be reached. Some opportunists even 
collected money from retailers in the name of ‘supporting the movement’. The 
detention of one activist has eventually ignited a large-scale strike by small 
retailers, although some of the shopkeepers close their doors unwillingly but 
was threatened to do so by proactive union members. To eliminate the 
turmoil, the municipal government reacted swiftly and various measures were 
taken, such as making a series of criteria on the rents, sending high level 
officers to convince the shopkeepers to re-open the door and releasing the 
former detained activist while arrested some key numbers that attempted to 
get illegal profit from the chaos. The representatives, leaders of organizations 
and celebrities were called for a meeting later by the local authority and 
eventually compromised (Zhang and Chin, 2002).  
There was a tradition for Chinese people to gather together and resist the 
government’s decisions when they get a sense of unfairness. In the 1920s’ 
Shanghai, merchants on the same street united to resist unreasonable taxes 
as well as to protect their legal rights against the authority. This road-based 
chamber of commerce can be seen as an alternative to the larger one, which 
from small retailers’ point of view, is manipulated by the authority as well as 
big players. Representatives were publicly elected and small fees were 
collected for maintaining the daily operation of these organizations. Nanjing 
Road Chamber of Commerce was such an organization with great influence. 
According to Peng (2009), the committee was well organized and played an 
important role in mediating the disputes not only between employers and 
employees but also between authorities and the individual retailers. Moreover, 
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it contributed to managing and maintaining public facilities and supporting the 
civic right movements. This can be seen as the prototype of an alternative 
strategy in reaction to the lack of formal venue for citizen participation in 
decision making relating to their benefits. One the one hand, according to 
Sun (2007), the tenants within such a union are tied by the same interest, e.g. 
the economic demanding, rather than by consistent identification of a 
community. It is partly due to the fact that the majority of the participants in 
such movement were rootless migrants. On the other hand, the Nanjing 
National Government at that time intended to share the bonus of the rising 
rent to finance the upcoming wars in North China known as Northern 
Expedition12. To some extent, the movements was also a reflection of the 
social class struggle, in which landlords and property owners usually serve as 
the target to the proletariat. The shaping of current political system as well as 
some mobilizing models used by the Chinese Communist Party can indeed 
be traced back to the period between 1937 and 1949 when China 
experienced two nationwide wars. One was against the Japanese’s invasion 
from 1937 to 1945, the other was the civil war led the China’s Communist 
Party and the Kuomingtang (Chinese Nationalist Party) between 1947 and 
1949. 
After the civil war, China’s was facing a severe housing shortage. In 
consistent with the socialist ideology and limited policy choices, the 
                                            
 
 
12 A military campaign led by the Kuomintang (KMT) from 1926 to 1928. 
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government emulated the Soviet Union’s planned economic system to 
reduce the financial deficit, promote industry production and supply the way 
for establishment of a welfare housing system. The core of the economic 
policy, according to Rowe (2005.p.109) was to expand the reproduction of 
the means of primary production, i.e. primary industry, and to avoid rivalry 
from non-productive urbanization, i.e., housing, for scare resource and the 
Work Units emerged under such a background, which was usually relatively 
large and highly mixed-used environment, incorporating production centres, 
living quarters, social services, leisure activities and easy access to daily and 
occasional shopping facilities. It is geologically a large community where 
people are relatively familiar with each other thanks to the social bonds 
established by their working positions in the first place.  
Since 1978, the dominant ideology has been gradually shifted from class 
struggle to socialist modernization, followed in 1984 by a planned market 
economy and in the 1990s by a fully-fledged socialist economy, 
commercialization of housing, as a commodity and not as a welfare good, 
substantially loosened the hold on housing by work-unit communities. Yet the 
political system inherited from Chairman Mao has not been changed 
profoundly. It was this political system, according to Ferguson (2012a), that 
facilitated the past 30 years’ high economic growth on the Mainland. However, 
as is mentioned by Rowe (2005, p30), civil society has remained weak in its 
lasting impact on political landscapes, and business and political 
arrangements have remained diffuse and murky in China, which is different 
from its western counterparts such as Europe and the US where he local 
participatory process is routinely available and have had such a salutary 
effect on many public and private urban proposals. Li and Liang (2011) 
argued that the current public participation practices in China are facing three 
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major obstacles: 
(1) The public lack awareness towards public participation and are 
indifferent about political issues. 
(2) The public lacks the necessary ability, including information, 
educational level as well perspective required by decision make.  
(3) The public participation in China lacks efficient organizational support, 
which can be further divided into three levels. Among the top is the fuzzy 
regulations on public participation and the discretion power hold by local 
governors that decide when and how the public can participate. 
Meanwhile, representatives usually lack legitimacy, as in many cases 
they are appointed by the organizers. The third level is that the 
participants are usually not well organized or the organizations are 
actually a branch of the government.  
5.7.2 The Legislations for Public Participation  
The Town and Country Planning Act 2008 of the PRC established the 
framework for public participation, as is shown in Table 5.7 and 5.8: 
Table 5.7: The legislation framework for public participation 
 
Principles  26.Before the submission of town and country planning, the 
organizers should inform the public about the content of 
the draft planning.    
43.……Planning administrative department of city and town 
government is required to  inform the land and resources 
department of the same level as well as inform the public.  
8. The organizer of planning making is required to publish the 
approved planning promptly.  
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40.…… planning administrative departments of city and town 
government is required publish the approved site plan and 
the master plan of approved projects.  
The citizens’ 
rights to know 
9. Any organizations and individuals …… have the rights to 
enquire the planning administrative department about the 
legitimacy of construction projects relating to their 
immediate interests.  
54.The outcomes of censorship and supervision should be 
published to enable the supervision and scrutiny from the 
public.  
48.The change of regulatory plan ……should consult with the 
individuals and organizations whose interest are involved.  
50.The change of site plan and master plan of construction 
projects …… should consult with the individuals and 
organizations whose interest are involved. 
Venue for the 
public to 
express their 
ideas 
9.Organizations and individuals have the rights to report and 
complain activities violate the town and country planning. 
The urban planning as well as other related administrative 
department should accept, inspect and deal with the issues 
promptly.  
26.Public hearings or other forms of public participation should 
be organized before the submission of town and country 
planning.  
46.Public hearings or other forms of public participation should 
be organized before making or modifying the provincial 
urban system planning, urban and township master plan.  
50. Public hearings or other forms of public participation 
should be organized before the change of site plan and 
master plan of construction projects. 
Emphasizing 
on the 
significance of   
public will in 
planning 
making   
16.Opinions collected from various venues (People’s 
congress, professionals, public) together with the solutions 
should be submitted together with the provincial urban 
system planning, urban and township master plan.  
26.The suggestions and opinions from experts should be 
considered seriously and related solutions as well as 
reasons need to be declared in the submitted materials.  
22.The village planning should be discussed and approved by 
the village council or villagers’ congress before 
submission.  
Violations, 
rules and legal 
responsibilities  
58. The upper level government has the right to supervise and 
regulate the making, modifying and submission of planning 
organized by its subordinate government. Any actions 
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violating the procedure or law will be looked into and the 
leading personal shell be held responsibility.  
60. If any of the listed conditions is found in the township 
government or above, the government, the administrative 
department from the up level government and the 
supervisory authority have the rights command it to be 
amended, and the leading personal shell be held 
responsibility. 
(4) Failed to publish the approved site plan and construction 
master plan.  
(5) Approving modifying the detailed plan, site plan or 
construction master plan without consulting the stake 
holders.  
(6) Acquiescing constructing activities without planning 
permissions. 
Sun and Yin (2008) 
 
Table	  5.8:	  The	  Articles	  in	  relation	  to	  Public	  Participation	  
The 18thArticle: ‘The making of country planning should be made according 
to the local situation and follow the local residents’ willingness….’  
The 22thArticle: ‘The country planning should be approved by the villagers or 
their delegates collectively before been submitted to the upper level 
government’.  
The 26thArticle: ‘Before the submission, a 30 days’ planning publicity is 
necessary. Public hearing, discussions as well as other measures should be 
taken by the planning making institution to collect public opinions.  
Together with the planning, a report on the adoption/reject of these 
suggestions should be attached to explain the reasons to the upper level 
administrative departments.’ 
The 27thArticle: ‘Experts as well as related administrative departments 
should be organized to provide opinions before the approval of provincial 
strategic planning as well as the master planning of cities and towns.’ 
The 28thArticle: ‘The implementation of planning should take full 
consideration of the local economic development level and respect the 
citizens’ willingness. The implementation procedure should be well planned 
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and organized. 
Source: Urban and Country Planning Act of the P.R.C. (2008) 
 
 
Theoretically the democratic political system can provide a legal framework 
for protecting the people’s civic rights to participation (Angle 2005). Yet in 
China, the ‘government-to-legislature’ relationship is ‘a division of Labour 
rather than separation of power’ (Cho, 2002, p.729). In such a political 
system, judges subordinate to the party leaders, which makes it extremely 
difficult for local people to seek legal protections illegal activities are 
conducted by the government.  
At local level, regulations are approved by provincial or municipal People’s 
Congresses and only functions within the provincial/municipal government’s 
jurisdictional area. For particular development scheme, the most frequently 
referenced are local regulations, which are approved by the provincial or 
municipal People’s Congress and are only applicable to the 
provincial/municipal government’s jurisdictional area. As a complementary 
part, municipal government are empowered with a considerable degree of 
freedom in explaining the local regulations.  
5.7.3 Major Forms and Venues for Public Participation 
5.7.3.1 Public Hearing  
Currently public hearing is the major form of public participation in China’s 
urban regeneration programs. Wang, Dong and Li (2009) classified public 
hearing into two categories: (1) Formal public hearing (trail type hearings). In 
this type of public hearing, the administration has to provide stakeholders 
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with opportunities to show their evidence in approving or objecting the 
decisions and chances for face-to-face questioning. The final decisions will 
be made based on the records of hearings. (2) Informal public hearings 
(reference-type hearings), in which the public’s opinion only serves as a 
reference for the decision makers. The informal public hearings also appears 
in other forms such as public inform, questioners and focus groups. Through 
examining 31Chinese major cities, they found that in18 cities, of which the 
majority are in the middle and west part of China, public hearings are not 
formally introduced for the urban planning decision making process.  
5.7.3.2 The People’s Congress  
As an essential part of the political system of the People’s Republic of China, 
the People’s Congress serves as the ‘watch dog’ of public interests and has a 
variety of power in terms of enquiring and supervising the government’s 
decisions according to the constitution. Yan and Cheng (2011) discussed the 
legislative paradox in the case that in the ‘Jiangsu provincial Town and 
country planning Regulations’ the People’s Congress is empowered to 
censor the site plan. Whereas approving site plan is an administrative action 
that is directly related to individual interests of citizens. Once the People’s 
Congress hold this power, citizens that disagree with the decisions cannot 
appeal through legal procedures, since according to the PRC’s constitution, 
the court has no right to investigate decisions made by the People’s 
Congress. This is very different from the separation of the 
executive, legislative and judicial powers in western countries.  
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5.7.3.3 Medias and the Internet 
Li and Liang (2011) mentioned the significances of media as an instrument 
as well as venue for public participation. In China, due to the firm control and 
relatively strict censorship on publications from the government, local media’s 
function as venues for expressing public voices are actually undermined, 
especially when encountering sensitive topics that are thought to be potential 
risks for the social ‘harmony’.  
5.8 CONCLUSION 
In the first part of this chapter, the major features of China are depicted. It 
then gives a review to the evolution of urban and regeneration policies in the 
country since 1949. The prevailing patterns of urban regeneration 
programmes are also introduced and the delivery of physical regeneration 
programs within the current institutional setup is examined and the major 
features of public participation in China’s urban regeneration programs are 
also introduced. The major focus was to examine how the structural factors, 
such as the land and property ownership, the urban development strategies, 
the provision and demand of housing and the relationship between central 
and local government, influence China’s inner city regeneration policies and 
practices.  
The state ownership of urban land distinguishes China’s urban development 
model from that in other developed countries. China’ history as a socialist 
country with a predominant left-leaning ideology before the 1970s paved the 
way for the nationalisation of urban land in 1982, as strong anti-capitalism 
movements during the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution (1960s-1970s) 
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deterred people from claiming individual property rights. Such a 
post-socialism feature enables Chinese municipalities to monopolize the 
provision of land for constructions and to extract great economic interests 
from the circulation of urban land. Chinese government indeed became one 
of the most important beneficiaries of recent urban development and physical 
regeneration programs in China.  
China’s cities are unevenly developed. Before the 1980s, the national 
distribution of resources through the planned economic system had a 
significant impact on the urban development of Chinese cities. Many inner 
land cities benefited from Mao’s Three Line Strategy and became the major 
receptors of national investment while east coast cities suffered from 
underinvestment for their vulnerability to airstrike if a war happens. Yet the 
situation reversed since the 1980s, as many East Chinese cities became the 
major beneficiaries of the FDI. Since the 1990s, the Government’s attitude 
towards large cities has also changed dramatically from negative to 
supportive as large cities were seen as important engines for regional 
economic growth.  
Over the past half century, it has also seen significant changes in the 
migration and housing policies in China. The FDI increased the demand for 
labour forces in eastern Chinese cities and the tight control on population 
movement during the socialism era was accordingly loosened. China’ 
housing market was opened up in the 1990s, since then the state gradually 
retreated from the provision of houses. However, the ‘Hukou’ system created 
during the socialism era was retained and is still playing an important role in 
connecting property ownership with migrants’ access to social securities and 
public services. The decentralization of fiscal power in China became an 
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important incentive for local governors to encourage the urbanization, which 
does not only contribute to the local economic growth but also generates 
huge incomes for municipalities.  
The factors listed above together shape the unique features of Chinese inner 
city regeneration policies and practices. The state ownership of urban land 
and the strong desire for developing local economy with highly decentralized 
power make municipalities one of the major facilitators and beneficiaries of 
inner city regeneration programs. The massive migrant population and the 
strong demand for residential properties in Chinese cities make property-led 
regeneration as one of the prevailing regeneration models.  
The urbanization and regeneration process in China, however, has never 
been smooth. The Chinese municipalities’ aggressive involvement in the 
circulation of urban land and its authoritarian features leave little space for 
local people to express their interests, not to mention to bargain with the 
government in an equal position.  
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CHAPTER 6 THE LIVERPOOL CASE  
6.1 THE HISTORY OF LIVERPOOL CITY   
Liverpool locates in the Northwest England, as is shown in Figure 6.1. Over 
the past 200 years, Liverpool had experienced both extreme prosperity and 
decline. Between the 18th and early 20th century (Wilks-Heeg, 2003) the city 
rose as a prominent global trade center (Belchem, 2006). The scale of the 
city had expanded dramatically and it has also seen a plethora of the 
provision of public infrastructures such as the world’s first intercity railway, 
massive housing stock, large public parks and sanitation (Skyes, et al., 2013). 
Yet over the past half century, shrinkage was one of the major features of 
Liverpool (Coach and Cocks, 2012). With the change of external economic 
environment led by the globalization, containerization and Britain’s emphasis 
on the importance of the continental European market, the significance of the 
port in Liverpool was greatly undermined (Couch, 2003). Moreover, Britain’s 
deindustrialization since the 1970s made the city region together with its 
Lancashire hinterland ‘a rust-belt of vacant cotton mills, declining coal fields 
and stagnant canals’ (Sykes, et al, 2013, p. 310), which was accompanied by 
a great loss of population. Liverpool and the city region had experienced a 
dramatic transition towards decline since the 1970s. After peaking at around 
800,000 at the middle of 1930s, the population in Liverpool consistently 
shrank, and in 2011 the figure was only 466,415 (Bartlett, 2012). The 
dramatic loss of population resulted in widespread derelictions and many 
neighborhoods in Liverpool suffered from high unemployment rates and the 
associated social problems such as drugs, crimes, and riots (Lane, 1978; 
Couch, 2003). According to the Census 1991, the unemployment rate in 
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Liverpool was as high as 21.6% in 1971.  
Figure	  6.1	  The	  geographical	  location	  of	  Liverpool	  in	  the	  UK	   	  
 
Source: Sykes, et al., 2013, pp. 301 
In the 1960s the overoptimistic attitude regarding the future economic and 
population growth in Liverpool led to wrong policy reactions and ‘the 
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energetic adoption of comprehensive area clearance and redevelopment 
policies had made things even worse’ (Sykes, et al.,2013, p. 310). The 
central-local relation went sour in the 1980s when the militant Liverpool 
council disagreed with the severe budget cuts from the Thatcher government 
and chose confrontation rather than cooperation (Parkinson, 1985; Frost and 
North, 2013). Parkinson and Bianchini (1993) argued that the Liverpool 
municipality’s fight against central government for more resources cost 
opportunities for revitalizing the city. The confrontation did not only affect the 
inflow of public funding streams, but also deterred investments from private 
sectors. As is argued by Frost and North (2013, p.27): 'Liverpool in the early 
1980s suffered from a triple crisis: an economic crisis in common with the rest 
of the country that saw manufacturing and port employment decimated; a 
geographical crisis that left a largely derelict city marooned on the wrong side 
of the country; and a political crisis as the city's leaders failed to raise to these 
challenges’.  
Real progress in revitalizing Liverpool has been made since the late 1990s, 
when the city had a Liberal Democratic municipal government that was more 
willing to cooperate with central government in providing a business-friendly 
environment. Various funding streams such as the Single Regeneration 
Budget (SRB), the Housing Market Renewal Initiatives (HMRI) and the New 
Deal for Community (NDC) were channelled in. Additionally, Liverpool’s 
successful bid for the 2008 European Cultural Capital helped to attract 
regeneration funding from both public and private sectors to initiate a range 
of revitalization projects in the waterfront area (Jones and Wilks-Heeg, 2004), 
such as the new Liverpool Museum, the Tate Gallery, the International 
Slavery Museum and the privately funded Beatles museum. With the help of 
the EU Objective One funding and investment from private sectors, a new 
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commercial complex - the Liverpool One was built in the city centre (Shrples 
and Stonard, 2008).  
In spit of the numerous regeneration initiatives and the positive changes they 
brought to Liverpool, the city is still facing great challenges. A study 
conducted by the Centre for Cities (2012) comparing the 64 primary British 
urban areas showed that ‘Liverpool was still the most deprived borough in 
England and… spatially concentrated deprivation is among the most acute in 
the UK in Liverpool’s central, northern and peripheral residential districts’ 
(quoted from Sykes, et al., 2013, pp. 300). This can be explained from two 
perspectives. Firstly, over the past three decades, the economic basis of 
Liverpool has undergone restructuring. Between 1998 and 2007, two sectors 
became the major contributors for the employment growth in Liverpool: 1) the 
financial services and 2) the public administration, education and health 
services, with a growth rate of 47.1% and 25.7% respectively. Yet dramatic 
decline happened in the manufacturing sector, offering only 5.7% jobs by 
2007, in contrast with over 60% jobs in the former two sectors (Pion 
Economic, 2006, p.7, quoted from Couch, et al, 2009, p. 327). Old 
neighbourhoods with a higher concentration of ‘working class’ residents who 
generally lack the skills needed in the fast growing sectors therefore shared 
little benefits from the growth of the city (Allen, 2008). Secondly, the national 
housing policies also had a great impact on Liverpool. There are many 
pre-1919 terraced houses locating in the surrounding areas of the city centre, 
which were built to accommodate dockers. In the 1970s and 80s, the boom of 
social housing was triggered by the ‘right to buy’ program. It has seen major 
funding streams coming from central government in helping social housing 
associations to acquire and refurbish these old properties and then let them 
out to social tenants. Yet public subsidies for refurbishing old properties 
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shrunk since the late 1990s while the design and quality of the terraced 
properties became obsolete and were less attractive to middle class people, 
who would flee from the city centre and live in suburbs and it has therefore 
seen a doughnut-shaped deprived area lying in between the city centre and 
the affluent suburban areas (Nevin and Lee, 2003; Couch, et al., 2009)  
Since the early 2000s, a number of Area Based Initiatives (ABIs) such as the 
New Deal for Community (NDC) and the Housing Market Renewal Initiatives 
(HMRI) had been implemented to help address problems faced by particular 
deprived areas in Liverpool. After a decade, the funding streams for the 
majority of these initiatives ceased and a closer examination on how the 
targeted neighbourhoods were affected is necessary, especially when 
considering the fact that many neighbourhoods in Liverpool are still in 
deprivation (Centre for Cities, 2012).  
6.2 THE LOCATION OF THE KENSINGTON 
REGENERATION AREA AND THE BOUNDARIES OF 
THE ABIs 
Regeneration practices in Kensington can serve as a typical case for 
understanding how the ABIs were implemented on the ground and how they 
affected the targeted neighborhoods. As one of the most deprived areas in 
the UK, the Kensington Regeneration area (Figure 6.1) had received funding 
from both the NDC and the HMRI programs since the early 2000s, yet after a 
decade’s regeneration practices, the area (Kensington and Fairfield Ward) 
still ranks the third most deprived ward in Liverpool and the top 5% most 
deprived wards in the UK (Liverpool City Council, 2011).  
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Figure	  6.1	  The	  Location	  of	  Kensington	  Regeneration	  Area	  
 
Source: Liverpool City Council, 2011, pp. 4 
 
The Kensington regeneration area situates immediately east of Liverpool 
city centre, as is shown in Figure 6.2.  
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Figure	  6.2:	  The	  location	  of	  the	  Kensington	  Regeneration	  Area	   	  
 
In 1998 five neighbourhoods, which were respectively Kensington Fields, 
Holt Road, Holly Road, part of Fairfield and Edge Hill, together won the 
NDC status, the boundary of the Kensington NDC area is shown in Figure 
6.3.  
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Figure	  6.3:	  The	  five	  neighborhoods	  covered	  by	  the	  Kensington	  NDC	  
 
In 2002, Liverpool was selected as one of the nine Pathfinders of the 
Housing Market Renewal Initiatives (HMRI) by New Labour aiming at 
bridging the gap between the housing prices in the selected areas and that 
of the overall region, which was primarily realized through demolishing the 
existing terraced houses and replacing them with new residential 
properties. Within the city, four Zones of Opportunity13 were identified, 
                                            
 
 
13A defined area with the most acute problems of social and economic deprivation, physical decay and 
dysfunctional housing markets, and most in need of action and investment. 
 192 
which were respectively: City Centre North, City Centre South, Wavertree 
and Stanley Park, as is shown in Figure 6.4: 
Figure	  6.4:	  the	  four	  designated	  Opportunity	  Zones	  in	  Liverpool	   	  
 
Source: Housing Market Renewal in Liverpool, Annual report 2008/09, pp.5.  
 
Within the four Opportunity Zones, seven Renewal Areas were designated 
and Kensington was one of them, locating in the Wavertree Zone, where it 
was planned to build ‘531 new homes and 40,000 square feet of new 
commercial floor space with the potential to generate up to 2,000 new jobs’ 
(Liverpool City Council, 2004). The Kensington Renewal Area was the 
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largest one among the seven Renewal Areas for the population it has and 
the area it covers. The project was designated in 2004 and was planned to 
be a 10-year-long programme. However, it was ceased in 2010 after the 
coalition government came into power. The boundary of the designated 
Kensington Housing Market Renewal Initiative (KHMRI) area is shown in 
Figure 6.5: 
Figure	  6.5:	  The	  designated	  Kensington	  Renewal	  Area	   	  
 
Source: Source: Soure: Kensington Implementation Plan UPDATE, pp. 21. Liverpool 
City Council 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.5, the boundaries of the 
KNDC and the KHMRI programs were largely overlapped. 
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6.3 THE PROFILE OF THE ABIs IN KENSINGTON 
6.3.1 The KNDC  
6.3.1.1 The KNDC Program and the Rationale 
The KNDC was announced in 1998, when the area was amongst the 1% 
most deprived wards in England if measured by the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD) (Russell, et al., 2009). The regeneration area consisted of 
4,200 households and 5,050 homes, most of which were pre-1914 residential 
buildings (EIUA, 2010). The properties were in a mixed ownership: 40% 
owner occupation, 30% Registered Social Landlords (RSLs), 20% privately 
rented and the rest of the 10% was owned by the Local Authority (Russell, et 
al., 2009, p.5) 
At the beginning of the KNDC program, the area was facing a number of 
challenges. Firstly, the Kensington Regeneration area is situated on the edge 
of the Liverpool City Centre and was a major gateway into the city, yet it had 
a derelict physical environment and a large number of old housing stock that 
were not properly maintained and could not attract affluent buyers in the 
housing market; Secondly, long-term unemployment rates in the area was 
high and lacking necessary skills and proper education continuously kept 
many local people from undertaking a job; Thirdly, the area had high levels of 
crime and drug & alcohol dependency, which had a detrimental impact on its 
reputation and led to underperformance of the local housing market; 
Additionally, high level of turnover and vacancy rates continuously attract 
disadvantaged people coming into the area and at the same time it has seen 
a significant outflow of population with higher affordability during the 1980s 
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and 1990s, which makes the area in a cycle of decline (Nevin, 2010; Russell, 
et al., 2009). Apart from the fact that previously little public funding was 
allocated to help tackle problems faced by the area, there were also political 
reasons for selecting Kensington rather than other deprived neighbourhoods 
in Liverpool, as from1998 Liverpool City Council (LCC) was led by the Liberal 
Democrats, who enjoyed a strong support from Kensington. 
Another special feature of the KNDC program was its emphasis on public 
participation. It was realized through the establishment of the partnership that 
was in charge of the delivery of the regeneration programme.  As a 
response to the lack of community involvement in the previous British ABIs 
initiated between the1960s and the 1990s, the NDC partnership was to bring 
all parts together for the consensus building and to enable power-sharing in 
regeneration programs. According to detailed guidance given in Involving 
Communities in Urban and Rural Regeneration: A Guide for Practitioners 
(DETR, 1997), partnerships were assumed not only to be the interface 
connecting central government and local people but also the major facilitator 
of regeneration projects at the community level and there is a strong 
connection between the performance of individual NDC partnership and the 
outcomes of the regeneration initiatives. As the accountable body, NDC 
partnerships enjoy a considerable freedom in selecting and implementing 
public funded regeneration projects.  
The KNDC formally started in 2001 and over its 10 years’ life span central 
government had distributed a grant of £62 million, which was the largest 
amount of the NDC funding received by the 39 NDC areas. Funding from the 
municipal government and private sectors were also levered in to make 
improvements in five outcome areas, which were respectively housing and 
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physical environment, unemployment, crime, health and education.  
6.3.1.2 The Operation of the KNDC Programme 
One of the key dimensions of the NDC program was to enhance the local 
co-ordination and realize greater community empowerment. The KNDC 
program was delivered by the Kensington Regeneration (KR) - a 
partnership that was founded in 2001 with a coordinative board initially 
consisted of 20 board members, of which 10 were elected local residents, 3 
were private sector representatives and 7 were from the following agencies: 
police, health service, employment service, local authority, RSLs and Black 
and Racial Minority communities (Couch and Cocks, 2012). Liverpool City 
Council (LCC) was designated as the accountable body of the KR, with a 
responsibility of checking that appropriate systems are in place for financial 
probity; project appraisal and approval and processing the receipt and 
expenditure of NDC funding and support KR in delivering its program. And 
there were some major agencies involved in the delivery of the 
regeneration programme, including: Community 714, Liverpool Vision15 and 
Bellway Homes16. The KR was responsible for managing and delivering the 
                                            
 
 
14 A community-based housing association; set up as a subsidiary of Riverside Housing, 
which had been the largest landlord in the area. 
15 The first Urban Regeneration Company in the UK, in charge of leading delivering public 
infrastructure development and investment projects.  
16 A private developer that was appointed as developer for the Wavertree Zone from 2005.  
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program in accordance with the NDC guidance and the delivery plan; 
ensuring proper administrative systems were in place; appraising, 
approving and monitoring projects; making arrangements with delivery 
agents and securing best value for money in purchasing goods and 
services (Russell, et al., 2009, p.75). According to the arrangement of the 
partnership, the decision-making rights were finally allocated to a small 
group of people - the Kensington Regeneration (KR) board, while the rest 
of the communities were delegated by the board members. The 
composition of the board was later slightly changed. In 2008, the KR board 
contained 29 board members, including 2 representatives from each of the 
five areas; 2 nominees of the Parks Community Forum; 3 private sector 
representatives selected by the invitation of the chair with the endorsement 
of the board (Hand picked); 2 elected members from the Partnership's 
Accountable Body; 2 for minority groups; and 1 for each of the public 
institutions; nearly 2/3 of the board members were local residents (KNDC 
Annual Report, 2008).  
Many of the social programs were initiated following a bottom-up model. To 
get the KNDC funding, the organization has to demonstrate how their 
contributions to the community are in line with what the decision makers want 
to see in the area. As is put by one of the interviewees: 
‘Kensington Regeneration’ spoke to the community about what kind of 
improvement they want to see in the area, and then organizations and 
projects are created to apply for funding, so that Kensington 
Regeneration could deliver their needs’. (Alicia, Local resident who 
opposed the HMRI, interviewed in 2013)  
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‘The concept for one of the social regeneration programs was to give out 
internet-ready computers for free to community members in Kensington 
so the digital divide would be bridged. People in the local area were poor 
and they could not afford the equipment, which at that time were quite 
expensive. (Alicia, Local resident who opposed the HMRI, interviewed in 
2013) 
6.3.1.3 Progress made by the KNDC 
According to Russell, et al. (2009), from 2000 to 2009, the overall spending of 
the KNDC program was £80.8m, of which £55m came from the NDC funding, 
£24.2m from the municipal government and the rest £1.6m from private and 
voluntary sectors. Social regeneration was one of the most important parts of 
the overall regeneration strategy. The total spending on social regeneration 
programs accounted for 56%. The expenditures on each of the social 
regeneration themes were respectively: £12.8m on Crime and Community 
safety (of which £3.8m was NDC funding), accounting for 16%; £8.5m on 
Education and Learning (of which £6.2m was NDC funding), accounting for 
11%; £8.5m on Health (£2.1m was NDC funding), accounting for 11%; £8.2m 
on Employment and Business (£5.6m was NDC funding) , accounting for 
10% and £7.3m on Community and Cooperate (£6.3m was NDC funding), 
accounting for 9%. Since the municipal government took a major 
responsibility for the Crime and Community safety and Health, the proportion 
of NDC funding invested in the two areas was comparatively small.   
A number of social programs in relation to each of the thematic areas were 
funded. For instance, the Kensington Community Learning Centre (KCLC) 
was established to improve local people’s computer skills; the Health Energy 
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Advice Team (HEAT) that was established to provide local residents who are 
tracked in poverty with advices and support covering a range of themes such 
as domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse and accessing to training and 
employment, etc.; the Youth inclusion Project that works with around 60 
youngsters identified by the police; the Kensington Crime Alert Project in 
helping small retailers reporting offending behaviours etc.  
Additionally, the NDC funding was also used to provide a number of facilities 
such as a Sports Centre, the Kensington Campus where Kensington Infant 
and Junior Schools and the Life Bank are located on. The KNDC was one of 
the major supporters in getting a secondary school for the area on the edge 
of Newsham Park, which was a joint Catholic and Local Community school. 
Some of the existing projects also received funding from the KNDC. Over the 
10 years, a number of social projects were supported by the KNDC 
partnership using the NDC funding to help local residents. As one of the 
scholars put it:   
‘They brought some very good new facilities into the area…some good 
work in relation to community cohesion…. some of the staff members of 
the team did quite a lot of work to bring different social groups 
together…they have multi culture things…before that, no body was 
trying to do some works to maintain decent relationships across the 
community…it has been a racial mixed area …they were helping them 
develop their own support networks, within the group…they have some 
nice little environmental projects, refurbishment of gardens…good work 
with the schools…local people on board did particularly want pursue 
education as a dimension, later on, they thought it was one of the best 
projects…a lot of work with local primary schools…the KNDC work with 
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the Philharmonic Orchestra, to invite the Orchestra going into the school 
and then those children were actually performing in the Philharmonic hall 
and their parents were going who’d never across the door before. That 
kind of discovering talents is hugely important’ (Hillary, Scholar, 
Interviewed in 2014) 
‘…it had an impact on a lot of areas and made a big multiple impact on 
all those folks…it laid the foundation for the community with the better 
capacity’ (Tom, Professional who supported the Regeneration programs, 
Interviewed in 2014)  
‘The big success of Kensington Regeneration was the work on 
community cohesion over ten year period, the work they did with 
educational bursaries was a huge success…’ (Nik, Politician against the 
KNDC, Interviewed in 2013) 
6.3.1.4 The Previous Evaluation of the KNDC Program  
The NDC ended in 2011 and some of the researchers (Beatty, et al., 2011) 
suggested that ‘when compared with benchmark data, there is only modest 
net change for NDC areas and their residents, much of which reflects 
improving attitudes towards the area, rather than for the people-related 
outcomes of health, education and unemployment…community engagement 
raped fewer benefits, and proved more problematic...’ (Lawless, 2012, p.313) 
Indicators show moderate improvements in the five outcome areas in the 
KNDC area (Russell, et al.,2009): in 2008 43% of the local people were in 
paid work while the figure was 35% in 2002; the unemployment in Kensington 
moved from 72% higher than the city average in 2002 to 60% higher in 2008; 
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the proportion of people suffering from work limiting illness decreased from 
19.3% to 17.3%; for house burglaries, the rate dropped from 73% higher than 
the city average in 2000 to 21.4% higher in 2006/07. Additionally, the last 
decade has also seen a significant demographic change in the area. In 2000, 
non-white groups accounts for only 5% of the total population living in 
Kensington, the figure had risen to 28% in 2009, of which the Irish and other 
white background accounts for 9%, Asian or Asian British accounts for 5%, 
Black or Black British accounts for 5%, and Chinese or other ethnic groups 
accounts for 3%. It has also seen an inflated housing price in the area, thanks 
to the recovery of housing market before 2008. However, the percentage of 
respondents who felt unable to influence decisions affecting their area rose 
from 66% to 75%.  
There were some readings regarding the underperformance of the NDC 
program in bringing changes to the targeted communities in previous studies. 
Firstly, although the NDC provided around £50m funding for each of the 39 
NDC areas over the ten years, the expenditure per capita per year was only 
around £580 (Lawless，et al., 2010), which was too small to bring immediate 
changes to the communities that have been deprived for decades (Beatty, 
2010). Secondly, setting up partnerships and making them operate smoothly 
were proved to be extremely time-consuming (Lawless, et al., 2010) and the 
first few years of the program has seen a considerable proportion of time 
been spent on issues such as staff recruiting, learning and debating (Lawless, 
et al., 2010; Russell, et al., 2009). Secondly, it was argued by some scholars 
(Hull, 2006; Russell, et al., 2009) that delivering projects and spending the 
NDC budgets became the priority for the partnerships and ‘annual budgeting 
rounds dominated activity, not evidence-based assessments as to how 
outcome change could be achieved’ (Lawless, et.al., 2010, pp. 265). 
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Moreover, it was believed that central government had a comparatively firm 
control over the local partnerships in deciding the types of regeneration 
initiatives that can get access to the funding and the ‘NDC program became a 
mechanism for delivering a series of mainstream projects within broad 
expected outcomes defined by central government’ (Beatty, et al., 2010).  
According to some of the scholars (Wright, et al., 2006; Russell, et al., 2009; 
Lawless, et al., 2012;), the public participation model adopted in the NDC 
programs faced a number of challenges. Firstly, communities need capacities 
to lead the regeneration program, which requires time and practices to be 
built. Secondly, there were mistrusts existing between local people and the 
public sectors and, sometimes, among different community groups. Thirdly, 
the representatives that involved in the regeneration board sometimes only 
represent minority views or those specific interest groups. Moreover, in some 
cases it is the public funding rather than wider goals that attract people to 
participate.  
6.3.2 THE KHMRI 
6.3.2.1 The Delivery of the KHMRI  
Between 2002 and 2008 the nine Housing Market Renewal pathfinder areas 
had received a funding of £1.2 billion in total, in the following 3 years a further 
£1 billion was channelled in. The HMRI didn’t last for 15 years as it was 
initially planned and the funding for the program was ceased in 2010 with the 
coalition came into power. The KHMRI project was delivered by a four-way 
partnership including central government, the municipal government, social 
landlords and private developers. The Government as the major provider of 
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funding owned the rights to appropriate all the selected HMR areas while the 
city council was local accountable body. The delivery of the project was 
looked after by the Strategic Housing Authorities, within each of them there 
was a major social housing provider and a private housing provider. In the 
Edge Hill case the social landlord was the Community 7 while the private 
developer was the Bellway, Co.,Ltd. The Government provided funding for 
the property acquisition and demolition while Liverpool City Council 
supervised the property expropriation, demolition and held ‘the primary 
responsibility for all aspects of the programme concerned with 
transformational redevelopment’ (Liverpool City Council, 2004). Community 7, 
as the largest stakeholder in the area owning around 350 dwellings, was one 
of the most important players in the program. Indeed to reduce the 
expenditures on maintaining the old housing stock, Community 7 gave away 
around two thirds of its property ownership in the area in return for around 
100 newly built properties. And the land acquired using the public money was 
handed over by the council to Bellway for free. From 2002 to 2007, housing 
prices in Waver Tree Opportunity Zone had inflated by 247%, from £26,000 
to £92,000 (Liverpool City Council, 2010). In encouraging the former 
residents to stay, Equity Relocation Loan17 was offered to bridge the gap 
between the compensation they received and the costs for purchasing a new 
property.  
                                            
 
 
17 A financial product to help bridge the gap between, the value of a property that has been scheduled 
for clearance and the cost of purchasing alternative accommodation. 
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‘It’s great to see such good progress in the Edge Hill area, which will lead 
to new modern homes for local residents and their families’ (Cllr Joe 
Anderson, Liverpool City Council, 2010)  
In the KHMRI Area, housing development mainly concentrated in Edge Hill 
(Figure 6.6), which locates to the west of the Edge Lane- the gateway into the 
Liverpool city centre from the M62 highway. The Edge Hill Housing Renewal 
project was divided into three phases as can be seen in Figure 6.7. There 
were ‘around 700 dwellings, including flats and terraced houses, bound to be 
demolished, of which over half were social rented, where as around 30% 
home ownership and 10% private landlords’ (McGuire, interviewed in 2014).  
Figure	  6.6:	  The	  intervention	  map	  for	  the	  KHMRI	  Area	   	  
 
Soure: Kensington Implementation Plan UPDATE, pp. 22. Liverpool City 
Council  
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Figure	  6.7:	  The	  phase	  plan	  for	  the	  Edge	  hill	  Housing	  Demolition	   	  
 
Source: Soure: Kensington Implementation Plan UPDATE, pp. 23. Liverpool 
City Council  
 
There were two Compulsory Purchase Orders18 imposed back to back on 
Phase One. The appeal from local residents and the judicial process delayed 
the process for three years into 2008, when the economic crisis happened 
and developing confidence vanished. For phase 2, a CPO was approved by 
                                            
 
 
18 A legal tool that enables the Council to acquire properties in order to facilitate the consolidation of land 
interests needed to take forward regeneration within an area. The acquiring authority must confirm their 
intention to engage in the CPO process with the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State. Once 
notification of the order has been served, members of the public are entitled to submit objections. In the 
event that formal objections are not withdrawn, a Public Local Inquiry will be held 
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the Secretary of State in 2008 and was not challenged. The construction in 
the Edge Hill area thus started on the site of Phase 2/2a and by 2013 167 
new properties were erected. There wasn’t a CPO order put on phase 3 and 
the negotiation between the municipal government and homeowners on 
phase 3 ended in 2014 when the last occupier accepted the conditions 
offered by the council for demolishing of her property.   
6.3.2.2 The Previous Evaluation of the KHMR 
Some evaluations regarding the programme were made in previous studies 
(Leather and Nevin, 2012; Wilson, 2013;): Firstly, at the beginning of the 
HMR programme, the government was facing an oversupply of old properties 
in some deprived neighbourhoods. Yet the situation changed dramatically 
since 2007 when high vacancies and low housing prices were replaced by a 
shortage of housing supply and a inflation of housing price national wide 
(Leather and Nevin, 2012). Secondly, the HMR program imposed ‘large scale 
Whitehall targets for demolition and clearance across the Midlands and the 
North of England’ and was resisted by local residents (Wilson, 2013); Thirdly, 
the top-down approach in many areas could not be implemented smoothly 
due to strong resistances from local people and leaves some families isolated 
in abandoned streets (Turcu, 2012); Additionally, the obsession with 
demolition over refurbishment was strongly criticised by many local residents   
and the designation of areas for demolition increased deprivation in the areas  
(Allen, 2008;Webb, 2010); In some cases it was found that for demolition, 
‘areas were intentionally managed to decline’ and there was a lack of 
transparency of the pathfinder Quangos (Taylor, 2007). For many local 
residents, the promised transformation in their neighbourhood was delayed 
and many of them are eventually priced out of their own community (Allen, 
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2008).  
6.4 CONCLUSION 
In the first part of this chapter, the history of Liverpool city is reviewed. It then 
moves on to introduce the profile of Kensington Regeneration area and the 
Area Based Initiatives implemented in it, which are respectively the 
Kensington New Deal for Community (KNDC) and the Kensington Housing 
Market Renewal Initiative (KHMRI).  
The two regeneration programs were both initiated by New Labour in the 
2000s and underpinned by large amount of central funding. Their boundaries 
were largely overlapped and their target was to bring improvement to the 
selected areas. Both of them emphasised the importance of public 
participation. Yet some differences existed between the two projects as well. 
Firstly, while the 10-year programme KNDC formally started in 2001 and 
ended in 2011 as planned, the KHMRI, which was claimed to be a 15-year 
programme, started in 2004 and only lasted 7 years due to the budget cuts in 
2010. The unexpected cease of funding had a negative impact on the 
performance of the latter. Secondly, the KNDC was designed to make 
improvements in five outcome areas covering both social and physical 
aspects and housing and physical environment was one of the themes, while 
the KHMRI mainly focused on renewing residential houses and in particular 
neighbourhoods the major means was demolition and reconstruction, which 
yield some strong local resistance. Behind the two projects were very 
different rationales. The KNDC was designed to tackle the deprivation 
holistically and some of the projects it funded were to help local residents 
prepare themselves for re-entering the job market while the KHMRI was 
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initiated to revive the failed local housing market and to attract middle class 
buyers.  The forms of public participation adopted by the two programs were 
different as well. Although both of the programmes were delivered through a 
‘partnership’, as is described in the official discourse, the phrase actually 
referred to very different things. For the KNDC, the ‘partnership’ was 
embodied by a regeneration board that formed by delegates from various 
stakeholders. The distribution of the NDC funding was largely decided by 
such a committee. In the KHMRI, however, ‘partnership’ mainly referred to 
the coalition of central government, the municipal government, social 
landlords and private developers, who worked together in evacuating the 
former occupiers of the old properties that were subjected to demolition and 
delivering new housing units. Local residents, who were claimed to be an 
indispensable part of the ‘partnership’ in the official discourse, participated 
mainly in the form of consultation and public hearing.  
For local residents living in the Kensington regeneration area, they have been 
affected by both. Previous research on the NDC the HMRI programs 
intended to examine the two initiatives separately and to get a general 
conclusion that could be used to explain the major features of the two 
nationwide regeneration initiatives. Up till now, very little efforts have been 
done in looking at how different regeneration initiatives exert their impacts on 
the same area and the remaining part of this research adopted such a 
perspective. Another shortcoming suffered by previous evaluations of the 
NDC and HMRI programs is that the impacts of the regeneration programs 
on local areas together with the delivery of the programs are context-specific. 
Research based on statistic data has limited capacity in elaborating the 
realities of the regeneration projects. This research focuses on the 
Kensington Regeneration area that was covered by both the NDC and the 
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HMRI, and probed how the two different initiatives were implemented and 
how different players interacted within the framework shaped by the 
structural factors as well as specific rationales behind the regeneration 
programs.  
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CHAPTER 7 THE XI’AN CASE 
7.1 THE HISTORY OF XI’AN CITY 
Xi’an locates in the northwest part of China and is one of the major inland 
cities of the country (Figure 7.1). As the provincial capital of Shan’xi, the 
administrative area of Xi’an city consists of 10 districts and 4 counties with a 
built-up area of 449 km2 and a population of 8.57 million in 2010 (Xi’an 
Municipal Government, 2015).  
Figure	  7.1	  The	  Location	  of	  Xi’an	  City	   	  
 
Source: based on data provided by AutoNavi Software Co., Ltd 
 
Xi’an was the capital city of ancient China in the Tang Dynasty (618-907AD) 
when it was known as ‘Changan’. At that time it was the largest city in the 
world with over one million people concentrated in a built-up area of 84 km2 
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(Wang, 1992).  
The second Sino-Japanese war began in 1937 had caused inflow of 
population and capital into inland Chinese cities such as Xi’an. When the 
CPC took over Xi’an in 1949, the population in Xi’an was 2.27million (NBSC, 
2010). The following decades had seen a steady growth of urban population 
in Xi’an, excepting for the year between 1960 and 1961. Before the late 
1970s, under the planned economy, the development of Chinese cities 
mainly relied on the centrally allocated resources as private capitals were 
eliminated from the economy. Central government’s rational in distributing 
resources at that time, however, was more than often subject to political 
considerations rather than economic principles. In the 1950s, with the fear of 
having the ‘Third World War’ with the U.S, priorities were given to national 
security and Xi’an had benefited from its location as an inland city that was 
less vulnerable to air strikes. In 1953, it was designated by the national 
government as one of the major inland development centres and priority was 
given to industrial sectors such as the textiles, electronic devices and military 
industries (Yin, et al., 2004). Additionally, to support the development of 
industries, a number of high educational institutions were also established. 
The first Master Plan of the Xi’an city (1953-1980) was produced against 
such a background. As is argued by Wang (1992, p.3), ‘it thought to promote 
industrial urbanization within a strict centrally-planned economy and was cast 
in a characteristically static blueprint model.’ The population of the city was 
planned to reach 1.22 million by 1972 and the average land for each person 
was envisaged to be 108m2, based on which the urban construction area of 
the city was calculated. Indicators in relation to the buildings were also given 
as 70% of the properties were planned to be 3 floors, 20% two storeys, 5% 
single storey and 5% others (Wang, 1992, pp.5).  
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The 1953 plan helped to shape the basic spatial structure of the city and 
underpinned the expansion of industries towards suburban areas to the east, 
south and west of the ancient town that was surrounded city walls. Regarding 
the spatial structure, the city generally followed a grid pattern inherited from 
the ancient capital cities. Meanwhile, some measures applied in the urban 
constructions of cities in the Soviet Union were also referenced, such as the 
central axis, large public squares, etc. (Yin and Liu, 2002). Although the 
centrally allocated industries contributed to the local economic growth, they 
also had side effects. For one thing, many of the work units were under the 
direct supervision of central departments and were relatively isolated from 
the rest of the urban areas (Bray, 2005; Wang and Chai, 2009). This was 
partly due to fact that the industrial plots were integrated with residential 
areas and some basic social services such as shops, schools and hospitals 
were equipped within work units, especially the large ones. It has therefore 
seen part of the city been cut into many small ‘cells’ that were free from the 
control of urban planning system, as constructions within these cells were 
largely determined by the work units or the upper level administrative entities 
(Chai, et al., 2007). Thirdly, the central investment mainly concentrated on 
production sectors while the improvement of people’s living standards was 
largely ignored (Wu, 2008; Chen, 2010). Indeed in 1954 the Xi’an municipal 
government was instructed by central government to halve the residential 
land by 50%. With the flood in of industrial workers, the average living space 
for citizens in Xi’an decreased from 3.32m2 in 1949 to 2.25m2 in 1954, and 
the severe shortage of housing provision hasn’t been alleviated until the late 
1990s (Wang and Hague, 1992, p. 9).  
In the middle of the Great Leap forward (1958-1962), the devastating 
consequences was realized by central government and it was followed by the 
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centralization of economic power (Wong and PW, 1992). Urban planning was 
blamed for facilitating the overambitious urban expansion and was therefore 
abolished for three years since 1960 (Chen, 2012). The planning department 
of Xi’an was accordingly dismissed during that time. With the sharp decrease 
of food production, the previous dramatic increase of urban workers were 
seen as a burden and since 1961 central government instructed to send 
newly enrolled workers together with their Hukou back to where they 
originally came from. It has seen a net outflow of 164 000 people from Xi’an 
between 1960 and 1962 (Wang and Hague, 1992). From 1965 to 1978 Xi’an 
continued to be one of the major receptors of state investment yet the amount 
of funding received by the urban construction areas shrunk dramatically as 
the newly invested industries were deliberately located in rural and 
mountainous districts rather than the constructed urban areas to avoid the air 
strikes (Chen, 2003). The year 1978 was a turning point for Xi’an. With the 
opening up of China, Xi’an’s geographical location gradually became a 
disadvantage for it to compete with other coastal cities in attracting foreign 
investments and talented workers. The rank of Xi’an’s GDP among Chinese 
major cities has fallen from the 7th in 1982 to 28th in 2011 (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 1990, 2013) 
The function of urban planning was disrupted by the Cultural Revolution from 
1967 to 1976 as there was no new master plan for Xi’an over the 1970s. With 
the restore of the municipal planning authority in 1983, the Xi’an Master Plan 
(1980-2000) was immediately prepared and was approved by the State 
Council in 1983. Excepting for continuing to develop the industries such as 
textile and machinery manufacturing, the plan also projected to develop 
tourism and at the same time to protect the historical elements of the city. 
This was primarily due to the fact that the ‘Emperor’s Terracotta Warriors’ 
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was discovered in 1974 in the east suburbs, which made the city a 
world-renown tourism destination. In developing tourism, the municipal 
government endeavoured to utilize the available resources and also to create 
new ones. Despite the fact that little historical relics were inherited from the 
Tang dynasty, the municipal government was enthusiastic about branding the 
city into another Changan (Rothschild, et al., 2012). One of the expensive 
projects was to restore the ancient city wall and to create a park on top of it. 
In the surrounding areas of the Great Goose Pagoda, the municipal 
government spent around 500 million Yuan to create a plaza with commercial 
properties built into ancient Tang Styles. There were a number of other 
similar mega projects initiated over the following three decades to create new 
tourism attractions.  
In terms of its economy, in 2001, the SOEs weighted 48% of the Xi’an’s 
industrial outputs, while the figure was as high as over 80% from 1957 to 
1980 (Yin, et al., 2005). Before the 1980s, the expansion of city towards 
suburban areas were mainly driven by SOEs with the expansion of work units, 
which consisted both residential and industrial areas, while the municipal 
government had a comparatively weak control on the constructions within 
these work units (Yin, et al., 2004; Wang, 2000). Since the 1990s, with the 
concentration of planning power into the hands of municipal government, 
large ‘development zones’ emerged in suburban areas (Schneider and 
Mertes, 2014). Xi’an has its first ‘High Technology and Economic Zone’ to the 
south of the old town in 1991, which was later developed into a new district 
consisting of multiple functions and became a strong engine for the growth of 
urban economy (Ying, et al., 2012). In Xi’an’s latest Master Plan (2008-2020), 
the city was planned to expand towards the north and in 2011 the municipal 
government moved into the new district. The continuous expansion of the city 
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required enormous investment on public infrastructures such as road, 
hospitals and schools, etc. Land releasing fees therefore became one of the 
most important financial resources for the municipal government. Similar to 
many other Chinese municipalities, the Xi’an Government also proactively 
mobilized its power and resources to accomplish its primitive accumulation 
through the urban development and regeneration process (Zheng, et al., 
2014). The fast economic growth and outward expansion of the urban areas 
have brought challenges for the preservation of the core urban area of Xi’an 
city (Figure 7.2). The inflated housing prices since the late 1990s had driven 
the city to grow upward. The initial limits on the height of buildings was 9-24 
meters and was later replaced by 50 meters in parts of the old town as 
decision makers realized that against the fast development, it was more 
realistic to designate several conservation zones rather than to strictly control 
the constructions within the entire old town (Wang, 2000).  
Figure	  7.2:	  The	  spatial	  structure	  of	  Xi’an	  City	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7.2 THE MAJOR FEATURES OF THE DRUM TOWER 
MUSLIM DISTRICT (DTMD)  
The Drum Tower Muslim District (DTMD) locates at the centre of Xi’an city 
(Figure 7.2) and covers an area of around 54 ha and a population of around 
60,000, of which more than half are Hui people (Local Muslims) (XMHDPPO, 
2003). The eastern, western, northern and southern boundaries of the DTMD 
are respectively Shehui Road, ZaociLane, Hongfu Road and the West 
Avenue (Figure 7.3). DTMD is under the administration of Lian’hu District 
government and the whole area is divided into 8 neighborhoods based on the 
locations of the mosques. Over 70% of the properties in the area are privately 
owned in 2005 (Li, 2005) and the historical buildings and commercial streets 
are mainly concentrated in the east part of the DTMD (Zhang, Y., 2008).  
Figure	  7.3:	  The	  spatial	  structure	  of	  the	  DTMD	  
 
The Hui nationality was formed in the Yuan dynasty (A.D. 1271-1368) and 
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developed in the Ming (A.D 1368-1644) dynasty. Their daily life is greatly 
influenced by the Islamic norms and disciplines. Mosques are playing an 
significant role in Hui people’s social and spiritual life. It is the place where 
they go for daily worship and hold various ceremonies such as weddings and 
funerals. Small food stores run by families absorbed around 70% of local 
labour (Zhai & Ng, 2013). Hui people speak Chinese and in some aspects 
they are highly Hannized. Many local Muslims live in large family groups 
consisting of three or even four generation and grandchildren and most of the 
local residents want this kind of family structure to be maintained (Li, 2005). 
According to Huang and Wu (2011), about 23.5% investigated families had 
two generations and around 3-5 people living together and 86.6% of the 
DTMD residents that were investigated expressed a strong willingness to 
maintain the traditional living patterns.  
Chen (2001) pointed out that while the local residents were dissatisfied with 
their physical living environment, their motivation of moving outward has 
been mitigated by the strong social bond and shared identities as an ethnic 
minority. In a survey, over 90% of the interviewees identified Mosques as the 
decisive element when choosing a community (Xu, et al., 2009). Around 44% 
residents in this area are now working in the tertiary industry while the share 
of manufacture has fallen from 69.24% in 1997 to less than 20% in 2011 
(Huang and Wu, 2011).  
Tourism plays an important role in the DTMD’s economy. Indeed the 
development of tourism in the DTMD was not intentionally planned by the 
local government, which, however, endeavoured to render the city as the 
ancient capital of Tang dynasty through large-scale commercial 
developments in old architecture styles. It was the special ethnic foods that 
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firstly attracted tourists coming to the area, which laid the foundation for 
further exploration of other elements with the potential of being tourism 
attractions in the area. It was found that the majority of tourism-related jobs 
are undertaken by people without a bachelor’s degree (Zhang, et al., 2008). 
The payment for working in the DTMD was at a comparatively low level: 
26.5% of the interviewees that participate in services earn less than £80 per 
month, about 50% of them are paid for 800-2000 RMB per month, people 
falls into the £200-300 and £300-500 categories accounts for 13.3% and 
7.2% of the total, respectively, while only 3.6% of them got a salary higher 
than £500/Month (Wang, et al., 2008) 
It was also found that residents in the DTMD generally held a positive attitude 
towards tourism (Zhang, Y., et al., 2008), which largely take place on the 
streets or in public spaces surrounding the Mosques. It was partly due to the 
fact that local people have the tradition of doing small businesses are 
therefore more tolerable to the inflow of tourists.  
7.3 THE PROFILE OF THE DTMD REGENERATION 
PROJECT  
7.3.1 Physical Regeneration Projects  
During the first 30 years after 1949, the development of Chinese cities 
followed an imbalanced model. Industrial sectors were invested heavily while 
other aspects of urban life were neglected. Although Xi’an was one of the 
largest receptors of national investment during this period, little resources 
had actually been devoted to regenerating its inner urban areas. Before the 
1990s, neither local people nor municipal government was capable of 
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changing the dilapidated physical environment in the DTMD and only 
small-scale refurbishment projects were occasionally implemented by local 
people and before the 1990s, the majority of the properties in the DTMD were 
small courtyards with single-floor buildings (Li, 2005).  
The Xi’an municipal government started regenerating the DTMD in 1991, with 
a small-scale refurbishment project aiming at beautifying the Beiyuan-gate 
Street in the east DTMD. In 1993, when the government intended to 
regenerate parts of the DTMD area with a proposal of building seven 18-floor 
high-rise buildings near a Mosque, it was strongly opposed by some of the 
local people. The project was eventually carried out yet some of the previous 
activists that previously resisted the redevelopment program had 
encountered great troubles in their post-regeneration life. As is put by one of 
the local activists:  
‘After the demolition, many representatives who were proactively against 
the government beforehand did not get the compensation they deserve, 
which casted great shadow for the next regeneration project in 2005’ 
(Ding, Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013)  
In 1997, a co-operative regeneration project levered in 5 million Yuan from 
the Norwegian Government and match funding from the Chinese central and 
municipal governments into the east part of the DTMD. The boundaries of the 
regeneration project were respectively: Huaue alley to the south, Guangji 
street to the west, Xiyangshi to the north and Beiyuan-Gate street to the east. 
The program mainly focused on controlling the Floor-Area Ratio (F.A.R) as 
well as preserving historical buildings and courtyards. The project has three 
major achievements: 1.Restoring the traditional courtyards and buildings; 
 220 
2.Safeguarding the physical and social environment surrounding the Great 
Mosque; Notably, the flagship project for the second round regeneration-the 
preservation of No.125 in Huajue Alley, was awarded with ‘Cultural Heritage 
Protection Prize’ by the UNESCO in 2002. Commentaries from both 
academics and the local residents were mainly positive. It was agreed that 
the regeneration projects did not only changed the dilapidated image of inner 
urban areas in Xi’an city but also successfully preserved both tangible and 
intangible heritages in the DTMD (Zhang, Y., 2008; Liu, 2010). Moreover, the 
regeneration projects stimulated development of tourism in the area and 
added many working opportunities (Zhai and Ng, 2013; Zhang, Y., 2008).  
In 1993, the Xi’an municipal government set an agenda to redevelop the west 
DTMD and the pilot regeneration project was implemented in1995. It was a 
property-led regeneration project aiming at replacing some of the old 
properties in the northwest corner of the DTMD by high-rise tower blocks. In 
2002, the Damaishi-Sajinqiao street regeneration programme was initiated in 
the west DTMD, with the aims of widening the street and redeveloping the 
dilapidated properties alongside it so as to mitigate the increasing traffic 
congestions as well as to beautify the streetscape. The project was attached 
with high political priorities and was listed as one of Xi’an’ ‘Ten Key Projects 
of the Year 2005’ (Xi’an Municipal government, 2005). It was supervised by 
one of the major cadres of the provincial government and directed by the 
chief executive of Lianhu District government. In 2005, the Lianhu district 
government conducted a comprehensive survey in the DTMD and a research 
report was produced. Based on the report and consultations conducted with 
the government officials and academicians, a regeneration proposal was 
produced in 2005 by the Xi’an City Planning and Design Institute (CPDI) – a 
public institution administrated by the Xi’an Planning Bureau.  
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The pre-regeneration survey conducted in the west DTMD in 2005 suggested 
that over 90% of the interviewees wish their community to be regenerated 
following the public funded conservation and beautification pattern in the east 
DTMD, yet the final proposal was a property-led redevelopment plan 
supported by the government. According to the plan, around 1000 properties 
were to be demolished for the expansion and beautification of the 
Damaishi-sajingqiao street. Two pedestrian streets (Figure 7.4) in parallel 
with the main street were to be built for accommodating small businesses 
and several flats were also to be erected. When consulted, the majority of the 
local residents were dissatisfied with the proposal as they believed that the 
planned commercial area was too small to accommodate the small 
businesses, which are the main source of income for many local families 
(Ding, interviewed in 2012). Later the Lianhu district government published 
the relocation and compensation plan, according to which owners of the 
properties with a registered floor space larger than 20 m2 will be moved to 
several condominiums that were going to be built on No.64 Xianmiyuan, a 
piece of land previously owned by a SOE and was 500 metres away from the 
regeneration area. The construction and relocation work was promised to be 
finished within 18 months (Xi’an Municipal Government, 2006).  
Figure	  7.4:	  Local	  government-­‐proposed	  plans	  in	  Sajinqiao	  street	  area	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Source: Local official promulgation materials in 2005 
Local party members and officials were promised with higher compensation 
fees for taking a lead to sign the expropriate contract. It was hoped that the 
rest of the local people would follow up. From 13th March to 20th May 2005, 
291 demolition contracts had been signed, covering a floor area of 29,000 m2, 
which was less than one third of the total houses holds that need to be 
demolished (Zhai and Ng, 2013). The speed was much slower than what the 
government had expected. For local people, in spite of the obvious low 
compensation prices, they also worried about their post-regeneration life. For 
some of them, the relocation would deprive their only source of income. 
Constrained by low educational background and Islamic convention, it is 
difficult for the local Muslims to make a living outside the DTMD. The 
redevelopment was also thought to have a detrimental impact on the 
indigenous culture and social life (Ding, interviewed in 2013). Some of the 
interviewees in this research expressed their concern that the relocation 
would deconstruct the social structure and lead the Islamic convention to be 
assimilated, as people living outside of the DTMD may not necessarily follow 
the Islamic disciplines in their daily life. Besides, the local people were also 
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suspicious about the sincerity of the government as the construction of the 
promised resettlement condominium near the Lianhu District stopped a week 
after the announcement of the compensation policies (Ma, interviewed in 
2013).  
With mounting pressures to accomplish the regeneration project, the 
executive of the district government had to accelerate the expropriation 
process. The government decided to tear down all the previously contracted 
buildings together, aiming at displaying muscles to the local people. In spite 
of officials from different government departments and policemen, the district 
government also hired hundreds of temporary workers to maintain the order. 
The local residents invited some local media to report the incident yet none of 
them appeared. The bulldozer quickly dismantled many properties and the 
local people were stunned, as the government had expected. However, the 
intimidation aroused stronger resistance. From the beginning, the district 
government’s strategy was to divide the local people and treat them 
separately. There was an informal rule that officials should be included in 
every meeting held by the local residents. Any self-organized discussions 
regarding the demolition and compensation issues without the attendance of 
officials were regarded as a challenge to the government.  
Local people in the DTMD were intimidated and realized that their economic 
interests would very likely to be infringed by the municipality and began to 
react in a militant way. They gathered together and reached an agreement 
that no one should sign the contract with the government individually before 
the compensation and rehabilitation conditions are collectively accepted. The 
Imams from the two mosques in the community were put forward to take the 
leadership, although two of them initially refused to do so. They managed to 
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use their unique identity as the ethnic minority to increase their political 
influence. Various venues such as the Ethnic Committee and the People’s 
Congress were used to make their voices heard. 
Petitions were sent to municipal, provincial and central government. In the 
petitions, local people gave their own interpretations of the rights to the 
property. Apart from the legal concept of ‘ownership’; they also employed 
cultural, political and moral concepts to oppose the state-sponsored 
gentrification. They believed that the proposed redevelopment would not only 
expropriate their properties at an unfair price, but also brutally cut off the 
majority of the relocatees’ connections to their culture life as well as their 
means of making a living, which are crucial to the local families. Moreover, 
the local Muslims’ cemetery also locates within the regeneration area (Zhai 
and Ng, 2013) and it was morally unacceptable for them to see it to be 
distorted by the redevelopment.  
However, the petitions yield no reply from the Xi’an Planning Bureau, the 
Xi’an Municipal government as well as the Shanxi Provincial Government 
while local media refused to report the forced eviction. Even the Imams 
alongside the street were suffering pressures and initially unwilling to put 
themselves forward as local representatives to bargain with the municipality. 
The resistance lasted for three months and ended up with the intervention of 
central government. A group of inspectors were sent by the Minister of 
Housing and Construction to investigate the regeneration project. According 
to the local residents who participated in the resistance (Ding, interviewed in 
2013), the conclusion was that the relocation project was carried without 
proper permissions and therefore the whole regeneration project should 
cease.  
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Within the current Chinese context, it is indeed very difficult for local residents 
to resist the property-led redevelopment propelled by the government and to 
protect their indigenous culture and social fabrics. What seems to be more 
practical for local people is to maximize their economic benefits by utilizing 
the given policies. Compensations based on floor space are widely accepted 
by both government and the public in China and enlarging the floor space 
before the expropriation thus became a rational choice for local people. 
Having realized that their properties could be demolished at any time, local 
people began to increase the Floor space on their sites either by adding 
additional floors on to the properties or by demolition and reconstructions. 
These activities are largely self-sponsored.  
Construction activities in the urban areas are monitored by the Planning and 
Construction bureau. According to Town and Country planning Act 2008, if 
local people want to rebuild their housing, they have to apply for a Building 
Permit (BP), which gives the parameters regarding the height, floor space 
and architectural styles of the new buildings. The DTMD was designated as a 
historical area in the Conservation Regulations on Xi’an Historic City (Zhai 
and Ng, 2013) and the height and elevation of new buildings are required to 
follow given codes. Yet most of the local residents had chosen to ignore the 
indicators once they obtained the BP. Since over 70% of the properties in the 
DTMD are privately owned, the prevailing self-sponsored constructions have 
profoundly changed the physical environment of the DTMD and downgraded 
local people’s living environment.  
7.3.2 Social Regeneration Programs  
In the DTMD case, social regeneration programs were separated from the 
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property-led redevelopment and were mainly delivered via the Local 
Residents’ Committee (LRC), which is theoretically a self-organized entity yet 
in practice a branch of municipal governments with multiple functions. The 
LRC members are democratically elected by local residents yet are paid by 
the government in assisting the latter to provide basic social benefits for poor 
families with an average income lower than the poverty line.  Specifically, 
LRCs are responsible for censoring the eligibility of applicants and help them 
to get access to social benefits. As it put by one of the LRC staff:  
‘For those in a family with an average income lower than 450 
Yuan/Month/person (around £45)’ (Bai, Executive of the LRC, 
interviewed in 2013).  
Another important function of the LRC is providing help to disadvantaged 
groups such as the disabled, at their late ages and those who enjoy social 
benefits. LRCs serve as the basic tier of China’s social security network. The 
LRCs also play a complementary role in facilitating the job-related trainings to 
help local people:  
‘We hold some short-term training campus for local residents… we 
provide them with specific technologies and skills... we have the special 
training programs for parents, for seniors, and for women. All the training 
programs are established by the Lianhu LRC to support locals. We (LRC) 
initiated the educational programs, and the municipal government gave 
provided us with fund and managerial advices to make the programs 
institutionalized…and they (the municipal government) are now paying 
more attention to such programs’ (Wang, staff in the LRC, interviewed in 
2013) 
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In spite of the similar institutional setup and mandated social functions, roles 
played by the LRCs at community level are highly context-specific. LRCs 
have considerable freedom in developing their own working strategies. 
However, no grand funding is in place to support their social programs, not to 
mention to have national regeneration packages similar to the NDC 
programme in the UK. LRC members are expected to work with 
entrepreneurship and to lever in external funding to finance social programs 
within the community.  
‘The amount of public funding is the total population times 1 Yuan… as 
we only have 10,000 people, the money we got is far lower than what we 
need to run the programs…and we don’t have much channels to apply 
for other funding... (Wang, staff in the LRC, interviewed in 2013). 
 ‘…but we have donations from some entrepreneurs. Since our 
community is an advanced community and the director has her personal 
charisma, which enables us to get donations from private sectors to run 
our social programs. The operation of the training programs follows the 
principle of ‘established by the government while supported by the 
society’. Currently the scale of social donations for the DTMD is not 
enough to sustain a large number of social regeneration projects since 
the majority of local people are still relatively poor. Although the 
municipal government has recently invested heavily on infrastructures 
and urban regeneration, the living standard of the citizens and the overall 
income remains stagnated’ (Wang, staff in the LRC, interviewed in 2013) 
Some of social regeneration programs are delivered by government 
department and institutions. As one of the LRC committee members put it like 
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this:  
‘…The Work Unions and Women’s Union indeed take the major 
responsibilities for providing skill training programs, and there are other 
government departments in relation to employment involved…We (LRC) 
will inform the local residents when and where would there be such 
training programs’ (Bai, Executive of the LRC, interviewed in 2013) 
Yet it has also to be realized that currently in China, public resources for 
community-based social regeneration programs are severely limited in 
comparison with the scale of investments on infrastructures. For one thing, 
the effects of the investment on social programs are invisible to the majority 
of citizens as well as to high-profile cadres. For another thing, the benefits of 
investment on social projects are hard to be measured and how efficient the 
money could be used is also questionable. Thirdly, when compared with the 
well-developed mechanisms of delivering and managing ‘hardware’ projects, 
the efficient delivery model of social regeneration projects in China are yet to 
be explored.  
7.4 CONCLUSION 
In the first part of this chapter the history of Xi’an City is introduced. It then 
moves on to examine the history of regeneration in the Drum Tower Muslim 
District (DTMD). It is found that the previous regeneration programs initiated 
in the DTMD area were mainly property-led redevelopment whereas little 
resource was available for social regeneration projects.  
Public resources were unevenly distributed for the initiation of physical 
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regeneration programs in different parts of the DTMD. With the aim of 
developing tourism, the east DTMD received large amount of public funding 
to beautify the streetscape and to preserve the historical buildings. Yet for 
people living in the west part of the DTMD, regeneration policies imposed the 
municipal governments were mainly about massive relocation, demolition 
and reconstruction. The implementation of such regeneration initiatives was 
never smooth. Indeed it has seen both municipal government and local 
residents proactively mobilizing resources and powers they have to realize 
their aims when interacting with each other and sometimes the activities of 
both sides could go beyond the boundaries drawn by the formal structures. 
Social regeneration projects are not included in the West DTMD regeneration 
project. Instead, the social programs in the DTMD are mainly initiated and run 
by the LRC.  
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CHAPTER 8 DISCOURSE USED BY THE 
GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL RESIDENTS 
IN INTERPRETING THE ABIs IN 
KENSINGTON 
In this research, it is believed that the examination on the discourses used by 
local residents and municipal governments in describing the regeneration 
programs would not only contribute to a better understanding of the conflicts 
in relation to economic and social aspects, but also help to articulate practical 
solutions for mitigating the negative consequences led by the regeneration 
programs.   
8.1 THE OFFICAL DISCOURSE REGARDING 
PHYSICAL REGENERATION IN KENSINGTON  
8.1.1 The Rational for Housing Renewal 
For cities such as Liverpool that had experienced long-term decline until 
recently, wealth is unevenly distributed across the urban area. Places with 
unwanted properties and the associated social problems may suffer from a 
underperforming housing market.  
‘Because of the cheap houses, sometimes you can end up with people 
living in the area, who do not respect for everybody else…you have lots 
of challenges like antisocial behaviour as well. I think because we get 
access to the city centre, which is actually quite a good location for 
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people to live and to get access to jobs… I think the kind of the nature of 
the current housing stock are more challenging, it tends to be small 
terraced streets, so that doesn’t always attract people that want to stay 
for a long period of time’ (Lim, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, 
interviewed in 2013) 
In such areas housing prices and rents are much lower than the city average. 
Generally there are several types of property owners in these areas: the 
municipal government, social housing associations, individuals and private 
companies. Due to the guidance on rents for social housing given by the 
central government, tenants renting from the municipal government or social 
landlords pay a much lower price than those renting from individual landlords 
or private companies. In areas like Kensington, over the past decade, on the 
one hand it has seen some of the previous residents fleeing away when they 
can afford to move into more affluent areas with better environment, 
educational resources and new types of properties; on the other hand there 
were also flood in of students and migrant tenants from other countries 
attracted by cheap rents offered by private landlords in the area.  
‘Liverpool city center has 110,000 people working here, but 55,000 don’t 
live in Liverpool, 80% of the local institutions are in Liverpool, but the 
20% with the most money don’t…So just creating economic growth won’t 
solve the problems of Kensington, in fact it might get them even 
worse…You just end up with the ghetto and the disadvantaged… the 
economic growth won’t … deal problems of some of the area’ (Richard, 
Politician supports the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in2014) 
For municipal government, it is impossible for the deprived areas to attract 
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investment and revival itself. Intervention from the government is therefore 
necessary. As one of the politicians put it:  
‘Well if we just…don’t intervene… then you could rip-off’ (Richard, 
Politician supports the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
8.1.2 The Official Discourse for the HMRI  
8.1.2.1 Basic assumptions for the intervention  
In the official discourse, the basic assumption of the government’s 
intervention was that the HMRI project could help to change the dilapidated 
view of the area and to attract affluent middle class people to become 
long-term residents, whose spending will help to revitalize the local business 
and services. The priority was to change the image of the area through 
improving the physical environment and to provide properties that meet the 
demands of the market. As some of the interviewees put it:  
 ‘So the idea was that the HMRI was to take away properties people 
didn’t really want out the space and build properties they did want. And 
that couldn’t be done without government intervention’ (Richard, 
Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘Small terraced houses are not suitable for people nowadays, we had a 
lot of small terraced houses in Kensington and you can’t change that 
very easily…That is not different from other parts of Liverpool. That does 
mean that you can only do small scale, what I would call pepper-pot 
development, something here something there not a whole scale 
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physical regeneration as well’ (Jerry, Professional against the KNDC and 
KHRMI, interviewed in 2013) 
‘…Kensington…is part of the ring, (which is) kind of a donut of run-down 
Victoria terraced houses and large Victoria villa properties that converted 
into 3-4 flats in the 1970s and 80s…. …they are unpopular properties, 
and there were two and three bedroom houses that were never 
constructed with bathrooms… so many these houses, which have been 
built in 1890s, for families who had no greater aspiration, at the time, 
since family going out and elderly folk remain at houses and even 
through the 80s and 90s there were not the property of choice of families, 
they were properties of people having no choices…’ (Tom, Executive of 
Social Landlord support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
 ‘…so we intervened, trying get parts of Liverpool a point where the 
market works, rather than fight the market…(Richard, Politician support 
the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘The creation of development opportunities is viewed to be an essential 
element to restructure existing housing markets and introduce greater 
housing choice within the Inner Core’ (2008 review report on the 
Liverpool HMR) 
8.1.2.2 How demolition rather than refurbishment was justified 
In the decision makers’ discourse, one of the most important reasons for the 
demolition rather than refurbishment was that for local government and social 
landlords, demolition and reconstruction is financially more viable, although 
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not necessary more cheap, than refurbishment.  
‘…because the houses at the time, probably worth about £ 20,000, it 
would cost us about £40,000 to maintain it in good condition, who was 
going to spend £40,000 on that house that was originally worth £20,000 
and probably about 35,000 when you’ve done something to it, which still 
have bathroom on the ground out of the kitchen not near the bedroom’ 
(Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
The ‘Right To Buy’ in the 1970s and 80s under the Thatcher government 
initiated massive-scale privatization of housing stock. Some of the housing 
associations later became large property owners. The withdraw of public 
funding for refurbishing old housing stock since the late 1990s became a 
major driven force for the social landlords to get rid of some of their properties 
that on the one hand are unwanted by the tenants and on the other hand 
need constant investment for maintenance. As one of the interviewees put it:  
‘…the kind of gold rush of the late 1970s, and 80s enabled all the 
associations acquired lots of properties at the short period of time, which 
30 years’ later became to fail … at the 70s and 80s were improved using 
public subsidy to give them a 30 years’ life…and by the time we came 
into the late 90s and the turn of the century, the 30-year life expired… 
and those properties need major investment again…indeed, in the late 
90s and early 2000s of public subsidy to improve housing, was almost 
null…you can get public subsidy for new building but not necessarily for 
improvements (of old ones)…so improving our now expiring properties 
requires more private investment by ourselves, which put pressures on 
our organizations to become more cost-efficient…(and to strengthen) it’s 
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financial capacity in the business to support quite a lot of failing property 
at the same time…’ (Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support the 
KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014)’ 
From the perspective of the decision makers, another strong reason for 
demolishing the private properties was that these properties had never 
received large amount of public money for refurbishment even in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Therefore they are in a more deteriorated status. As some of the 
interviewees put it:  
‘If you imagine the privately owned properties, they never enjoyed the 
same investment at the same time as the social housing did in the 70s 
and 80s…’ (Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and 
KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
8.1.2.3 Rationales for the major stake holders in the four-way partnership  
The delivery of the Edge Hill regeneration was accomplished through a 
four-way partnership, including the central government, the municipal 
government, the social housing landlords and the private developer. Each of 
them involved with their own rationales for formulating strategies and taking 
actions. For the central and local government, in spite of the money and 
energy they devoted into the programs, the outcomes they expected to see 
were in accordance with the national and urban-wide development strategy. 
While the Labour government intended to fulfil its political commitment to 
mitigating social stratification and to save the failed housing market in the 
most deprived areas in the north England, the municipal government wanted 
to end the chronic subsidies on particular areas through one-shot investment 
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on physical regeneration. As one of the interviewees put it:  
‘…if you can make profit (from it), you should try to do it, but for Liverpool, 
the biggest public asset for Liverpool is having more people living here. 
Cause that would help us to provide our services more cost-effectively’ 
(Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
‘…the whole idea was that you would convert the area so became an 
area that you don’t need to subsidies…’ (Richard, Politician support the 
KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
For the social housing association, which in the Edge Hill project was the 
Riverside - a nonprofit independent charitable organization, owning a large 
proportion of the properties in the areas doesn’t actually guarantee them a 
healthy financial condition due to the high-level vacancy rates and excessive 
maintaining fees. As one of its senior officials put it:  
‘…we had too many of (the social housing) empty for too long…so they 
were just losing money…when they are empty, we have to pay council 
tax on empty properties, we pay for security-20 pounds a week for each 
property, so they set steal call alarms inside of them to response to 
vandalism…so (empty properties) cost a lot of money while they were 
empty…’ (Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and 
KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
Therefore the social housing landlords were positive to the project and had 
proactively involved in implementing the regeneration project. They believed 
that reducing the quantity of properties while improving the quality would 
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bring them a better financial performance. Indeed they eventually gave up 2/3 
of their property rights in return for new properties that no longer need 
maintenance fees and can be completely let out. As is put by one of the 
senior officers of the social housing associations:  
‘Well, we got a lot less property… so we started off with probably 350 
properties in central Edge Hill, and we end up with probably 100’ (Tom, 
Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed 
in 2014)  
‘…that is OK, that is good business… even if it takes a significant loss of 
properties in the areas, we will be in a better position after the 
regeneration compared before when we were losing money… we got 
100 new properties that are occupied without much costs on repair’ (Tom, 
Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed 
in 2014) 
Both the municipal government and the social housing association didn’t 
foresee the forthcoming booming housing market in 2003, when they 
reached the agreement with the private developer on the conditions of 
development and the disposal of the properties. For the municipal 
government, the land in Edge Hill at that time was thought to be of no value:  
‘…if for city council, they are trying to stick out for money from it, in some 
case there are some place where the land value and the property value 
came together, you can sell them for value, but in most of the cases (in 
Liverpool), if you say right we want to 25,000 for the plot, that would put 
the housing prices above the market value. So no one would buy them’ 
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(Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
‘…we didn’t sell the land in most of the cases, even to private developer 
sector. Because although even we have remediated the land, it still didn’t 
have much value…so once we knocked down and remediated, it was 
more questions of the powers of the council and the money of the 
council’ (Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed 
in 2014) 
The private developer got the remediated land and development rights to 
around 500 properties in the Edge Hill area only at the expense of giving 
back around 100 new properties to the social landlords. The rest of the 
properties could be sold at a market price. Since the housing price in the area 
had almost trebled between 2002 and 2007, the margin was huge. The false 
expectation and miscalculation had indeed created great opportunities for 
speculation. Yet this was denied by the decision makers:  
‘Well, the housing price went up partly because they are much better 
properties. So we knocked old properties down, and built strong modern 
well decorated properties, so there was a increase in value…’ (Richard, 
Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
‘So the prices went up a bit, but they didn’t go up tremendously, there 
were very little room for speculation in that process...it is a long long way 
off, so we had started the process off, and we ignore the speculation, 
and by large we didn’t think it even exist, and that has been proved to be 
the case’ (Richard，Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed 
in 2014)  
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According to the initial plan, the expected profit rate for the private developer 
was 20%. Yet there was not a pre-set mechanism to avoid excessive profit to 
be extracted from the physical redevelopment by the private developers as 
no one in the government has predicted the rapid rise of the housing prices 
later on. One of the interviewees put it like this:  
‘…If we had thought they’d make a profit, of anything could involve what 
we consider to be a normal developer’s profit, we knew that, by and large 
they were trying to take 20%, above the cost of the building, covering the 
cost of sale and make a profit. We looked using our own analysis of what 
the profit would be. If we thought we were going to make more than that, 
and we didn’t in that case, we could sell them the land, but in most cases, 
we didn’t think that would be the case. And it hasn’t been, so….profit, at 
the moment we thought it was reasonable for the social housing and the 
private housing people to make a profit, we didn’t think that was a 
opportunity for them to make a financial killing. So we didn’t by large built 
those mechanisms (Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, 
interviewed in 2014) 
In dealing with the resistance from local residents who were dissatisfied with 
the physical regeneration project, the Compulsory Purchas Order is an 
effective instrument enabling local authorities to acquire land without the 
consent of the property owners so as to guarantee the implementation of 
projects that are thought to be in the interest of the public. A CPO is normally 
issued by the municipal government or the Secretary of the State, which has 
to demonstrate the necessity of the order with strong evidence bases. Once a 
Compulsory Purchas Order is issued, it would be widely discussed on medias 
and the evidence they used to show that there is a ‘compelling case in the 
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public interests’ would be closely examined. As one of the interviewees put it:  
‘In Compulsory Purchas Order law, it is not just, the local authorities with 
a CPO…but was to have a case, that….everybody can say, this is the 
case now…that the best case…so you requires the CPO on somebody’s 
property, compensation for that, has got to be reasonable, and that is not 
just about the prices of the property, it is about the solution of the project’ 
(Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and KNDC, 
interviewed in 2014) 
 ‘…sometimes we have to put in CPOs…in some case that the last 
person in the area that developers intended to develop, is an old lady 
living in a house which she was born…you have to go, with the pressure 
to explain why you’re getting her out her properties, cause otherwise you 
can’t build new properties. So that is why we spent time (on 
consultations)…we went to people saying we are going to knock your 
house down, but this is what we are going to give you… what we say is 
that you will still be there, near those shops and your neighbors, we will 
sort everything out for you… once you take away the fear factor, they 
would always prefer a flat’ (Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and 
KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
8.1.2.4 Interpretations of the Local Residents’ Resistance   
Perhaps one of the most time-consuming jobs throughout the Edge Hill 
regeneration was to persuade property owners to sign up to the master plan 
for the regeneration and to convince them to sell their properties to the 
government for demolition. Generally participation in the form of 
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representation doesn’t work for the issues in relation to housing, which is of 
great concern for the property owners who want to directly get involved in the 
process. As is put by one of the scholars:  
‘…housing…was a very individual thing…it is therefore difficult for that to 
have representative structures to, because you want the question 
answered yourself’ (Hillary, Scholar neutral to the KNDC, interviewed in 
2014) 
Social tenants were easy to be dealt with, as they do not hold any property 
rights in the area, yet the process of negotiating with some of the home 
occupiers were proved to be problematic.  
‘…we needed to buy out people who lived in the houses and 
demolish…remediating the land and making it ready for the developers, 
the public sector or private sector to build on them’ (Richard, Politician 
support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014 ) 
The municipal government has to reach local residents and sell them the 
whole idea of regeneration. This task was primarily allocated to the social 
housing associations for the connections they’ve built with local residents. As 
the primary agency the social landlords conducted face-to-face interactions 
with local people that would be affected. The process was extremely 
time-consuming and has two major functions. Firstly, it conveys information 
to local residents and strives to convince them to cooperate. Secondly, the 
process itself requires formalized procedures to add legitimacy. The ‘signing 
up’ activities would later serve as evidence base showing that the project was 
supported by the majority of local residents:  
 242 
‘We made the housing association the agent of the council across the 
whole consultation process, partly because they already knew most of 
the people living in the areas. And second they are more skilled in that 
sort of face-to-face interactions than the council did…’ (Richard, 
Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘I used to do four night meetings a week, until 9.30 pm, in community 
centers, church and schools. And we were doing that for 2,3,4 years, to 
gain the credibility, and the trust of local people, it was kind of a tuition 
when we were convincing them that ‘we are here and we mean what we 
say and we will deliver on it’. Although it took time to gain the credibility, 
people would sign up to, as a community project, for change’ (Tom, 
Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed 
in 2014) 
‘…it took several years, for the occupiers predominantly, even social 
tenants, to sign up to a master plan for the neighborhood…’ (Tom, 
Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed 
in 2014) 
According to the decision maikers, the HDMRI project in Kensington wasn’t to 
gentrify local people. Previously the owner occupied properties only accounts 
for around 30% of the housing stock and to avoid the potential gentrification 
effects, financial packages were offered to help homeowners to stay in the 
area. In the official discourse, such a financial package was a generous gift 
for local residents and enables them to avoid being priced out of their 
community. 
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‘So our objective for Liverpool wasn’t to gentrify…but to keep the clever 
kids (professionals) in Liverpool, diversify and change the demography 
of the City. But you can’t change the demography unless you do physical 
things that are required, so physical and social, it has to be both’ 
(Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘…those houses are sold, at the beginning of the program, 15 thousand 
pounds, which became 45 and 50 thousand pounds five years later, 
because of the speculation activity had pushed up general property 
values…So the value of homeowners’ properties doubled or trebled. But 
the problem was the prices for new homes they are about to move into 
are still about £100,000. There is a gap, the city council had to support 
and fund equity loan products, to homeowners, which is fundamentally a 
gift. If you stay in your property, for ten years, these gifts are yours…If 
you move out within ten years, you pay amount of money back… they 
make available equity products for the homeowners, it was the first time 
that have been done, possibly in this country. And it was invented to 
actually make the program happen, just to solve the problem of 
homeowners who had no organization like housing associations to fund 
the gap in property value…’ (Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support 
the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
However, not everyone would agree with what the government had proposed, 
and it is clearly evident in the overturn of the first CPO on phase one. In the 
official discourse, it was these people that went against the public will and 
delayed the whole project for many years. The local protestors used medias 
to portray themselves as the victims of the ‘relentless government’ and the 
same time as the guardians of the old Victoria properties that of great 
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historical and aesthetic merits.  
‘…homeowners…because of the degree of sense of skepticism about 
the intentions of local authority…were very alienated from the process of 
engagement… (Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI 
and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘…phase one was along the Edge Lane, which was the main road, and 
was the conservation area where there was objection to the CPO by a 
small group of BEVEF, that was a group of 8-10 residents, who got a sort 
of popular profile, cause they were exercising their democratic rights to 
object to the stereotypical local authority, you know ‘aggressive authority 
was characterized’…they managed to profile themselves on press or on 
the media as they oppose the heartless local authority strategy. Not like 
that, the truth, there were700 properties there…out of the 450 that were 
occupied, probably 430 signed up to master plan for the demolition, 
probably 8 or 15 said no. And the 8 or 15 who said no held up the 
clearance of Phase 1, the demolition of the houses that were there, 
empty, for three years and caused legal expenditure in some thing like 
£300,000’ (Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and 
KNDC, interviewed in 2014). 
‘78% people voted for it, 12% of people voted against it, 10% didn’t 
express an interest. So there is a time in democracy when you have to 
accept that you lost, even if there is about 52% in favor of it and 48% 
against it. There was a very clear majority… there was an example, that 
the majority pool across area against the small minority of people who 
living right on the fringe of the area, who stop them (the majority) from 
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getting houses for ten years…’ (Richard, Politician support the KHMRI 
and KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
‘Many residents in the area have been frustrated by the delays in taking 
this project forward’ (Cllr Peter Millea, Executive Member for Assets and 
Development, Narrated from news report) 
In the official discourse, the majority of the local residents that had signed up 
to the master plan were the real victims. The changes in the area they 
deserve were suspended for three years and unfortunately the government 
was dragged into the financial crisis that caused further delay in the 
implementation. It was suspicious that those protestors themselves were 
inspired by the speculative activities and were just sticking for higher 
compensation. Besides, homeowners were thought to alienate themselves 
from the major consultation events: 
‘Those three years, that delayed the CPO, took the program right up to 
2008, when the economic collapse happened, develop confidence 
disappeared overnight, the developers would not build anyway, they 
would have invested in the area two years ago when the area was 
booming and they were building everywhere. So it was quite conceivable 
that phase one, the Edge Lane front, would have been built on and 
occupied, but that didn’t happened. It just coincided with economic 
collapse in 2008, so the developers disappeared anyway, and there was 
no building, anywhere else in Edge Hill’ (Tom, Executive of Social 
Landlord support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘In the 2000s, the early 2000s, there was an economic boom in the 
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country, when property values going up. And one could buy a 
three-bedroom house, in Kensington, for 13-14 thousand pounds, and 
the same house, in other areas near the other side of Liverpool, was 100 
thousand pounds. And those houses on the other side of Liverpool that 
have a better social economy, so the residents themselves, homeowners 
could invest on their own properties… those houses’ values increased, 
to that 100 thousand, whereas over the same period, the 3,4,5 years to 
the late 90s and early 2000, the property in Kensington, didn’t go 
anywhere in value, they just stayed at the same. Those home owners 
who watched the phenomenon of people gaining economic assets, 
equity value, elsewhere in the same city, same property, and they were 
blaming the social landlords and the local authority for their 
predicaments and their experience. It was more complicated than the 
explanation but that was what they thought about and what they felt 
about. So then it became an issue that they expected, certain strategic 
intervention (Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI and 
KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
8.1.2.5 The Explanation for Other Symptoms  
Indeed, not all the new properties were occupied by homebuyers. A 
considerable proportion of them ended up as ‘buy-to-let’ estates purchased 
by speculators. As is complained by some of the local residents:  
‘So we now got an area without much homeowners, but an area with 
many new houses owned by private landlords, letting them out to people 
like students…a lot of Chinese students are living there. So this is the 
whole plan, it hasn't ever made any sense, it even makes less sense 
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now… After it's all finished, all the people behind this thing, they've gone! 
So it is left to me and anyone else living in Kensington (Steve, Activist 
against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
According to the official discourse, such a phenomenon was fueled by the 
financial products from the banking system. Which is to say, such a 
speculative activity is spontaneous and local government and the social 
housing associations can do little to curb it:  
‘…you can get mortgages for, not living in a house but to buy a house 
and to rent it out. So lots of people began to buy their second property, 
third properties, so people who made equities as homeowners on their 
own house, mortgage their own place, to buy another one, on a 
buy-to-let mortgage…there was a very significant increase in private 
sector renting’ (Tom, Executive of Social Landlord support the KHMRI 
and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
Moreover, not only the new properties can be used as an instrument for 
speculation. There is another type of speculative activity that is quite similar 
to the ‘rampant constructions’ in the DTMD case whereas individual 
speculators would invest on properties before the government declares the 
regeneration plan so they would make a profit from the compensation.  
‘… …the government intends to put money into support that intervention, 
through New Deal or through HMR, so speculators saw the opportunities 
and bought the properties… the didn’t just let them empty, they would 
rent them out to anybody else who could afford a competitive rent and 
you know…they were making a lot of money (Tom, Executive of Social 
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Landlord support the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
8.2 THE COMMUNITY DISCOURSES REGARDING 
THE REGENERATION PROJECTS IN THE 
KENSINGTON REGENERATION AREA 
In the official discourse, physical dilapidation and the concentration of 
low-income groups that are not capable of spending much money in the area 
had contributed to the deprivation of the area. The high proportion of social 
tenants and low level of owner-occupational rates had put a ‘transient’ tag on 
the area, implying that the majority of local residents do not have a long-term 
stake in the community they are living in. It was claimed that the physical 
regeneration would bring a fundamental change to such a situation. However, 
for some of the local residents, these ‘attributes’ were imposed on their 
communities simply for the sake of legitimizing the massive demolition. For 
them, the official language was manipulated to camouflage the essence of 
the physical regeneration, which is social cleansing and creating 
opportunities for speculation.  
"From the start, pathfinder showed an appetite for destruction…the 
classic English terraced house was demonized as ‘obsolete’…yet the 
cure turned out worse than the disease”(Steve, Activist against the 
KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013)  
 ‘In 1999 to 2000, they were going to knock down about 2/3 Kensington. 
And I think that was why Kensington was picked, because it was a great 
way to make money…’ (Steve, Activist against the KNDC and KHMRI, 
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interviewed in 2013) 
From the perspective of some local residents, the rent gap derived from the 
dilapidated physical environment and deteriorated housing stock of 
Kensington were the driven force for the intervention of local government. For 
them, the essence of the NDC was a gentrification process. As some of the 
interviewees put it:  
‘…the proportion of people that are homeowners in this area was about 
40%, and they wanted it to rise to 60%. That's their way to make this 
area more sustainable. It is called gentrification, you know they want the 
middle class come into this area, and do that by building better 
houses…’ (Steve, Activist against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 
2013) 
‘Although the depredations of Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders 
have been ghastly all over the north of England, there is nothing to rival 
Liverpool for the sheer scale of destruction, dereliction and waste…In 
fact, typically for Labour councils after the collapse of the speculative 
boom, the current strategy is to hope desperately that the process can 
be restarted…’ (Hatherley, theguardian.com)  
There are different voices from some long-term local residents regarding the 
transient argument as well. For them, those who do not live in the area would 
have a biased view and cannot really understand the area and local people. 
And the judgments they made on the Kensington HMRI area wasn’t based on 
real experiences of living there but on the exaggeration of some of the small 
problems so as to support the solutions they proposed, which is holistic 
 250 
demolition and reconstruction. As some of the interviewees put it: 
‘I can tell you this area is great, it is fantastic for a lot of reasons really. It 
has got a lot of history…there are still lots of people living there for a long 
time. It's not transient and the population is not as transient as people 
think it is…because they don't live here… (Steve, Activist against the 
KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
‘I have lived in Kensington for 20 years…I am very proud of living here…I 
think a lot of people love living in this area, and they have no intention of 
moving to a big house in posh area…to a lot of people, it is enough to 
have their own home in a small terraced house in Kensington or Fairfield. 
I think more important things for people around here is to feed the 
children, pay the bills…’ (Edward, Activist against the KNDC, interviewed 
in 2013) 
‘The biggest issue, the antisocial behaviour, is people drinking wine or 
taking drugs, but there is not a big gang issue, there are not much gang 
here as other parts in Liverpool that were terrible those years with gun 
crime…(Edward, Activist against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 
2013) 
In the official discourse, the pre-1919 Victorian terraced houses were thought 
to be unattractive on the market, not only for the obsolete design, but also for 
the high costs for refurbishment. Yet from the perspective of local people, the 
new buildings constructed by the private developers were not either in a 
better quality or of a good design. Which again became a strong proof in 
support of some local residents’ suspicion that the physical regeneration 
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programs were nothing but a means of speculation. As some of the local 
residents put it:  
‘They've knocked down some really sturdy houses, which is really good 
family homes…’ (Edward, Activist against the KNDC and KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
‘… they deem to build bigger houses on the same plot of land, so indeed 
it's smaller, it has smaller room, space in total.  When these house, get 
demolished and rebuilt, this is a two bedroom plot, it's going to be a three 
bedroom plot by the time they finish with it. So it is certainly three 
bedrooms but it is still the same size, so it's going to be much squashed. 
And they are going to charge double for it…a lot of money…’ (Alicia, 
Relocatees against the KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
‘The new house…the wall is very thin, you can hear next door, and it got 
a lifespan, allegedly, 30 years…’ (Edward, Activist against the KNDC, 
interviewed in 2013) 
For tenants, although many of them had long been living in the area, they are 
basically not in a position to bargain with the Social Landlords regarding the 
relocation due to the property-based democracy. Indeed, after the 
regeneration, the number of social tenant has seen a significant shrinkage 
and the vacancies they left were to be filled by homebuyers with a better 
economic position in the market. In other words, social tenants were to some 
extent blamed for their inability to consume and moving them out was seen 
as an effective means to address the problems faced by the area. The HMRI 
programs were accordingly been criticized as a ‘social cleansing’ project.  
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‘…a recently submitted planning application proposes the demolition of 
439 houses and a housing association scheme that will replace them 
with only 152’ (Hatherley, theguardian.com)  
From the perspective of people who resisted the project, the condition of their 
properties was not as bad as what the government had described and they 
believe they can cope with it well. Moreover, it is unacceptable for them to 
hand over their properties and take another loan in return for one of the new 
properties which, from their perspective, wasn’t well constructed and has a 
short life span. As one of the property owners put it:  
‘…so they could buy my house from me and then loan me…to let me 
have the full amount of money and then to buy one of their houses, these 
new buildings...I wasn't happy with the deal…you know what they do is 
very profitable’. (Alicia, Relocatees against the KHMRI, interviewed in 
2013) 
To legitimize their resistance, local residents developed their own strategies 
and discourse in response to the government’s actions. Apart from 
questioning the motivation of the regeneration projects and connecting the 
physical regeneration with speculation, some of the government’s measures 
in propelling the project were also accused. For one thing, it was argued that 
the evidence base for the physical regeneration wasn’t solid as the high 
vacancy rates of the properties in Kensington were to some extent made by 
the social housing associations that can manipulate the flow of social tenants. 
As is argued by one of the interviewees:  
‘... this street had lots of social housing and there were a lot of tenants, 
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renting...not necessarily affluent families you know they didn't have 
much money. They were offered something about £4,000 pounds to 
move into other homes... that’s how they made the plans to say this 
place needs regenerating cause it’s under inhabited…they created that 
themselves, by moving people out (Alicia, Relocatees against the 
KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
For another thing, they criticised the rationale of the gap loan. According to 
the policy design, the possible impacts on the social structure of the 
community would be mitigated through a financial package, which provided 
low-interest mortgages to relocatees who are privileged to buy the new 
houses. Yet for local residents, once a consent on the holistic demolition and 
reconstruction is reached, properties are bound to be demolished and the 
previous owners that want to stay in the area should pay for the improvement 
of the physical environment and housing conditions. Moreover, many of the 
former residents were at the late age of their working life or were even retired. 
They were incapable of paying back the money and have to sell the 
properties on the market. Some of the local residents put it like this:  
‘…there are a lot of old people, who has already finished their mortgage 
years ago and are not working, retired. At their 70s, they are given 
£80,000 for their house, but to move back to where they live, it is going to 
cost an extra £20,000. (Edward, Activist against the KNDC and KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
"I used to say ‘I'm 65, we worked hard to pay off our mortgage, why do I 
want a £35,000 loan?' - I didn't want to leave that for my kids," (Mrs 
Walsh, 2012, Narrated from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17255852) 
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‘…so it would turn you from a 100% homeowner to a shared homeowner, 
with loans…that was also the statement that if you sell your new Bellway 
home within ten years, if increase in prices, they (the developers) took a 
percentage out of that profit too… (Alicia, Relocatees against the KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
It is also thought by some of the local residents that the gap loan policy had 
indeed priced many of the original residents out from the community, as they 
would sell their new properties out and seek cheaper places to live. With the 
sudden increase in the number of international students, the rents in areas 
surrounding the campus of University of Liverpool had inflated by around 
30% since 2011. Many of the new properties are acquired by private 
landlords to let to students. As is put by one of the local residents:   
 ‘…the people are selling out their house here, so that is one of the 
biggest things I've noticed. The manifesto put together the stepping 
stones they said it the community here would stay, that is not true. 
Community now growing in this area is Chinese’ (Alicia, Relocatees 
against the KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
Since the Central Edge Hill area was included in one of the ‘opportunity 
zones’ and was designated as a HMRI project, local residents were facing 
great pressures from the government and their reactions varied significantly. 
As one of the local politicians put it: 
‘…so typically what you get, is you go out there, saying we've selected 
this street for demolition, let's talk about making you an offer, a number 
of people are willing to engage with that…without to have a CPO. There 
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will be other people, who think that, if I go, with the very first offer, I am 
going to get the worst offer, if I hold out a little bit longer, I will have a 
better offer in the end, so there is people who are trying to hold out for a 
bit of time…in one or two cases its people just hold on until as long as 
they can, cause they think people will give them more money...and 
you've then got people who don't want to go through the disruption, who 
don't want be able to do all of this, you got to be able to balance all sorts 
of things…’ (Nik, Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
For those who are not willing to cooperate, the consultation cannot really stop 
local government to implement their plan and refusing to move became the 
only way. The process for local residents would be both physically and 
mentally stressful. As is put by some of the interviewees:  
‘They did protest, but bit by bit, some of them will give up, and eventually 
moved somewhere else. A few stayed…but it was so stressful for these 
tenants, Because you know, when you get official letters from the council 
or Bellway Homes, eventually you worn down, let's take an easy way out, 
this was going over a few years, so eventually people can no longer 
stand… (Edward, Activist against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 
2013) 
The municipal government can choose to put a Compulsory Purchas Order 
(CPO) on those who stick to the area, yet the process would be extremely 
time and money consuming. Local residents clearly understand that and 
therefore take it as a tool when bargaining with the municipal government. As 
one of the local residents who resisted the project put it:  
 256 
‘If I don't move, they will CPO me, but they have to do it on the whole 
land, so even if I am the only one standing, they have to do it for the 
whole land…it would cost them, I think up to a quarter of million 
pounds…local government's money, to compulsory purchase me, it 
could take anything up to 18 months to 2 years because I have rights I 
can stop them from times, there will be court cases, court prices, public 
inquires, it would be very time consuming, and cost a lot of money. They 
want to avoid that, very much… (Alicia, Relocatees against the HMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
Yet playing against the government would be extremely stressful, both 
physically and mentally. For one thing, local people know that they can delay 
the process rather than fundamentally reject the decisions of regeneration. 
Therefore any investment on the current environment would be considered 
as a waste of money: 
‘So in fact I lived in a situation that, ok my carpet need replacement, but I 
can spend £400 or £500 to replace the carpet, and then suddenly come 
and tell me I got go. It is always been uncertainty, it’s been awful, just so 
many things just one by one (Alicia, Relocatees against the KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
For another thing, the evacuation of the community would cast strong 
feelings of isolation on those who are left behind, not only for the fact that 
they are the only ones remaining on the empty street but also that they would 
be blamed by some of their previous neighbours for the delay they’ve caused. 
Moreover, while the private developers were described as profit originated, 
those who resisted the regeneration project were also described to be 
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‘greedy’ by their opponents. As is put by some of the interviewees:  
‘They continue to pick everyone else one by one, and every meet on the 
street, and I believe, I mean I have been through this totally on my own 
for two years, before that there were three or four of us (who were 
unwilling to cooperate)’ (Alicia, Relocatees against the KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
‘I went out on a tea time news, in the morning on the Radio Merseyside, 
they did get the councillor in there, the cabinet member for housing. 
They got her to do her side… I've never seen her before but I know who 
she was…she just said I was after for more money, which I did agree 
with her, because I was. Because I would lose my house, and in the 
market, to buy another house like this, would cost a lot of money, they 
charge it themselves. So she wasn't actually very nice towards me, she 
just said me was for the money. I couldn't deny that, because I want a 
good price for my house…if they are going to make profit, I want to make 
that too. I don't see why I can't…’ (Alicia, Relocatees against the KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
Once the majority of the local people moved out, the area would become 
even more derelict. For the municipal government, the costs for maintaining 
the public services would rise due to the shrinkage of the council tax bases. 
Moreover, properties in the area would be more likely to be targeted by 
vandals. Although people who resisted the regeneration program had caused 
trouble to the municipal government, the latter had indeed handled it in a 
decent way when compared with its Chinese counterparts.  
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‘…a couple of years ago they took down all the road signs and I still lived 
here, so that's continually some time the rubbish was never collected… 
the postman they were just waited until there were a handful of letters 
which could be until four or three weeks' period, then they will post them 
to me I get post once or twice a month. And I have whole time lock, for 
the most of the time I have to complain… (Alicia, Relocatees against the 
KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
‘… I had a layer stolen from my roof, when the rains came, it flooded, 
and I approached the council, cause I believe it was a direct result of the 
scheme, that led with stolen…cause you got a derelict street...and finally 
they fixed it for me…’ (Alicia, Relocatees against the HMRI, interviewed 
in 2013) 
8.3 THE COMMUNITY DISCOURSE REGARDING 
PUBLIC PARTICIAPTION IN THE FORM OF 
‘KENSINGTON REGENERAITON’  
The KNDC project was criticised by many local residents for the lacking of 
strategy and falling to deliver the desirable outcomes that should have been 
provided by the funding in such a large scale. For local people, perhaps the 
most significant failure of the program was that it didn’t bring much working 
opportunities to local people that desperately needed it. As some of the local 
people put it:  
‘…in the end of the day. Areas like Kensington improve by people having 
jobs, and spend their money within the area where they live… It doesn’t 
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matter what you do, how nice you make it look, or you saying to people 
that you’re still unemployed but the area looks nicer…(Steve, Activist 
against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013). 
Moreover, some local residents as well as politicians thought that the NDC 
funding wasn’t effectively used and too much money was spent on 
unnecessary things such as propaganda. There seems to be a deep 
entrenchment between those who were supposed to be the beneficiaries of 
the program and the decision makers. This is partly due to the fact that not all 
the local residents could equally benefit from the social programs as each of 
these projects has its own specially targeted groups. It is hard to please 
everyone. For people who need skill trainings for new jobs, the improvement 
on physical environment cannot really satisfy them. As is put by some of the 
interviewees:  
'I have not been very impressed by the physical regeneration… the 
medical centre is really good, but that's probably the best thing they had 
done…the money doesn't trickle down to us…they spent a lot on 
propaganda events. But the people don't see much…’ (Edward, Activist 
against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
As a national program, a certain proportion of money has been spent on 
propagandas so as to let the project well known by people from both inside 
and outside of the area, which was seen by some local people as 
unnecessary. As is put by some of the interviewees:  
‘So people got things like this (the booklet) every year. They used to print 
these quite regularly. It is newspapers they sent to us, and if you look at 
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it, all it about was Kensington Regeneration. A picture of the Chairman is 
everywhere, like something of showing personality. If you look at it and 
you read it, there is no information about NDC, so all of this is 
self-promotion, self-marketing, nothing about anything else. But all this 
was quite expensive to do…(Steve, Activist against the KNDC and 
KHMRI, interviewed in 2013)’  
‘I stand as a cabinet member in 2011, I then pull the funding from that 
because it simply wasn't delivered what it should have delivered. And it 
was quite do wasted money…I think you can't spend that amount of 
money without making a positive difference…I think on the whole the 
question we should ask is did it do as well as it should be, did it achieve 
what it should achieve? And it absolutely fall shortage from those 
grounds. It didn't achieve Kensington Regeneration’s own hype that it 
would achieve; it didn't achieve what that amount of funding was capable 
of achieving. (Nik, Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
The New Deal for Community Partnership was an innovative institutional 
setup in delivering the central government’s regeneration targets with the 
assumption that a community-lead partnership can well represent local 
residents’ interests and is capable of delivering both physical and social 
regeneration programs. In Kensington, the partnership was Kensington 
Regeneration (KR). As is put by one of the interviewees:  
‘Kensington Regeneration has a board that controls how that money 
(NDC funding) spent, that board would come up with a business plan, for 
ten years, and then a business plan every year, about how it was going 
to spend that amount of money…City council wasn't in control of 
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that…(Nik, Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
‘So if you look at how it (NDC Partnership) started off, it was almost kind 
of like a council within a council….’ (Nik, Politician against the KNDC, 
interviewed in 2013) 
In practice such a structure is proved to be problematic and less effective in 
enhancing participation. Initially the board was constituted by 24 people from 
various stakeholders such as the local authority, the social housing 
associations, public institutions and local communities. The sheer size of the 
board made it ineffective to make decisions. As is put by one of the former 
board members:  
‘….it was too big, because it couldn’t make decisions. It couldn’t spend 
the money. (Tom, Executive of Social Enterprise against the KNDC 
interviewed in 2013)  
To demonstrate the real accountability to local people, the neighborhoods’ 
opinions were attached with great significance, which was especially the 
case during the first few years when the board was with its first Chairman. At 
that time, decisions made by the KNDC board had indeed to be reported to 
local forums and the five neighborhoods. As one of the interviewees put it:  
‘…he chaired it in a way that almost gave the entire power to community 
representatives. Which was fair enough in one way, but in another way, 
you got all the others sitting around the table coming from the council 
and other organizations, who might thought oh why we would bother for 
coming?... (Hillary, Scholar neutral to the KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
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‘…the board has to report to local forums and the five neighbourhoods. 
So they couldn’t make a decision until the forums of the neighbourhoods 
agree. (Tom, Executive of Social Enterprise against the KNDC, 336-339)  
It would be naïve to assume that all the representatives of these 
neighborhoods would share a common interest and can cooperate with each 
other smoothly. In reality, representatives from different neighborhoods 
played like watchdogs for the interests of their own community, especially 
when it comes to the distribution of the public funding. As is put by one of the 
interviewees:  
‘…there were five geographical places…all have representatives on the 
board. All those neighbourhoods were quite parochial, they 
separate…hard to cope with each other…they didn’t really work well with 
each other, so if one person spoke on the board, argued for some 
community investments in their area, neighbourhood, the other people 
would say, no, unless we have the same as well, or they might not need 
it, as well. And it was just arguing, and arguing without a decision’ (Tom, 
Executive of Social Enterprise against the KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘…after 30 years’ street fighting, sort of things, they actually are difficult 
to change perceptions. In a lot of divided areas, if people feel that they 
have been walked through in the past, it is actually quite difficult to bring 
them alongside. When they are on the board, you are asking them to 
think the good of the whole of the NDC area, it was actually quite difficult 
to do that, if you got one of those in yours, actually we want get those in 
ours, or if we spend 15 million on Fairfield, we need spend similar 
amount of money on other areas as well…without actually thinking in a 
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more strategic way’’ (Hillary, Scholar neutral to the KNDC, interviewed in 
2014) 
The initial democratic way of running the regeneration led to endless 
arguments and discussions which undermined the organization’s ability to 
make decisions and was finally modified by the board from within. Facing 
pressures from the government, the decision-making power was later 
centralized to the board and the mechanism of reporting to the local 
communities was stripped away. As is put by one of the former board 
members:  
‘New Deal had to take 6 million pounds every year…so the community… 
have to get it spent…the first three years failed to get any spent, the first 
three years was in crisis (Tom, Executive of Social Enterprise against the 
KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘So about at the three years’ end… the officers from the government 
office were saying that (the partnership) is not working, they are not 
spending any money and they cannot make a decision. Cause they are 
just trying to please everyone at the same time…’ (Tom, Executive of 
Social Enterprise against the KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
‘…they simplified the structure and reduced the size of the board. And 
reduced their link to these forms…they reduced the numbers (of board 
members) and they renewed the way of decision making...so the board 
made decisions…so it became more autocratic in making a decision, 
which improved its efficiency as an organization. But it took some time 
for them to realize the necessaries’ (Tom, Executive of Social Enterprise 
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against the KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
The decision making process of the KNDC partnership was extremely 
opaque for local residents. According to the official guidance, NDC 
partnerships were expected to be ‘operated like an enterprise, and all the 
decisions made should be based on the interests of the organization’. The 
KNDC board were not mandated to release the project related details to the 
public but only to the departments of the central government. Which means 
the KR is exempted from the Freedom of Information (FOI) and therefore 
they do not have a responsibility to disclose detailed information about how 
the NDC money were spent, which increased the suspicion of local residents. 
As is put by one of the interviewees:  
‘The Kensington Regeneration is not a public limited company, and they 
are basically an agency…we cannot go online and check how much the 
chief executive paid for herself, or the chairmen or whatever…there was 
no scrutiny, and let us ask questions of where would you spend this 
money. I have seen all through these years there has been a couple of 
silly things that they had spent the money on… (Edward, Activist against 
the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
‘…when it (KNDC) is finished and the local city council take over all the 
assets, I can ask questions, yet after the houses are gone, it was too late 
to ask questions (Steve, Activist against the KNDC and KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
 ‘…the agency didn’t bring any decision making closer to the people, 
which it was supposed to do, it caused more problems than itself, but 
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actually it was a much less efficient and effective way of spending money 
than had the council spend it directly in that area (Nik, Politician against 
the KNDC, interviewed in 2013)  
There is a trade-off between the stability of the organization and the 
legitimacy of the board members. For the Kensington Regeneration itself, 
maintaining the stability of the board certainly has a positive effect on its 
operation and can reduce the uncertainties. As is put by one of the 
interviewees:  
‘…the NDC team would think that it is much more easier if you get 
people you already know and you can easily get along with, can work 
with, and to be able to understand what issues are…if you get new 
people in, you have to do all that again’ (Hillary, Scholar neutral to the 
KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
However, a comparatively stabilized composition of the decision makers 
certainly has negative impacts people’s perception about the organization. 
Accordingly the board members’ legitimacy was questioned and local 
residents would be suspicious about the organization. As is put by some of 
the interviewees:  
‘It was a little club of people who just going to do what they want to do 
rather that the community want to do or not. So I think Kensington New 
Deal was a lost opportunity…’ (Jerry, Professional against the KNDC 
and KHMRI, interviewed in 2014) 
Apart from the legitimacy, the board members’ ability for delivering such a 
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large scale regeneration project was also questioned by both local people 
and some of the politicians. Although board members from the KR can get 
advices and professional support from the local authority and other institution, 
there is still a learning curve for them to cope with the complicate program as 
well as to work with other board members. Within the board, decisions are 
normally made through vote. Although all the board members enjoyed equal 
voting rights, the process can easily be affected by members with strong 
personality. Therefore it was usually to see the decision-making process 
been dominated by a few number of the board members. As is put by some 
of the interviewees:  
‘It was by vertue of personality not by vertue of constitution. Because of 
the strength of the characters, the capacity to advocate or bully, it wasn’t 
pleasant…one or two characters, became very loud and very aggressive, 
and dominant, others were quite. So people make decisions not 
necessary because of the intelligence of the decision, but because of the 
strength of the personality as the proportion of the particular’ (Tom, 
Executive of Social Enterprise against the KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
It is obvious that there is a naivety existing in the policy design assuming that 
decisions made by democratically constituted organizations such as the KR 
would be the best decisions for local people. In the KR, apart from the 
personality issue, there is another factor that affect the decision makings. It 
was found that some of the board members in the Kensington Regeneration 
have long involved in community-based social programs. They are 
professional players hanging on social programs and they know how to 
capture opportunities offered by the public funded social programs such as 
the KNDC and take advantages of it. With the existing social connections and 
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the power base, they can be easily elected as board members and play a 
predominant role in the distribution of the NDC funding. As is put by some of 
the interviewees:  
‘It was a self-selected group of people, based on existing cliques, 
existing power basis, who were all about supporting the existing power 
basis. It wasn't about empowering community to take control of their own 
lives, and take control of their own destiny and spend this money. (Nik, 
Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
 ‘…if you look at the legacy strategy, it was about setting up a 
Community Interest Company that was controlled by those existing 
interests, to be able to sustain their existing power basis beyond the 
Kensington Regeneration’ (Nik, Politician against the KNDC, interviewed 
in 2013). 
The way the board was managed was also criticized. The centralization of 
the power indeed became a barrier for public participation and community 
empowerment rather than an effective instrument to encourage both. Board 
members within the NDC partnership were required to act in the interest of 
the partnership. Any publicly expressed criticisms from the board members 
towards the NDC partnership were prohibited so as to maintain the 
organization’s public image. The rule is equally applied to all the board 
members, even for the democratically elected councillors. To some extent it 
shows that the partnership has a degree of independency, yet it can be also 
deciphered by many local people that the organization is run in a somewhat 
undemocratic way. As one of the interviewees put it:   
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 ‘…if you are a community representative, you couldn't be publicly 
critical of anything the Kensington Regeneration did, so if you disagree 
with a certain project, you could argue the case when you are on the 
board, behind closed doors, but if you couldn't then stand up in the 
assembly and say I think that was the wrong decision for these reasons, 
and if you did that, they pull those people off the board…’ (Nik, Politician 
against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013). 
‘in 2007,one of the councillors on the board as the representative of the 
city council wrote a critical piece on her blog, saying she didn't agree 
with the legacy strategy, she argued against the board, and the board 
members tried to get her sacked from the board, despite the fact she 
was speaking as a councillor…It turned out the councillor resigned from 
the board over that issue, but there were moves to pull her off the board 
of Kensington Regeneration…Just through the vote of the board…’ (Nik, 
Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013). 
Since the KNDC was an area-based program, according to the rules, only 
those who are living within the KNDC area were eligible to involve in the NDC 
events ranging from consultation to the election of board members. This was 
later used as an effective instrument to exclude those who are dissatisfied 
with the program. As is put by one of the interviewees:  
‘I was disqualified from participating in the meetings held by the NDC 
partnership simply because I moved into a house which is somewhat 3 
meters away from the boundaries of the NDC area’ (Steve, Activist 
against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013)  
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 ‘One guy in the area used to print newsletters…they (the board) banned 
him from going to the meetings, they said he couldn’t come to the 
meetings any more as he has moved out of the area…indeed they don’t 
expect for people to question what they were doing…(Steve, Activist 
against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013)  
8.4 CONCLUSION 
It is found that the descriptions regarding the same regeneration project could 
be significantly different in the discourse used by the government and local 
residents. In the official discourse, the old properties were seen as one of the 
major sources for the deprivation and the solution is to replace them with new 
ones in attracting long-term residents with deep pocket. Yet for local 
residents, the housing redevelopment project was largely seen as 
profit-oriented and was initiated to collect the ‘rent gap’ and to price poor 
people out.  
It is also found that the incentives for different stakeholders involving in the 
physical regeneration program varied significantly. The social landlords 
involved because they want to improve the profitability, for which they would 
rather give up a considerable proportion of the property ownership in return 
for new properties that require less maintained fees. For municipal 
government, they are willing to use money from Central Government to 
fundamentally change the landscape of deprived areas. Private sectors 
participated for the fixed profit rate. Some local people accepted the 
government’s vision and policy and were willing to see the physical 
regeneration happen in the community. Yet there were also strong 
resistances for the disagreement on the compensation policies. Both the 
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municipal government and those who resisted the regeneration program 
proactively mobilized powers and resources they can get within the 
framework set by the formal structure.  
Public participation in the form of the ‘Kensington Regeneration’ was 
criticized for its undemocratic nature, the opaque decision-making process, 
the inability of the decision makers in running such a big regeneration 
program and the naivety existing in the policy design.  
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CHAPTER 9 DISCOURSE USED BY THE 
GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL RESIDENTS 
IN INTERPRETING THE DTMD 
REGENERATION PROGRAMME 
The Chinese fast urbanization and development in recent years was deeply 
involved with the process of neoliberalization, including opening up areas for 
private capitals, accumulation by disposition, strengthened and expanded 
state power to guarantee a steady environment for the accumulation regime 
and local officials’ progress-based promotional mechanisms that stimulate 
the entrepreneurship of municipal government. Since 1994, the tax basis was 
divided into two separate sections that are collected and used by the central 
and local government respectively, which guarantees stable revenues of 
central government and at the same time leaves municipal government with 
considerable freedom in deciding the accumulation and spending strategy 
within their own jurisdictions. Since the 1990s, with the marketization of 
housing provision, land-related revenues, including land lease fees, taxations 
and various sort of administrative fees charged on the property development 
activities, had contributed to a considerable proportion of local government’s 
income. Local government therefore has strong incentives to materialize 
urban development and physical regeneration programs. The commonly 
used tactics of local governments include: making strategic plans for the 
development of clusters of certain types of industries and providing well 
equipped infrastructures such as transportation, living environment, 
education, health, and leisure facilities, and services, to attract both domestic 
and foreign investments. Many local governments therefore have borrowed 
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heavily from banks and are facing great fiscal deficits that need to be covered 
through exploiting new sources of revenues and slashing ‘ineffective’ 
expenditures on programs in relation to social welfare, social housing and the 
health care. Such a development strategy has a significant impact on the way 
in which inner city regeneration policies are formulated and delivered. As 
local governments’ affordability were overstretched by the fast expansion of 
cities and the accompanied expenditures on infrastructure provision, inner 
city regeneration programs were less likely to get compensations and the 
cadres in charge had to balance the budget through extra money generated 
from the project themselves, which can only be realized through 
dispossessing local residents’ rights in profiting from the inflation of their own 
properties. 
9.1 THE OFFICAL DISCOURSES REGARDING THE 
PHYSICAL REGENERATION IN THE DTMD 
In the official announcements and news reports from the major media, the 
West-DTMD regeneration project was repeatedly portrayed as one of the 
most important projects of the Xi’an Municipal government aiming at 
developing the local economies and benefiting local people.  
‘The project is one of the annual key projects of the Xi’an municipal 
government and is directed by the vice party secretary and the deputy 
mayor of Xi’an City with the assistance from two other vice Mayors’ 
(Narrated from local newspaper published in 2005) 
‘The party secretary and the mayor emphasized that the aim of the 
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project was to benefit the Xi’an citizens and to realize the local residents’ 
expectations for having a modern life…’ (Government Announcement in 
2005)  
According to the official announcement and reports on local newspapers, the 
‘road widening’ was not only a mandated task attached with great social, 
economic and political importance but also a project initiated in the interests 
of Xi’an’s citizens. Local media strove to create a scene that the initiation of 
the regeneration project was not only supported by the ‘vast majority’ of Xi’an 
citizens but also local residents, which was evidenced by speeches from local 
representatives that attended the official meetings. Indeed, asking ‘local 
representatives’, who are normally local elites, to publicly express their 
support is a conventional way for the government to enhance the legitimacy 
of the government’s activities in front of the public, i.e., the participatory 
process dominated by the government and participated by ‘local 
representatives’ more than often becomes a hegemonic project. The 
propaganda machine also runs at the government’s will. It is hard to find any 
negative views regarding the road widening project from local media and no 
public debate regarding various aspects of the regeneration project was 
really facilitated. Citizens in Xi’an, had they never talked with the local 
residents in the West-DTMD, will hardly get a full picture of the project simply 
based on the printed information.  
‘The representatives of the local Muslim people agreed that the 
Sajingqiao widening is good for local people and the vast majority of 
local residents are in support of the proposal. They further expressed 
that in comply with the wider aim of the municipal government, they 
themselves will play as a role model in supporting the demolition work, 
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and at the same time try their best to convince their relatives’. (Narrated 
from Local news report in 2005) 
From the governor’s perspective, the west DTMD regeneration was an 
integrative part of the overall development strategy of the Xi’an City, 
especially in dealing with the inner-city congestions. The Sajingqiao Street 
has the potential of becoming a longitudinal main road that could mitigate the 
traffic congestions in Central Xi’an. The costs for expanding the street was 
planned to be partly covered by profits generated from the commercial 
developments alongside it and the benefits brought by the project to the city 
as a whole would be significant. The project was also seen as an 
indispensable measure to realize the aim of ‘developing the tourism 
attractions and the commercial centres that can reveal the ancient landscape 
of Xi’an-the great capital city of empire China in Tang dynasty.  
‘…the conference pointed out that the expansion project of Sajingqiao 
street is one of the key projects of the municipal government intending to 
benefit local people, to improve the physical environment, to improve the 
functionality of the whole city, to improve the local economic vitality and 
to protect the traditional culture’ (Narrated from local newspaper 
published in 2005)  
‘Through protection and redevelopment, the environmental deterioration, 
traffic congestions and the under-use of the tourism resources in the 
Sajingqiao area would be fundamentally reversed…after the 
regeneration, the Sajingqiao street will become a ‘golden street’ which 
will not only accelerate the local economic development but also reveal 
the prosperous economy in ancient Xi’an’ (Narrated from local 
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newspaper published in 2005)  
For the district government, the project indeed provided a great opportunity 
for its property-led intervention to be realized. The great significance attached 
to the road expansion implied that the implementation of the project will be 
guaranteed by enforcement measures, which is clearly addressed in the 
announcement of the meetings attended by provincial and municipal top 
officials.  
‘…especially, the Sajingqiao regeneration will take the opportunities 
offered by the expansion of ‘Sajingqiao Street’ and to be built into a 
district with a concentration of Local cultural products and indigenous 
cuisine’ (The former party secretary of the Lianhu District, narrated from 
interviews published on newspaper In 2005)  
Indeed, the ‘opportunity’ mentioned above refers to the fact that for the 
widening of Sajingqiao Street, which is in the public interest, the government 
was able to impose a Compulsory Purchase Order on the properties within 
the designated area. According to the plan, the adjacent areas alongside the 
road with a 25 meters’ width would be flattened for commercial development. 
With the excuse of road expansion, enforcement measures could be used to 
eliminate resistance from local people. The bright vision regarding the area 
portrayed by the party cadres to a large extent is irrelevant to those 
relocatees that either doing business on the street or living alongside it. As 
according to the compensation policies they will be priced out to periphery 
areas with lower commercial values.  
Local residents’ interests, according to the government’s announcement, are 
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pended to be sacrificed and any attempts to delay the progress would face 
severe consequences according to the government’s announcement, which, 
as is seen from the local residents, is full of intimidation.  
‘…the area’s potentiality of becoming an important tourist attraction is 
constrained by the out-of-date facilities and deteriorated physical 
environment. As early as in the 1950s it was suggested by many people 
to regenerate the area. In the recent decade, the issue has been raised 
by representatives repeatedly on the annual municipal People’ 
Conference and People's Political Consultative Conference’ (Narrated 
from local newspaper published in 2005) 
‘The Sajingqiao expansion project is fundamentally beneficial to local 
people and for the common interests of Xi’an’s Citizens, all the local 
residents, small business and institutions within the demolition zone 
should cooperate and relocate on time…this time, we will impose strict 
disciplines on our faculties, yet for those intentionally delay or even 
obstruct the demolition process, we will decisively take necessary 
actions in accordance with the law. We will never allow the infringement 
of public interests to be imposed by a small group of people’ (Interview 
with the director of the Demolition Office, narrated from the news report, 
2005)  
One of the inherited features of the government in mobilizing local residents 
was to ask individuals such as the party members and local officials to step 
forward and play as a role model in accepting the conditions for demolition. 
The government departments, public institutions and even private sectors are 
also commanded to cooperate. For private sectors that are required to 
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cooperate, to refuse is obvious not a wise choice, as their stakes are held in 
the hands of the Administrative Department of Commerce and Industry .The 
whole process is a good demonstration of how the power of public 
management in China can be manipulated by the municipal government. 
‘We also required the party members to play as a role model for the rest 
of local residents (Interview with the Director of the Demolition Office, 
narrated from news report, 2005)  
‘The public institutions should take a lead in cooperating with the 
demolition work and act as the role model for the rest of the local people’ 
(Narrated from local news report, 2005) 
To speed up the demolition process, the government proactively mobilized 
the power and resources it has in an authoritarian way. All the government 
departments were required to ‘fulfil their duty’ and contribute to the demolition 
project. The state apparatus were repeatedly mentioned as the ultimate 
guarantee for the successful implementation of the demolition. The 
underlining message conveyed in the government’s statement and the local 
officials’ speech was: due to the great significance attached to the 
regeneration project, the administrative and judicial resources are now at the 
disposal of the district government. The provincial cadres’ appearance in the 
conversation between the government and local representatives implies that 
the program was patronized by the provincial government. A series of signs 
from the government have shown that local residents stand with no chance to 
resist the top-down decisions imposed on them through the formal structures, 
which is actually a prevailing phenomenon in many Chinese inner-city 
regeneration projects.  
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‘The Governmental departments in relation to planning, construction, 
land management and commercial and industrial management should 
fulfil their duties and cooperate the District government in accomplishing 
the demolition and construction works of the Sajingiqao expansion 
project’ (The announcement of the government, 2005) 
‘This time, we will impose strict disciplines on our faculties, yet for those 
intentionally delay or even obstruct the demolition process, we will 
decisively take necessary actions in accordance with the law. We will not 
tolerate the infringement on public interests from a small group of people’ 
(Interview with the director of the Demolition Office, narrated from the 
news report, 2005) 
‘The relocatees should cooperate and support the urban construction. 
Unreasonable activities impeding the demolition, including insulting the 
officers, inciting local people to resist and violating the related laws and 
regulation would be handled by the police. For actions violating the laws, 
the subjects will be prosecuted (The announcement of the government, 
2005).  
For some of the officials and professionals working for the government, the 
local government’s intention to balance part of the expenditures on the road 
widening through commercial development alongside the main road is 
warrant. From their perspective, the inflation of the land and property price in 
the west DTMD is largely contributed by the public investment on the 
infrastructures and therefore the government should benefit from the 
regeneration project. On the contrary, local residents are thought to be 
problematic, as following local people’s requirements on compensation and 
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relocation, the government would not be able to balance the check without 
external funding. One of the officials put it like this:  
‘The compensation policies were fair but some of the residents wanted 
more and were hard to be convinced. The local residents can really 
benefit from the regeneration as they will be able to live in new 
apartments with central heating, which is a great improvement compared 
with their current living conditions’ (Bai, Executive of the LRC, 
interviewed in 2013)  
‘….what the local people really want is using public money to expand 
and beautify their street, modify their houses and make places to 
accommodate their business. They refuse relocations of Muslims but 
want all the Han people to be moved out’ (Liu, the former Chief planner 
of the DTMD regeneration project, interviewed in 2013)  
Behind the officials’ rational is the reality that politicians in Chinese local 
governments have to make decisions like an entrepreneur with eyes always 
on pro-growth strategies and at the same time remain sensitive to the return 
of the investment. During the past two decades, Chinese local governments 
gradually established an accumulation strategy based on the monopolization 
of urban land ownership.  
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9.2 THE COMMUNITY DISCOURSES REGARDING 
THE PHYSICAL REGENERATION IN DTMD 
9.2.1 Local Residents’ Claims for their Rights to the DTMD 
Since very limited power and resources are granted by the current 
institutional setup for local residents to influence the decisions regarding the 
physical regeneration programs imposed on their community, they have to 
adopt alternative strategies to defend their property rights when forceful 
demolition and displacement are about to happen. Sticking around and 
refusing to evacuate are widely adopted by local people. A stagnated 
regeneration initiative may prevent any changes from happening in a 
community yet at the same time can successfully make a political statement 
and leave space for a different regeneration scenario. For local residents, a 
delayed or blocked redevelopment on the one hand implies the chance for 
getting a higher monetary compensation while on the other hand means local 
people has to bear with the dilapidated environment until the real 
regeneration takes place.  
In resisting the local government’s decisions, local residents articulated their 
own discourse to legitimize their actions in mobilizing power and resources 
they can reach to resist the state-led gentrification. According to the P.R.C.’s 
constitution, since 1982 all urban land belongs to the state while it is only 
possible for citizens to hold full rights to the properties attached on it. If strictly 
following this principle, the government as the land owner has the right to 
remove people from the pieces of land they want to reclaim. The state 
ownership of urban land has been repeatedly used by municipal 
governments as a tool for the primitive accumulation during the past 30 years 
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with the support from central government. Had such a fundamental condition 
not been challenged, local people would have lost the battle from the very 
beginning. One of the strongest reasons used by local residents to 
demonstrate their rights to the place was the ownership of the area they 
inherited from their ancestors as well as their attachment to the area that 
accommodate their ethnic culture and traditions. And the significance of 
social fabrics was used in local resident’s discourse to add up the real cost of 
the regeneration program. It was repeatedly emphasized in local resident’s 
discourse that the value of their property does not only mean costs of the new 
buildings or the central heating system, but also includes the existing social 
and cultural fabrics and the convenient daily life, all of which would disappear 
once the regeneration is implemented following the municipal government’s 
proposal.   
‘The Hui nationality has settled in the DTMD for at least 600 years, our 
cultural, social and economic activities are all rooted here. The relentless 
redevelopment may cause much severe loss to the indigenous social 
fabric than any other disasters such as the Cultural Revolution’ (Ding, 
Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013). 
‘The mosques are the most important thing for our Muslim people as we 
do our daily worship and hold our ceremonies in it. It is also impossible to 
find so many cuisines in any other places as in the DTMD. Most 
importantly, this is the place where our ancestors lived and local people 
have their family cemeteries here. By no means we would allow them to 
be touched’ (Ma, Local people against the west DTMD regeneration, 
interviewed in 2013). 
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‘.. we didn’t turn it (the land certificate) in to the government…if we do 
that, the land would now belong to the state, but we didn’t, so the land 
still belongs to us…(Zhao, local people against the west DTMD 
regeneration，interviewed in 2014) 
Another interesting phenomenon was that the majority of the interviewees 
from the DTMD that strongly opposed the regeneration proposal provided by 
local government clearly separated the ‘local government’ and central 
government in their discourse. According to them, the central government’s 
policy was generous and fair: ‘for every one square meter’s demolition, the 
relocatees will get two square meters’ compensation in new buildings 
constructed somewhere nearby’, which, based on the common sense, would 
too good to be true. Central government is less likely to give a clear guidance 
on the standard of the compensation for particular case. Yet for local 
residents, attaching justice and impartiality to central government can 
increase the legitimacy of their resistance and make the outside society 
believe that the municipal government should be blamed for its unethical 
behaviours. 
9.2.2 Justifying the Non-cooperation 
Being different from the critical attitudes appeared in the official documents 
against the potential local resistance and the official language that described 
the resistance as ‘irrational activities from a small number of people causing 
a severe infringement on the public interests’, the majority of local people see 
their resistance as a justified movement in protecting the unique features of 
the historical area, especially the social fabrics that have been nested in the 
area for hundreds of years.  
 283 
‘The DTMD is one of the few remaining historical urban areas that hasn’t 
be regenerated in Xi’an, simply because of the resistance from local 
residents against the ruthless property-led regeneration model (Wang, 
staff in the LRC, interviewed in 2013) 
‘Many properties in this community accommodate more than one 
generation of the family, as long as they hold the land, local people can 
refurbish their properties when necessary’ (Ma, Local resident against 
the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013) 
Moreover, in local residents’ discourse, pursuing reasonable individual 
interests they deserve is also justified. The evidence they used was the huge 
‘value gap’ between the market price of the properties in the area and the 
compensation promised by the municipal government. Although the majority 
of local residents haven’t heard about the concept of ‘gentrification’ and ‘rent 
gap’ that were primarily developed in the western contexts, it didn’t prevent 
them from figuring out the unfair essence of the regeneration program 
featured with dispossession and exploitation. According to local people, 
without resistance, the majority of the value gap generated from the 
redevelopment would be collected by the municipal government and property 
developers. Moreover, the state-led gentrification in the DTMD cases was 
underpinned by strong state-apparatuses and the discourse articulated in 
justifying and legitimizing the state’s actions.  
‘They (the government) said it (the expropriation) was for the expansion 
of the road and green spaces alongside it. Which was not true as they 
(the government) sold the land to private developers immediately after 
the demolition. As you can see from the south part of the road, only a tiny 
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section of the designated area have been used for road expansion while 
the rest of the area are expropriated primarily for commercial 
development ’ (Zhao, Local resident against the west DTMD 
regeneration, interviewed in 2014) 
‘The government wants to redevelop this area and they want to make 
money from the redevelopment. But what they pay for buying our 
properties are too low, local people are not fools. We want this area to be 
regenerated with respect to our culture and traditions. (JIa, Local 
resident against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2014) 
Local residents obviously have a different understanding regarding the 
property value and compensation polices based on their own calculations:  
‘The compensation offered by the government was unfair. In 2006, the 
average compensation for demolishing one square meter was 1980 
yuan, the price offered by the developer in an adjacent place was 4000 
yuan. The standards for compensation was not made following the 
national guidance, but by the local government, the initial price was 1680 
yuan/ m2 although was latterly increased to 1980, it was still less than 
half of that in other places in Xi’an’ (Chen, Local resident against the 
west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2014)    
‘In 2006 the housing price for residential properties was around 4000 
yuan/ m2. And now the price for new commercial and residential 
properties is about 36,000 Yuan/m2 and 8,000 Yuan/m2 respectively… 
(Chen, Local resident against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed 
in 2014)’ 
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‘It is impossible to buy a similar house in the same area with the 
compensation offered by the government. If we want to stay here after 
the regeneration, we have no choice but to pay extra money by 
ourselves. Why on earth should we accept the offer?’ (Ma, Local resident 
against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013) 
‘While for the new condos that with only 70 years’ shared land ownership, 
local people cannot do any modifications to the properties. Moreover, it 
would be hard for these new constructions to sustain more than 50 years 
due to the materials they use. What will happen to those relocatees after 
30 or 40 years? Would they pay more money for the refurbishment?’ (Bai, 
Local resident against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 
2014) 
9.2.3 Justifying Tactics: Militant Resistance and Petition  
Further, according to local residents, the formal structure doesn’t offer a 
workable solution for the question of who should be the major beneficiaries of 
the regeneration. Local people’s suggestions and proposals were refused by 
the government, which determined to ‘regenerate’ the area in their own way. 
‘We were really disappointed about the redevelopment proposal and 
asked the government to reconsider it. We hope the Damaishi-sajingqiao 
street can be regenerated following the east DTMD pattern and the 
owners of the commercial buildings alongside the street are willing to 
give up part of their property and land rights for the main street 
expansion, as long as they are allowed to retain the ownership and 
development rights to the rest part of their land. Yet all our suggestions 
 286 
were rejected by the government as they determined to expropriate all 
the properties from us and make money from the commercial 
redevelopment alone’ (Ding, Activist against the west DTMD 
regeneration, interviewed in 2013). 
For the municipal government, what required by the local people was to let 
them give up the potential profits they can gain from the redevelopment 
project, i.e the commercial properties that would be developed alongside the 
new street. In resisting the physical redevelopment imposed by the 
government, different alternative strategies, including militant resistances, 
rampant constructions and the submission of petitions to central government 
were all reasonable choices. The militant reactions, according to local people, 
were caused by violence and intimidation from the demolition office and the 
‘temporary employees’. According to the demolition officer’s interpretation, 
these employees provide assistance to the formal officers were ‘400 well 
trained employees with strong disciplines’, yet according to the local activists, 
they were ‘700 gangsters’ hired by the government in preparing for the forced 
eviction’. The tension between both sides was intensified and finally evolved 
into confrontations because of an unprecedented clash between some 
individuals from both sides. Since the confrontation wasn’t reported by the 
local media and officials interviewed also avoided to give a commentary on it, 
local activists’ testimony became the only source of information. Though with 
more or less bias, still helps to recap the process.  
‘On the 1.1km’s long street, 2 demolition offices were estabilshed  and 
about 700 temporary workers were involved, most of which came from 
‘Tigongdui’, an institution in which youngsters with sport talents were 
enrolled and trained for becoming professional athletes. With the thriving 
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urban redevelopment in recent years, they got a part-time job helping the 
demolition companies or the government to intimidate those who are not 
willing to cooperate. A group of the youngsters smashed a store owned 
by one of the activists and initially no one dared to say a word. However 
the local people’s anger were fuelled and they gathered together to 
protest in front of the demolition offices and then went to the West 
Mosque and requires the Imams to step forward and speak for them. 
Finally all the Imams agreed to negotiate with the government in 
representing local people and the local residents also reached an 
agreement that no one should sign contract with the government 
individually before the compensation and rehabilitation plans are 
collectively agreed’ (Ding, Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, 
interviewed in 2013)  
Two issues deserve further discussion. Firstly, from local residents’ 
perspective, the intimidations and violence imposed by the ‘part time 
employees’ were acquiesced by the demolition office, which acted at the will 
of the municipal government. To local people, the violence itself is a 
provocation from the government aiming at dampening local activists’ morale. 
Secondly, the outburst of local people’s anger and their instinctive reactions 
in urging the Imams-the local spiritual leaders who previously refuse to act as 
the representatives in resisting the government, to stand up and speak for 
them was a vivid image showing the relationship between local elites and 
people. Local elites are used to keep themselves in line with the government 
and in return, they are rewarded with various benefits including more political 
influence, higher social status and even economic returns. While for ordinary 
local people, when confronting with the powerful government, chronically 
they turn to the local elites for leadership, the underline meaning of this action 
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is that the Chinese non-elite classes expect someone rather than themselves 
to stand up and speak for the collective interests, since the accumulated 
experiences have told them that after the movement, activists that dare to 
defy are very likely to be punished by the government either openly or 
secretly afterwards. In such a pattern, the collective non-cooperation and the 
potential militant resistance from each individual citizen could be used to 
challenge the pre-set rules, which, for many Chinese local residents, is a way 
with higher promised returns if compared with having a lawsuit. 
‘In Zhejiang province, which is a highly developed area of China, in 2013, 
90% of the judgements of the first instance regarding the law suits 
initiated by individuals against the government came out with a decision 
in support of the government’ (Provincial Super Court of Zhejiang 
Province, 2013) 
Local elites are thought by local residents to be the proper interface between 
the municipal government and local residents and their decisions can 
sometimes change the trajectories of the whole incident. Although every 
single confrontation between the local people and the government may yield 
very different outcomes and make different contributions to the overall 
structure, the interactions between the two sides usually follow such a pattern. 
In fact, in the past few decades, collective movements were frequently used 
by the Chinese people to challenge the rules so as to protect their individual 
interests, which has exerted great pressures on central government and 
eventually led to the abolition of municipal government’s rights in making 
administrative orders for forced eviction. Now CPOs on people’s properties 
can only be issued by court after going through a formal legal procedure.  
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‘If we were a little bit more coward at that time, we would have been 
relocated…it is now difficult to drive the local people away like what they 
did seven years ago, as the forced eviction decisions made by municipal 
government is sensitive and has been banned by the central government. 
The politicians know that local people are tough and they have plenty of 
other opportunities to make progress for promotion, why bother with this 
area? (Ding, Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 
2013)’ 
In the DTMD case, local residents took advantage of the sensitivity of the 
ethno-politics and their networks with the national religious organizations to 
increase their political influence and exert political pressures on central 
government for intervention. Which, for many Chinese inner city communities 
that are facing forced evictions, is an intangible resource. This makes the 
west DTMD physical regeneration a unique case that may not be replicated 
in other areas. Yet the incident to some extent revealed how political 
struggles unfold themselves behind many of the Chinese inner city 
regeneration projects. As one of the interviewees put it:  
‘We started to employ various venues such as the Ethnic Committee, the 
People’s Congress to make their voices heard. Petitions were also sent 
to municipal, provincial and central government. The confrontation lasted 
for 3 months and eventually the local people drew the attention of the 
Ministry of Construction which sent special inspectors to investigate the 
redevelopment…’ (Ding, Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, 
interviewed in 2013) 
For the Chinese municipal government, when calculating the rent gap, 
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political costs should also be taken into account, which is previously 
neglected in many similar research due to the fact that the notion originally 
come from the western society, where ‘political costs’ could be significantly 
reduced by the formal structures embedded in the democratic political 
system. Under the authoritarian regime, 1) Politicians from central 
government and local government use a different formula to calculate 
political costs. The former pay more attention to people’s perception about 
the CPC’s legitimacy, which relies on maintaining the central government’s 
image as a facilitator in getting the people a better life, an arbitrator in 
maintaining the social justice and harmony and a protector of the country’s 
indecency and national interests. While for local politicians, political costs for 
the most of the time mean the higher level politicians’ perception about them, 
which relies on progress they made in enabling economic growth and 
maintaining the social stability and more importantly and in accomplishing the 
political tasks coming from the higher level cadres; 2) Political costs could be 
very high in some cases and the management of political risks often plays an 
important role in inner city regeneration programs. The authoritarian regime 
does not provide sufficient protections to its people, yet for politicians the 
situation to some extent is the same. The system is dynamic and rules 
consistently shift due to the interactions between both sides. 
For those who carried out the petition, it would be extremely dangerous as a 
successful petition may expose local officials’ flaws in front of the higher-level 
cadres and cost great uncertainties or even fatal damage to their political life. 
Municipal government leaders in China are highly vigilant to the bottom-up 
petitioners from their domain, especially those with an intention of sending 
materials to Beijing. The measures applied to suppress the petition are still 
crude.  
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‘…to avoid been discovered that we were preparing for the petition, we 
rented a house somewhere away from the DTMD and I stayed there for 
a whole month to write up the materials. I did not go back to home until 
all the documents were finished and carried to Beijing (Ding, Activist 
against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013) ’. 
9.2.4 Justifying Rampant Constructions  
Although local people in the DTMD are not familiar with the concept of ‘rent 
gap’, they have already realized that the government’s intention to collect the 
‘rent gap’ had never changed and would one day be realized due to the 
rocketing housing price in the surrounding areas. The higher the rent gap is, 
the stronger the determination of the government would be. To the DTMD 
residents, winning the battle against the District government over the 
West-DTMD regeneration was lucky yet can never guarantee a similar 
triumph over the war on the rights to the area. If breaking down the cost for 
the government to collect the ‘rent gap’ into political costs and economic 
costs, then the militant resistance and the petition played an effective role in 
raising the former while rampant construction in the DTMD had successfully 
narrowed the ‘rent gap’. The compensation was calculated based on the total 
floor space that has been approved by the local government and the formula 
is: Total Price=Price/M2 x Floor space (M2).  
‘It (adding extra floors onto the original buildings) is understandable, 
(because) the compensation is too low and we would get more (money) 
if we enlarge the original buildings. If the local government follows the 
national policy, we wouldn’t do like this… it were all driven by the 
government’ (Chen, Local people against the west DTMD regeneration, 
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interviewed in 2014)  
Local people in the DTMD have long strove to fill their land with poorly 
designed multi-story buildings and it has indeed become one of the biggest 
investments for many of them. As one of the local people put it:  
‘I wish the government can lend us some money to rebuild our house, as 
currently I have already borrowed 160,000 Yuan for the construction, it is 
a heavy burden for ordinary families like us’ (Ma, Local resident carried 
out self-funded redevelopment, interviewed in 2012) 
For local people, in spite of the need to match the enlarging family population, 
adding more floor spaces onto the old properties would also guarantee them 
a higher compensation price once the demolition happens. Two major 
reasons were used to justify their activities. Firstly, they apply the permission 
for reconstructions in the name of ‘self-funded repair for buildings in danger 
of collapses’, which cannot really be rejected by local Planning Bureaus and 
Construction Administrative offices simply because of the serious 
consequences a refusal may yield. If the building collapses one day and lead 
to causalities, those decided to turn the application down would take full 
responsibilities for that. Moreover, the activity has long been encouraged by 
national policy dating back to the 1960s when the government shifted its duty 
of refurbishing buildings that were not suitable for accommodating local 
residents. Normally government will take care of the exterior environment 
while leave the responsibilities of maintaining the building conditions to local 
people themselves. 
‘I have to build my house into a four-story flat, although I only got the 
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permission from the government with the following conditions: 1.New 
constructions should not exceed three floors for the sake of historical 
conservation; 2. The exterior decorations should follow the codes given 
by the administrative department; 3. The construction activities should 
not cause environmental problems’. (Ma, Local resident carried out 
self-funded redevelopment, interviewed in 2012) 
Secondly, local residents would argue the need for enlarging the buildings to 
accommodate the increased population within their family and emphasise the 
importance for the whole family to live together. Particularly they emphasise 
their attachment to the area regarding the job opportunities and convenient 
life the area provides. It is actually found in the survey that in many local 
families there are at least three generations living together.  
‘I have two children and each of them will take one floor for their 
marriage and me and my wife will take one floor as our bedroom…we 
also plan to use the ground floor for small business’… (Ma, Local 
resident carried out self-funded redevelopment, interviewed in 2012) 
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Indeed to maximise the floor space, local people had sacrificed the quality of 
their living environment. The lighting of the new properties is affected by the 
high density and to save the costs, there is not central heating system 
equipped. In their discourse, the government was to be blamed for this:  
“Anxiety increased among the locals and the following two years had 
seen a rush of self-construction. It had completely turned our decent 
courtyard into refuges. As you may see, even in the middle of the day, 
many households have to keep their lights on. (Ding, Activist against the 
west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013). 
Once the construction work is accomplished, local residents still need to get 
an official certificate from local government to prove their ownership to the 
buildings. Local government has long noticed the rampant construction 
phenomenon and tried to control it through granting certificates with detailed 
indicators and configurations for each building, based on which 
compensations for demolitions would eventually be made. As one of the 
relocatees put it:  
‘…they (the government) only compensated according to the figures of 
the floor space printed on the certificate they measured… (Zhao, Local 
resident against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2014) 
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The municipal government tried to enlarge the potential rent gap from the 
regeneration project through using the planning power it monopolized while 
local residents choose to neglect the rules made by the government when 
they take actions. Both sides strove to take advantage of applying/distorting 
the restrictions to maximize the expected interests they can get from the 
physical regeneration.  
Due to the limited capacity of the government, so far no evidence shows that 
the rampant construction within the DTMD could be prohibited, which is 
largely due to the fact that the scale at which the rampant constructions 
taking place is too large for the municipal government to exert an effective 
control. I.e. Chinese municipal govern has its limitations in dealing with the 
bottom-up rampant construction movement. The prevalence of rampant 
construction itself in the area has also become a reason used by the local 
people to justify their activity. One of the interviewees put it like this:  
‘…many people in the community are doing the same thing (enlarging 
the size of their buildings’ (Ma, Local resident against the west DTMD 
regeneration, interviewed in 2013) 
The narrowing down of the ‘rent gap’ would dampen the municipal 
government’s enthusiasm to regenerate the area and leaves the place 
trapped in a limbo with deteriorated physical environment and traffic 
congestions. No public money is now channelled in to help local residents to 
improve the shared physical environment either. In describing the current 
status of local residents’ living conditions in the west DTMD, one of the 
interviewees put it:   
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‘…most of the households do not even have tapped water and sewage 
system now, they need to go public toilet every day as there is no 
bathroom within their property…this area should have been regenerated 
long before 2006. The only obstacle is the government’s intention of 
making money from it. Indeed since the 1950s there were intentions to 
regeneration Sajingqiao-Damaishi Streeet, local people are expecting to 
see the regeneration in this are simply due to the dilapidated physical 
environment (Bai, Local resident against the west DTMD regeneration 
interviewed, in 2014).  
Figure	  9.3-­‐9.4:	  The	  Street	  Views	  in	  the	  DTMD:	   	  
 
It was found that local people generally lack professional knowledge, which 
can support them to formulate a holistic vision regarding the future of the area. 
Yet, as there are some examplar cases regarding Mulism District 
Regeneration in Beijing, local residents are now with more precise 
requirements on how do they want the area to be regenerated. As is put by 
one of the local people:  
‘There is a strong willingness from local people that the regeneration of 
the DTMD should give respect to local people’s attachment to the area 
and their unwillingness to be driven out of the area. They make their lives 
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here and their religious belief and activities are closely connected to the 
mosques spreading across the DTMD. For local government, it is difficult 
to regenerate this area, as the regeneration has to retain the physical as 
well as the social fabrics of the DTMD. Local people do not wish to be 
relocated to other places, instead they want opportunities to be created 
for them to continue live here, just like the regeneration of ‘Niu’ Street in 
Beijing’ (Wang, LRC staff, interviewed in 2013) 
The contrasting discourses used by the municipal governments and local 
residents in maximizing their own interests from the physical regeneration 
programs in the west DTMD area can also be found in many other Chinese 
inner city regeneration cases. While local governments’ neoliberal urbanism 
polices and their actions in taking advantages from deploying resources and 
powers they obtain from the authoritarian political system are accused, local 
people also managed to resist through deploying various resources and 
distorting rules made by the government.  
9.3 DISCOURSE REGARDING THE LRC 
In the DTMD case, social regeneration programs are mainly delivered 
through Local Resident’s Committee (LRC). In China, the authoritarian nature 
of the politic system decides that enabling the government to retain a certain 
degree of control over various tiers of the society and to intervene whenever 
it feels necessary is crucial for the survival of the regime. For one thing, the 
legitimacy of the P.R.C government is now increasingly relying on the 
progress it made in meeting with the ‘public interests’, which requires certain 
degree of capacity and efficiency in mobilizing resources and breaking down 
potential ‘barriers’. And on the ground the growth are facilitated by municipal 
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governments that need to be fully empowered to release their potential. For 
another thing, penetrating its control into different tiers of the social 
organizations including media and community organizations gives it more 
capacity in maintaining the social stability as the CPC is still highly vigilant to 
any bottom-up defiance that would damage its international image and 
domestic legitimacy. It is the central government’s principle strategy to 
subject public and private sectors under the guidance and supervision of the 
CPC. 
‘Can you find a similar governmental institution in any other countries 
called the United Front, which draws over the elites of Hui people and 
gives them official positions and payments to speak for the government’ 
(Jia, Local resident against the West DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 
2013) 
According to the Chinese institutional setup, although officials in the LRCs 
has no hope to be promoted to higher positions within the political system, 
they are indeed standing in a prominent position for their direct connections 
with local people and are playing an important role in consolidating the PRC 
regime. For them, working in the community and delivering social programs is 
a life-long job. Many of them have strong motivations to run the 
community-based organizations with a strong sense of entrepreneurship. In 
terms of reaching local people, the LRC as a community based organization 
is efficient. The core staff together with the voluntary workers formed a 
network that is capable of constantly channelling information in relation to the 
dynamics of local areas to the government officials. One of the advantages of 
such an ‘undemocratic’ way of operating the community-based organizations 
is that it enables the majority of local people to be reached and connected 
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and guarantees an impartial distribution of limited resources to those who are 
in need. Different LRCs usually compete with each other in getting resources 
from the municipal government and the LRC leaders are usually less likely to 
be promoted to higher positions within the hierarchical political system. Yet 
as the major interface between the party and local people, their political 
significance are appreciated by the CPC and every year a certain proportion 
of National People’s Representatives are selected from the LRC leaders, 
which, though, is usually seen as an honour selectively given by the 
government. Even like these, being a representative attending the National 
Congress would give great personal influence to the LRC leaders and help 
them to expand their networks, which is important in the competition for 
getting resources for the local community. One of the LRC members put it:  
‘From my opinion, a good community worker who has the commitment to 
serve the community does not necessarily depend on money, we can actually 
serve the local people in many ways using our time and energy instead of 
spreading money, which usually is not the decisive fact for the success of 
social projects. It is true that financial support from the municipal government 
is crucial for equipping the facilities, yet what is more important is the LRC 
workers’ motivation to get things done. We managed to find donations from 
the society by ourselves… entrepreneurship is indispensable for running the 
social regeneration programs’ (Bai, Executive of the LRC, interviewed in 
2013) 
9.4 CONCLUSION 
For governors at both central and local level, the real estate market became 
one of the most important drivers of the economy and priorities were given to 
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stabilizing it. Against such a background, gentrification has been driven 
deeper into the heart of disinvested city neighborhoods. In spite of the 
intention to mobilize local people, the official announcement also implies that 
the implementation of the physical regeneration project was attached with 
political significance and therefore guaranteed by the state power. It was a 
manifestation of the strong authoritarian feature of the Chinese government. 
Public participation was largely manipulated and the selected representatives 
did not really speak in the interests of local people and the road expansion 
was seen as an opportunity for imposing forced eviction.  
Local residents were forced to accept monetary compensation based on the 
market value and the floor space of their former property. Then they can 
choose to buy different properties from the housing market. The Chinese 
political system has granted very limited power and resources for local 
residents to resist physical regeneration-related decisions made by the 
government. Local residents have to adopt alternative ways such as rampant 
construction, petition and even militant resistance in defending their property 
rights. In their discourses, such activities are legitimized and the idea of ‘rent’ 
gap and ‘gentrification’ emerged from some of the interviewees’ arguments, 
although none of them had any theoretical knowledge regarding the two 
concepts. There were great tension between local residents and the 
municipal government over the property rights and it was found that both 
sides mobilize the power and resources to maximize what they could get 
from the regeneration project and sometimes their activities went beyond the 
boundaries drawn by the formal structure.  
In China social regeneration programs are mainly delivered through LRCs, 
which as a semi-official entity also shoulders the function of social 
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surveillance. The nature of the LRC decides that it is unable to stand up for 
local residents interests when conflicts emerge between the municipal 
government and local residents. The LRC has to merge different sources of 
funding by themselves with entrepreneurship to initiate social regeneration 
programs.  
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CHAPTER 10 COMPARING THE TWO 
CASES WITH A MICRO PERSPECTIVE 
The major research findings from the comparison study are presented in this 
chapter. In both China and the UK, the formation and implementation of 
urban regeneration policies are shaped by structural factors such as the 
politics, the central-local relationship, the social economic challenges faced 
by the country and the ways different players interact with each other. Urban 
regeneration policies and practices for specific urban areas, however, are 
largely shaped by the overall urban development strategy as well as the 
historical trajectories of the spatial, social and economic development of the 
city.  
The regeneration initiatives in both cases covered physical and social 
aspects. Regarding physical regeneration projects that involve demolition 
and relocation, it is found that in both cases the discourses used by the 
government and local residents in justifying their actions are significantly 
different. Specifically, the municipal government’s actions in both cases 
followed a Neoliberal Urbanism ideology while local residents decipher the 
physical regeneration as an action of ‘creating opportunities for speculation 
and accumulation by disposition’ with a critical perspective. In both cases, 
due to the great significance attached to the properties, local residents’ 
participation in physical regeneration projects were in the form of direct 
negotiation with the municipal government. In the bargaining process, both 
sides proactively mobilized power and resources they have to maximize their 
interests. Yet the interactions between local people and the government are 
context-specific. In the Kensington case local residents inclined to seek 
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solutions within the formal structures, while their Chinese counterparts in the 
DTMD case relied on alternatives such as collective protests or upward 
petitions to defend their property rights. It has also found that there are some 
common tactics used by municipal governments in both countries when 
implementing the physical regeneration projects, such as tenants first, 
portraying a bright future and sometimes even intimidations.  
In terms of social regeneration programs, New Deal for Communities has 
strong socialism features and involved distribution of large amount of public 
funding from the central government. The delivery mechanism-the Local 
Partnership was also an innovative institutional setup with the aim of 
encouraging public participation. While in the DTMD case, social 
regeneration programmes are mainly delivered through the Local Residents’ 
Committee (LRC), which subordinates to the municipal government. Little 
resources were allocated by central government for the initiation and 
operation of social programs and the LRC officials have to work with 
entrepreneurship. Public participation in social regeneration programs was 
realized through delegated democracy and in both cases was deeply affected 
by the indigenous power relations. 
10.1 DIFFERENCES IN POLICY DESIGN  
They policy design of the physical regeneration in Kensington was different 
from that in the west DTMD. Firstly, the government’s motivation in initiating 
the HMRI program was not to directly profit from it. Instead, public funding 
was channeled in to finance the acquisition and demolition of derelict 
properties in the area. One of the politicians’ commentaries revealed the 
intentions of the municipal government:  
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‘You actually need to spend money, because what you do is to build the 
neighborhood, the critical massive goodness, so then you don’t need to 
put any public money into them…the whole idea was that you would 
convert the area…so it became an area that you don’t need to subsides, 
and in Kensington of course it is a very good example, of how you kind of 
build it up (Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, 
interviewed in 2014) 
Secondly, there was not a significant rise in the Floor space-Area-Ratio after 
the redevelopment, which means the overall spending on demolition and 
reconstruction was less likely to be covered by the revenues from selling the 
new properties if the housing price in the area remained steady. The project 
therefore needed financial subsidy. Due to the centralized nature of the 
British government, municipalities had little fiscal power and they had to rely 
on regeneration funding from the central government. Such programs would 
be severely affected by funding cuts from the central government. One of the 
interviewees put it in this way:  
‘In some ways the HMRI became unsustainable as public money run 
out…the government has to find things it wasn’t going to pay for…the 
Labor would pause those programs as well, because we reached a point 
when we spent more than we get in…so there would be cuts 
somewhere’ (Richard, Politician support the KHMRI and KNDC, 
interviewed in 2014) 
Thirdly, to stabilize the social structure and avoid gentrification, the 
government provided financial packages to local residents to bridge the gap 
between the compensation they got and the cost of purchasing a new 
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property in the same area. Moreover, the delivery mechanism of the HMRI 
was a four-way partnership involving the central government, the municipal 
government, the social housing associations and the private developers.  
Each of them involved for their own rationales and played different roles.  
The situation in the west DTMD regeneration was very different. Behind the 
slogan of ‘road widening for public interests’ was the municipal government’s 
strong intention of profiting from the physical redevelopment.  Little central 
government funding was in place to finance the physical regeneration 
programs and the municipality had to balance the incomes and expenditures 
by itself. Indeed physical redevelopment has become an important means for 
Chinese municipal governments to increase its revenues over the past four 
decades. Through monopolizing the power of controlling the circulation of 
urban land and deciding the FAR, the municipal government would take a 
considerable proportion of the surplus from the regeneration projects while 
local residents previously living in the community would be offered with 
compensation fees and swept away. 
10.2 TACTICS USED IN PHYSICAL REGENERATION 
PROGRAMS  
10.2.1 Tenants First 
There were common tactics used by the municipal governments in both 
countries to propel physical regeneration projects. Municipal governments in 
both countries held absolute authority against the tenants and it was found in 
both cases that tenants were always among the first group of people to be 
relocated. In the UK, the participatory democracy is largely property-based 
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and tenants could be easily convinced to move away. Moreover, the vacancy 
rates of tenant-occupied properties are also an effective means for creating 
the derelict scene of the targeted regeneration area. Higher proportion of 
tenant occupancy leads to less resistances for the initiation of regeneration 
programs. Similar situation was found in the west DTMD regeneration project, 
where tenants rarely participated in resisting the physical regeneration 
projects initiated by the municipalities and they were more cooperative in 
accepting the relocation policies. As is put by one of the interviewees from 
the Chinese Case: 
‘The majority of residents living in the new condos were originally tenants 
of public housing. Very few private property owners had moved out of 
their properties, counting for less than 10% of the relocatees. Those 
agreed to move were all given better conditions privately with the hope 
that they could play as a model for the rest of the community’ … of course 
they (the government) failed (in mobilizing local people to move out), it 
was economic interests that no individual can easily give up, the 
mobilization simply doesn’t work (Bai, Local resident against the DTMD 
regeneration, interviewed in 2014).  
10.2.2 Isolation 
In both cases, the property owners were divided into three categories: those 
who are willing to cooperate; those who are hesitated and those who 
determined to resist. The municipal governments in both cases intentionally 
separate individuals and carried out one-on-one negotiations. Extra benefits 
were offered to those who would accept the conditions at the earlier stage. As 
one of the interviewees put it:  
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‘Some of the local officials were given an offer that was comparatively 
better than that offered to the others, yet still far lower than the market 
prices. (Edward, Activist against the HMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
Property owners who are either working for or have connections with the 
municipalities were more likely to be offered with a price that is thought by 
other property owners to be higher than the average level. In both cases it 
was found that among those who were relocated, there were not much 
communications regarding the compensation they were offered. As is put by 
one of the relocatees in the Kensington case:  
‘I put a note through all the houses, asking them to come to a coffee 
morning here whereby we can stand together, and sort something out, 
and I only got one response… they just said sorry we can't make it. Other 
than that, no one spoke to me, and that was the problem, you know a 
large part of the problem was that the community that left were not pulled 
together, and that is because of the fear, they feared losing the roof on 
their head (Alicia, Relocatee from the HKMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
For the municipal government, those who did not cooperate and proactively 
mobilized the powers and resources they have to resist the regeneration 
projects were troublesome. Both countries have the Compulsory Purchas 
Order that could help realize the physical regeneration, yet in both countries 
applying a CPO would greatly push up the costs. In the UK, the cost of 
putting a CPO mainly consists of the time and money spent on preparing all 
the necessary documents, going through required procedures such as 
consultations and possible legal challenges. The process could be extremely 
time and money consuming. While in China, although the authoritarian nature 
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of the political system and institutional setup enable the government to keep 
the economic and time costs at a comparatively low level. Yet for local 
politicians, the political risks led by the bottom-up protest may cost their 
political career and therefore projects involving CPOs are treated seriously. 
Imposing CPOs in both countries remains the last option for the government. 
10.2.3 Exerting Great Pressures on Local People  
In both cases, local residents that resisted the regeneration programs would 
suffer great pressures. Firstly, their behaviours will be morally condemned in 
the official discourse and their motivations would be described as ‘greedy’. 
Secondly, the provision of public services in the targeted areas can serve as 
a means for the government to increase the difficulties for resistance. In 
Kensington, the quality of public services was reduced with the excuse of 
rising costs led by the high vacancy rates. While in the Chinese case, before 
the implementation of the regeneration project, few public investment would 
be provided by the government to improve the infrastructures and until very 
recently many households in the west DTMD area are still sharing public 
toilets. 
10.2.4 Intimidation  
Intimidation was used by coalition of government and private sectors to 
speed up the regeneration process, which was especially the case in China. 
According to local people, before the initiation of west DTMD regeneration 
project, the government had begun to spread messages showing their 
attitude:  
“Rumours were spread by these people in 2003, that anyone dares to 
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object the next regeneration project will be punished or even arrested.” 
(Ding, Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013) 
For those who resisted in the DTMD case, there were even direct threats and 
insults from temporary workers employed by the government.  
‘In China there is a government-sponsored organization named 
‘Tigongdui’, in which youngsters with sport talents were enrolled and 
trained to become professional athletes. With the thriving urban 
redevelopment in recent years, they receive a part-time job helping the 
demolition companies or the government to intimidate the stubborn 
relocatees. One evening, a group of this people smashed a store owned 
by a proactive objector. Although it happened just in front of his 
neighbours, no one dared to say a word’ (Ding, Activist against the west 
DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013) 
While in the Kensington case, intimidations exist but were not as drastic as 
that in China. As one of the interviewees put it:  
‘I know they put in scare tactics…they had approached to me… six 
months ago, with the possibility that…they would demolish my gable wall 
and leave me here, just build the new all around, that is a scare tactic, but 
I saw through and I let them do that…if they come up to my gable wall 
with one brick falls in wards or hurt anything, it will be a million pounds 
law suit…they are still trying to do that (Alicia, Relocatee in the KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013) 
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10.2.5 Giving Fuzzy Information  
In both cases, to encourage local residents buy in the visions regarding the 
area, the municipal governments depicted fantastic pictures of the 
post-regeneration life. Yet not all the information was given to local people. 
In the UK case, it was promised by the government that the housing 
conditions would be significantly improved without causing extra financial 
burdens due to the gap loan and that the quality of the properties would be 
much better when compared with that of the obsolete Victoria houses. 
However, the delay of the program and the inflation of the housing prices in 
the following years had fundamentally changed the initial assumption of the 
project and the relocatees who want to be rehoused in the area and to take a 
much higher gap loan than what was initially promised. As one of the local 
activists put it:  
‘…the idea was, houses will be knocked down, the replacement houses 
would be affordable, and people would be moved back into the area and 
stay in the same community with the same people…yet it did not happen 
immediately, it took years to happen…for people moved out, they could 
never move back again. Because, the compensation was something like 
£11, 000 to £80, 000, but it was followed by a property boom after which 
the cheapest (house) there was £129,000…so they got £50, 000 pounds, 
and was then offered a £125, 000 houses, with £75,000 mortgage. So 
someone brought the (old) houses without any mortgages, after the 
regeneration, to stay in the same area, they got to pay for £75,000 
mortgage. So a lot of local people didn't got that houses at all, they just 
end up with sold the houses on the open market…the house scheme 
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seems like a money-making scheme for someone, not for people living in 
the area cause they were losing money. (Steve, Activist against the 
KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2013). 
‘The house are almost like flat packed houses, you could smell what was 
cooking next door in the kitchens…it's all about profit, so they are going 
to use cheap materials’ (Alicia, Relocatee in the KHMRI, interviewed in 
2013) 
In the Chinese case, to prove that the regeneration project was really in the 
interests of local residents in return for their support, the government gave 
some promises it can hardly fulfil, which makes the local residents suspicious 
and hesitated to cooperate. One of the ideas emphasized repeatedly by local 
officials was that local residents’ living environment would be significantly 
improved after the regeneration.  
‘The government gave us a fake proposal…they made a fake picture to 
demonstrate how the street would look like, which was far from the 
reality… (Ding, Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed 
in 2013)  
‘They promised that the demolition process would give full protection to 
local residents’ interests. Through the demolition, the living environment 
of the local residents would be greatly improved’ (From news report, 
2005) 
Indeed buildings that were constructed for rehousing the relocatees had 
made their lives difficult, as within these apartments, there is even no central 
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heating system equipped. Figure 10.1 and 10.2 show the exterior and interior 
conditions of the condos built by the government for accommodating the 
relocatees:  
“…We don’t have central heating system, we have to use the stove, and 
the coal is carried from the ground floor to the fifth floor by hands since 
there isn’t an elevator…’ (Zhao, Local resident against the west DTMD 
regeneration, interviewed in 2014)  
‘…(The living conditions are) just exactly the same, the only difference is 
we are now living in a higher floor with more inconvenience…you know 
me and my wife are now in our 50s, it is hard for us to climb up to the fifth 
floor every day (Zhao, Local resident against the west DTMD 
regeneration, interviewed in2014) 
Figure	  10.1:	  Physical	  Environment	  of	  the	  Relocation	  Properties	  
 
Source: Taken by the author with permission from the household.  
 
Another promise given by the local government was a smooth transition 
period with no more than 18 months: 
‘According to the officers from the Lianhu district government, all the 
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money needed for regenerating the area has been in place and the 
rehousing works can be finished within 18 months’ (Narrated from local 
newspapers)  
Yet according to the local residents, it was again an invalid announcement. 
As one of the interviewees put it:  
‘A week after the mobilizing meeting, local people found that the gate of 
the rehabilitation project was locked and it never opened again. It 
aggravated local residents’ concern about their post-demolition life (Ding, 
Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013) 
In both cases, dealing with the local resistance required much more time than 
what had been expected by the government, which means the project would 
be severely delayed and many of the relocatees have wait much longer and 
pay more money to be rehoused in the same area.  
10.3 THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE 
GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITIES IN PHYSICAL 
REGENERAITON  
In both cases, the distribution of interests were indeed decided by the political 
wrestling between local people and the municipal government based on 
power and resources they had as well as the potential risks they were willing 
to take. Yet the process as well as the measures used by local people in both 
cases was significantly different. In the Chinese case, there were deeply 
rooted distrusts between the municipal government and local residents. The 
 314 
significant discrepancy between local people’s expectations and the 
regeneration plan resulted in strong resistance among the local people 
against the local government. The interactions between the local residents 
and the municipal government thus fall into a ‘passive chain reaction’: ‘the 
local residents’ requirements are blocked → rising confrontation and conflicts 
(the process is time consuming and usually have a negative impact on the 
government’s prestige and authority) → the government reacts passively 
(including proposition of coping measures such as exerting pressure on the 
local activists and local officials; and formulating temporary policies such as 
raising compensation for those who are willing to cooperate) → emerging of 
new issues → search for new solutions → modification of public participation 
pattern and regeneration strategies’ (Bao and Sun, 2007,pp.16). To attract 
the central government’s attention for intervention, local people have to unite 
and sometimes even become militant.  
Yet in the KNDC case, local people’s resistances were largely realized 
through measures offered by the formal structure such as making appeals 
and lawsuits. Rampant construction was not an option for people in the 
Kensington case as compensation in the UK was not calculated based on the 
total floor space of a property.  
10.4 VESTED INTERESTS IN BOTH CASES  
There were vested interest groups in both cases, yet the ways in which they 
were organized and the roles they played were significantly different. In 
China traditionally local elites serve as intermediaries between the 
government and local people. On the one hand, they served as local 
delegates and were hoped to channel local people’s demand upward and 
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advocate for local residents’ interests. On the other hand, they were also 
expected by governors to play an active role in convincing local people to 
follow the government’s instructions. In the DTMD case, some of the local 
‘elites’ were selected as representatives for local people to have conversation 
with the officials and on medias their attitude towards the physical 
regeneration was described as positive. However, public participation in such 
a form of ‘conversation between government officials and local 
representatives’ was indeed a hegemonic project with the aim of adding 
legitimacy to the project. To make sure there would be no defiance from the 
public meetings attended by provincial cadres, only those who were willing to 
publicly support the government’s actions would be invited. As one of the 
interviewees put it: 
‘There are a few people on the street that profit from acquiring properties 
from poor local families, refurbish and sell them to affluent ones as they 
have connection with the government officials and were able to get 
permissions for the reconstruction… it was these people that were 
selected as the local representatives to attend the meetings held with the 
officials and they all support the government’s regeneration strategy. 
They are not really interested in representing of us’ (Ding, Activist 
against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013) 
The local elites’ cooperation to some extent was led by the continuous 
penetration of municipal government and individuals’ calculation of their 
individual interests. As was put by one of the interviewees:  
‘With the old generation of spiritual leaders passed away, the new 
generations has a comparatively wider experience yet are not really in 
 316 
our side…therefore our community lacks leadership, no one is now 
capable of being the leader who is trusted by local people. (Steve, 
Activist against the KHMRI and KNDC, interviewed in 2013)  
Generally, in the Chinese case, local elite groups were controlled and 
manipulated by the municipal government to create an image that the 
government’s decisions are widely supported by local people. In return, they 
were rewarded with both economic and political returns. In Kensington, 
despite the transient nature of the area and the large number of politically 
inactive local residents, there were a small number of long-term residents 
with strong interests that could easily get elected and played a significant role 
in the regeneration programs. Yet according to some of the interviewees, it is 
hard to say they are the real representatives of the community either. As is 
put by some of the interviewees:  
‘The community actors, certain people from the community that have 
been living for very long time, and have their small circle of friends and 
supporters, and they elect them always. They will make decisions. But 
they won’t listen to the community. That’s largely not any dissenting 
voices, or any different proposals to what already planned. Of course 
very often, these things are already planned and they are going to 
happen anyway. (Jerry, Professional against the KHMRI and KNDC, 
interviewed in 2013) 
There was a degree of naivety existing in the assumption that community is a 
harmonious entity, different interest groups can work together smoothly and 
the elected representatives have the capacity to contribute to the 
community’s better off. The claimed community empowerment did not really 
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happen. As some of the interviewees put it:  
‘The mental achievement of the NDC was that local people would be 
empowered, to effectively shape their own destiny, so almost it was like 
setting up a kind of mini council arm's length from the overall city council, 
I think the problem with K.R was that all the theories were implemented 
into the practices badly. Because yes local people involved but it was 
only small numbers of people, it was those who either saw the 
opportunity to get involved for various different means, or a lot of other 
people who did want to get involved were not necessarily as welcome as 
that should have been. So I think there were inherent flaws… (Lim, 
Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
 ‘…if you think you need to have intermediate to do that, then at least for 
god's sake, the intermediate is who are elected and are accountable, like 
the councillor is, or like the mayor is, but, Kensington regeneration never 
was’. (Nik, Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
It was found in both cases that local residents did not necessarily share 
similar sense of identity as well as interests even when they were living in the 
same community. In the DTMD case, people from other ethnic groups held 
different opinions regarding the physical regeneration program. Firstly, their 
cultural life and diet did not necessarily rely on the physical environment of 
the DTMD. Mosques and Muslim food for them were not indispensable. 
Additionally, as ethnic minorities living in a community dominated by the Hui 
people, there were more or less a sense of alienation. When having disputes 
with their Hui neighbours, they were less likely to get similar moral and 
practical support. For them, moving out of the community to a large extent 
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added to the benefits rather than the costs. As some of the interviewees put 
it: 
‘I signed the contract once the government announced the regeneration 
plan and we are now living in an apartment out of the DTMD with central 
heating system. I am quite happy with that as we no longer need to get 
ourselves into frequent disputes with the neighbours as we used to’ 
(Wang, Local resident support the west DTMD regeneration) 
‘We are Han people…the public house we are living in now is rented 
from the government…we share the corridor with our Hui neighbours. 
Several years ago they demolished their single-story house and rebuilt it 
into a 4-storey apartment. They expanded their building area and eroded 
half of the corridor…you know they have the relationship with some of 
the officials and were allowed to do so… (Liu, Local resident support the 
west DTMD regeneration, Interviewed in 2013)’ 
The government’s inefficiency in protecting local residents’ interests from 
being infringed by their neighbours was quite suspicious and can easily be 
accused for injustice and even corruption. The court has seldom been a 
conventional instrument used for resolving disputes within neighbourhoods. If 
considering the prevalence of the rampant constructions in the DTMD, it is 
actually not difficult to find the municipal government’s limitations. Which is to 
say, in China’s inner city regeneration cases, the state apparatuses are more 
likely to be used intensively for realizing the state’s will and show the state’s 
authority at a particular time juncture rather than in a consistent manner to 
realize a universal control over the inner city constructions.  
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10.6 SOCIAL REGENERATION  
Although the physical regeneration in both cases shared many similarities, 
the policy design and implementation of social regeneration projects in both 
cases were significantly different. In the UK, social programs were seen as 
equally important as physical redevelopment in helping regenerating the 
targeted area, which was evidenced by the fact that nearly half of the KNDC 
funding was distributed to support various social initiatives. It has also seen a 
partnership-the Kensington Regeneration, been established following the 
funding streams to integrated key players, such as the municipal government, 
the local communities, the social landlords, schools and police, etc. In the 
Chinese case, however, social regeneration was not an integrative part of the 
west DTMD regeneration project and there was no special funding in place to 
support social initiatives. Indeed, social programs in old Chinese 
neighbourhoods such as the DTMD are largely initiated and run by the LRC-a 
semi-official organization that is funded by the Chinese government not only 
for the purpose of social governance but also surveillance. The genre and 
scale of social initiatives largely depend on the LRC officials’ ability in getting 
external funding from both public departments as well as private sectors. 
Social regeneration programs in the DTMD were only a general practice of 
the LRC rather than a part of the West DTMD regeneration program. The 
purpose of comparing it with that of the KNDC is to show the differences in 
the policy design and implementation of social programs in both countries.  
10.6.1 Social Regeneration in the KNDC  
The NDC program was an experimental project, which for the first time raised 
the concept of integrating different genre of regeneration into one project. 
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Initially it was beyond many of the board member’s knowledge and ability to 
cope with that and there were not much experiences that can be referenced 
to run such a complicate program. As one of the interviewees put it: 
‘I think through all NDCs, the question of trying to integrate the physical, 
the social and the environmental regeneration, was a challenge, 
because people were only learning to cope with that’ (Hillary, Scholar 
neutral to KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
Most of the social programs in the KNDC area were delivered through social 
enterprises, which were non-profit and had difficulties to survive without 
external funding. Lacking sustainability was one of the major features of the 
social projects initiated by the KNDC. The majority of the social programs 
only existed when the funding was available, and very few of them actually 
sustained beyond the KNDC program. This was partly due to the fact that the 
end of the NDC program was encountered with the economic crisis and the 
shift of the government, which was followed by severe funding cuts on 
various social programs. As is put by one of the interviewees:  
‘…the end of the NDC, was coincided with the change of government, 
and a total change in the environment of support of funding, and then 
you know regeneration programs generally grand to a halt, authorities, 
particularly deprived areas, had no money…Which then is more likely to 
undermine what’s been achieved. And created more risks or 
organizations that are still there’ (Hillary, Scholar neutral to KNDC, 
interviewed in 2014) 
The KCLC and the HEAT were the only two social programs that managed to 
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survive in the post NDC period. As is put by one of the interviewees:  
‘Out of the dozens of projects Kensington Regeneration funded, there 
were only two projects continued beyond the NDC program (KCLC and 
HEAT)…everybody else, they were just using the funding…there 
appeared to be no strategy or, you know, what happens at the end of the 
NDC, was just a bit of case: give us some money, pay the staff and we 
will deliver the project and, when the money runs out, it runs out…’ (Allen, 
Executive of Social Enterprise against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013.) 
‘They (social projects) couldn’t get money from somewhere else…you 
can’t make people to pay for those services, because it is a poor area…’ 
(Steve, Activist against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
The two projects mentioned above survived because they successfully 
secured new funding streams. While the HEAT is now patronized by the 
government, the KCLC managed to win the bid for the Big Lottery (B.L), from 
which they get money to cover 70% of the expenditures that are needed for 
the operation of the project. And the rest of the 30% was made by 
commercial activities such as letting out office space to other social 
organizations, helping to promote other social programs or even opening up 
a ‘fleet market’: As is put by the chief executive of the KCLC:   
‘…until we did get the Big Lottery funding, we would all in essence 
unemployed. I didn’t want that happen because at my stage of life you 
know how hard it is to get a job…I might be a little biased, but as I 
thought, we are probably the most successful of all Kensington 
Regeneration projects. We have about 32 courses every week, either by 
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ourselves or our partners who are hiring our training facilities’ (Allen, 
Executive of Social Enterprise against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
‘The cost of running the CLC project for 3 years were £676,000 after we 
did all the calculations, we were only going to ask the Big Lottery for 
£499,000, roughly accounting for about 70%…to keep our part of the 
bargain, we try every means to make money ’(Allen, Executive of Social 
Enterprise against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013). 
‘…you got to develop other sources of incomes, at an early stage, don’t 
just be satisfied…’ (Hillary, Scholar neutral to the KNDC, interviewed in 
2014) 
One of the most important assumptions behind the NDC program was that 
better environment and housing conditions would help to reimage the KNDC 
area and to improve people's perceptions about the area. Issues such as 
crime, health, education and skills were assumed to be the cause of the 
deprivation. The presumption to some extent shifted the public's attention 
from searching solutions to the deprivation problems from the wider 
economic transformation to the everyday life. The grand funding and 
ambitious claim that deprivation would be tackled through the long-term and 
holistic project had inflated local people’s expectations about what could be 
achieved by the NDC program, which later led to greater disappointment and 
frustration when the regeneration funding was ceased. As is put by one of the 
interviewees:  
‘It was the government’s fault to raise false expectations regarding what 
could be achieved through the NDC’ (Hillary, Scholar neutral to the 
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KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
For local people, there were more deep-seated reasons for their 
dissatisfactions with the KNDC. Firstly, the targets set by the KNDC following 
the instructions prescribed by central government and the partnership's 
priority was to satisfy the government. Secondly, there were different 
understandings between local residents and the government on how to help 
local residents living in the NDC areas. For many local people, a decent job 
was what they desperately needed. Yet it was less likely to create enough job 
opportunities through the community based ABIs. Many of the interviewees 
thought that the government have chosen a comparatively easier way, which 
was to spend a large proportion of money on improving the physical 
environment, as every penny spent on physical regeneration could at least 
make a visible difference.  
10.6.2 Social Regeneration in the DTMD 
In many Chinese old communities, social regeneration programs are 
generally separated from property-led redevelopments and are delivered 
through the Local Resident’s Committee (LRC) as a general practice of social 
governance. Every community has its LRC with the freedom to start some 
social programs based on local residents’ needs. In the DTMD case, the 
social initiatives run by the LRC were not an integrative part of the west 
DTMD regeneration programme, which makes it different from the KNDC 
case in two major ways.  
Firstly, there was no special funding in place to support the social 
regeneration programs in the DTMD and the average official investment on 
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social programs per capita per year was only 1 Yuan (£0.1), far from enough 
to sustain social programs such as the community school. The government’s 
logic was not to distribute a large chunk of public funding in a socialist style 
and let the local people decide how to spend them. On the contrary, public 
money is used to establish the community-based organizations-the LRCs. 
For staff in the LRC, working in the community and delivering social 
programs could be a life-long job. For the local government, entrepreneurship 
is expected to be seen from the LRC members in levering in resources to 
sustain the social initiatives within the communities. In other words, the 
community based organization-the LRC remains at the core place in the 
government’s strategy of social governance and helps to compile various 
resources for their own community. In practice, different LRCs usually 
compete with each other in getting resources from the municipal government. 
It has embedded the government’s intention to devolve more responsibilities 
with less resource. As the leader of the LRC in the DTMD district put it:  
‘From my opinion, a good community worker who has the commitment to 
serve the community does not necessarily depend on money, we can 
actually serve the local people in many ways using our time and energy 
instead of spreading money, which usually is not the decisive fact for the 
success of social projects. It is true that financial support from the 
municipal government is crucial for equipping the facilities, yet what is 
more important is the LRC workers’ motivation to get things done. We 
managed to find donations from the society by ourselves… 
entrepreneurship is indispensable for running the social regeneration 
programs’ (Bai, Executive of the LRC, interviewed in 2013) 
Secondly, in the DTMD case, the primary deliver of the social programs is the 
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LRC, which is different from KNDC regarding the way in which they work. To 
a large extent, the CPC is still highly vigilant to any bottom-up defiance and 
the capacity of controlling different tiers of the social organizations such as 
medias and community organizations is believed to be crucial for maintaining 
the social stability. The LRC is playing a significant role in social surveillance 
as it was found in the DTMD case that the LRC has built a network 
encompassing hundreds of local volunteers and long-term residents. The 
network was capable of constantly channelling information regarding 
dynamics of local areas. Such an ‘undemocratic’ way of operating the 
community-based organization enables the majority of local people to be 
reached and connected and at the same time gives the LRC the ability to 
mobilize local people. As is put by some of the interviewees:  
‘We have one ‘Huzhang’ for every ten households, which is like the 
representative of the local residents, helping us to approach local people 
as well as bring us real-time information about what is happening within 
the community. There are about 300-400 such people and all of them 
are volunteers. We do not necessarily mobilize them all every time, but a 
small proportion each time for specific tasks. Among them about 100 
people are the backbones that can shoulder tough tasks’ (Bai, Executive 
of the LRC, interviewed in 2013 
‘We have many retired people who still have the passion to serve the 
society, and they are the major force of the volunteers that participate in 
various forms of community works. Many retired professors and officials 
still have the passion to deliver lectures to local residents regarding 
general topics. They have a better understanding of the local people. We 
invited guest lectures from Social Science Academy, from higher 
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educational institutions and other institutions to deliver professional 
lectures. Of course for the most of the time, considering the capacity and 
educational background of the audiences, we arrange some lectures that 
are easy to be understood by local people’ (Bai, Executive of the LRC, 
interviewed in 2013) 
Although the LRC officials are less likely to be promoted to higher positions 
within the hierarchical political system, as the major interface between the 
party and local people, their political significance is appreciated by the CPC 
and every year a certain proportion of National People’s Representatives are 
selected from these LRC leaders. 
Thirdly, in the DTMD area, local resident’s involvement in social programs 
are mainly in the form of voluntary work rather than participating in the 
decision making process. As the majority of the resources are levered in by 
the LRC, it naturally became the controller of these social programs. It was 
also found that many of the volunteers were actually receiving social benefits 
and they have to rely on the LRC to prove their eligibility. The way the LRC 
worked indeed had its advantage in enhancing local people’s feelings of been 
connected and cared and the LRC also helped to prevent crime from 
happening:  
‘The crime rate in this area is quite low, although there are some troubles 
hidden beneath, such as drug abusing and gambling, we are actually 
keeping an eye on them and trying to eliminate them before they get 
matured...we cooperate with police and armed police to initiate 
propaganda movements, and we have patrols formed by volunteers. We 
also keep in touch with the released criminals on a regular base to 
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provide them with education and at the same time record and report their 
recent activities…’ (Wang, Staff of the LRC, interviewed in 2013) 
10.7 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN BOTH CASES 
In regeneration programs involving housing acquisition and relocation, local 
people will eventually have direct conversations with the municipal 
government to reach an agreement on the compensation and it is rare to see 
delegated power in such a process. If such a process takes place in a pure 
market environment, local people should have the right to decide whether or 
not to accept the conditions offered by the government and therefore the 
property-ownership based participation can be called ‘citizen control’ if 
measured using Arnstein’s Ladder (Figure 2.1). However, in both the UK and 
China, physical regeneration programs have never been a pure economic 
issue but a political process. The government can use the state power to 
compulsory purchase individuals’ properties for ‘public good’ when there is a 
strong evidence base. Public participation as an effective instrument has 
therefore been frequently manipulated for the formation of such evidence 
bases.  
In the KHMRI case, the official and community discourses used in describing 
the public participation activities were significantly different. The officials saw 
the participation process in the form of public meetings and consultations as 
an important channel for the government to let local people understand the 
benefits they can get from the regeneration programs and win their support, 
yet in reality it was the demonstration process that helped to legitimize the 
government’s actions in imposing CPOs as inputs from the local people did 
not make real changes to the final decisions. In this sense, public 
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participation in the KHMRI project largely located in ‘consultation and 
placation’ if applying Arnstein’s Ladder theory (figure 2.1). 
Figure2.1:	  The	  Ladder	  of	  Public	  Participation	  
Citizen Control 
Delegated Power 
Partnership 
Placation 
Consultation 
Information 
Therapy 
Manipulation 
Source: Arnstein (1969) 
In the DTMD case, although local residents’ opinions were collected in the 
comprehensive survey before the regeneration, there was actually no 
guarantee that the results would necessarily serve as the evidence base for 
the decision-making. Decisions were largely made by politicians with support 
from technicians and some local elites that were inclined to support the 
physical regeneration plan. Local people were not really empowered to make 
decisions regarding the regeneration projects in their own community and 
public participation in the form of consultation was symbolic and manipulated 
by the government as well. It is also found that within the given institutional 
set up, no other functional venue was provided for citizens to appeal the 
decisions imposed by the government that may affect their life and they were 
not able to establish the community-controlled organizations that have 
political strength to bargain with the local government. The government had 
strong intention to mobilize local residents to accept the conditions for 
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regeneration. In this sense, the public participation activities in the DTMD 
case largely fell in the category of ‘information and therapy’. However, the 
economic and social transformation since the 1980s had cultivated a growing 
awareness of individual interests among the Chinese people and an 
increasing demand for protecting individual interests from been infringed by 
the fuzzy ‘public’ interests’ (Han, 2004; Ren &Hu, 2004). The mobilizing 
strategy was proved to be inefficient in the west DTMD.  
Regarding social regeneration, the early statement of the Government with 
an emphasis on public participation gave local residents a perception that the 
KNDC would be community controlled. However, in the later stage local 
residents were frustrated by the reality. The claimed bottom-up community 
led feature of the NDC actually provide limited spaces for real 'community led', 
as was argued by Wright, et al. (2006, p349), ' it is community led in the 
sense that government decides how the community will be involved, why they 
will be involved, what they will do and how they will do it'. The NDC became 
an instrument for central government to by-pass local authorities while 
remain full control of what happens on the ground. Through the Performance 
Management and Self-Assessment technique, the government confined the 
NDC's activities within its own priorities. Since the NDC was financially 
supported by central government and was embedded in the political and 
social context, it was unable to distant itself from delivering the government's 
priorities as well as party politics. In this sense, the public participation 
activities in the form the KNDC board can only fall into the category of 
‘Placation’ in Arnstein’s Ladder (1969).  The NDC model to some extent has 
encouraged isolation rather than cooperation as the empowerment led to an 
inclination among the board members to establish their own regeneration 
programs rather than to seek opportunities to cooperate with the existing 
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agencies and better utilize the existing regeneration initiatives. It was 
criticized by many interviewees that there was no real public participation as 
the decision making power were finally centralized into a small group of the 
board members while the majority of local residents were marginalized. 
Some of the board members with strong power basis were criticized for 
having jeopardized the democracy within the board.  
10.8 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, differences and similarities found from the comparison studies 
are presented. Regarding the physical regeneration, the policy designs in the 
two cases were significantly different. While the KHMRI to some extend has a 
strong socialist feature to avoid gentrification, the west DTMD regeneration 
was largely a state-led gentrification project. While the reliance on 
government funding made the KHMRI economically unsustainable, the 
‘accumulation by disposition’ strategy adopted in the west DTMD led to social 
problems.  
In the implementation of the physical regeneration projects, some similar 
tactics were used by local governments in both of the cases, including 
‘tenants first’, ‘isolation’, ‘exerting great pressures’, ‘intimidation’ and ‘giving 
fuzzy information’. It is also found that the ways in which local residents and 
the government interacted with each other were different. In the British case 
both sides inclined to seek solutions using measures offered by the formal 
structure while in the Chinese case both sides adopted alternatives including 
violation of the rules.  
It was evidenced in both cases that local residents’ interests are diversified 
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and the existence of vested interest groups would have a detrimental impact 
on the public participation process. In the KNDC case, the locally elected 
board members with strong power to some extent jeopardized the 
participatory process while in the DTMD case, some of the local elites were 
hand-picked by the government to express their support towards the 
regeneration program in representing local residents and public participation 
since became a hegemonic project.  
The deliveries of social regeneration initiatives were different in both cases. 
In the British case social initiations were largely delivered through social 
enterprises, whose survival relied on its ability of getting access to public 
funding. In the DTMD case, however, the LRC played a significant role in 
merging various sources of funding and offering helps to people who were in 
need and mobilization remains one of the most important measures for the 
LRCs to realize its aims.  
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CHAPTER 11 COMPARING THE TWO 
CASES AS EXAMPLES OF VARIEGATED 
NEOLIBERALISATION  
The Chinese case provides a good opportunity for expanding the theoretical 
framework of ‘Variegated Neoliberalism’. The concept is primarily developed 
based on western experiences, where capitalism generally falls into two 
categories: the ‘US-style ‘Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and the 
German-style Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs)’ (Peck and Zhang, 
2013). Countries that adopt either of the two models share some common 
features, such as the democratic political system, unambiguous property 
rights and clearly defined boundaries between the government, private 
sectors and the general public. The Neoliberalization in China, however, 
takes place in a post-socialism context where the path-dependent features of 
institutional reconstruction are clearly evidenced and the authoritarian power 
still plays a significant role. China is an independent version of how different 
parts of a society can be put together and the Chinese model has its own 
inter-contradictions that cannot be reconciled by simply imitating western 
models. Yet today the country also faces a number of challenges that are 
encountered or has been experienced by many western countries, such as 
the growing inequalities, addiction to real estate-driven economy and social 
justice. The western experiences and wisdoms can be referenced when 
formulating China’s domestic polices in reaction to these challenges. It is 
believed that a cross-national comparison can help to deepen the 
mutual-understanding and facilitate a mutual learning process, which is of 
great value in laying the foundation for mapping experiences from the 
western context into China.  
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Findings in this research are primarily based on literature reviews and the 
study on two regeneration cases in inner urban areas of both countries. The 
research strives to understand the factors that contribute to the differences 
and similarities existing in the urban regeneration and related public 
participation process between China and the UK. Yet it found that a holistic 
view on the regeneration and public participation practices in both countries 
is not easy to obtain simply based on single case studies. Variations 
regarding the geographical disparity, external economic conditions, the 
capacity and knowledgeability of local people in both countries all have 
impacts on the process and outcomes of a regeneration project and the 
participative process. Besides, the genre of regeneration projects in both 
countries is quite diversified and each of the selected cases can only reveal a 
particular type of the regeneration programs. Consequently, the findings in 
this research are to some extent context & project-specific. Yet this does not 
mean such a research is incapable of making validated generalizations 
based on the findings. Indeed, for each of the individual cases, the 
formulation of the regeneration policies, the delivery strategy and people’s 
perceptions about the regeneration practice share similarities with many 
other regeneration practices in a similar context. In this chapter there is a 
attempt to examine and compare the empirical research findings from the two 
case studies from a macro perspective. 
11.1 Long-term Stagnation VS Fast Development  
11.1.1 Long-term Stagnation in the Kensington NDC and 
HMRI area 
External economic environment has played a significant role in shaping the 
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unique features of the selected regeneration cases in both countries. From 
the perspective of professionals and politicians, the biggest problem for 
Kensington is its chronological stagnation and transient nature, which is a 
consequence of multiple factors such as the long-term deindustrialization, 
deteriorated physical environment and the obsolete housing stock that are 
attractive to low-income people and students. Some of the interviewees put it 
like this:  
‘…one of the problems for Kensington is that it is a transient 
community…an area full of flats, low-priced flats that are easy to let…I 
think that has much to do with over time loss of large-scale industries, 
the loss of local employment for a lot of people…which means people 
travels away, the transient population coming through and living as part 
of the problem’ (Jerry, Professional against the KNDC and KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2013).  
‘Because you have some of the cheapest housing stock in the city which, 
in some instances you got lots of people who moved in and then moved 
out quite quickly’ (Lim, Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
‘…so generally speaking, there are a lot of properties compressed in the 
areas, increasingly occupied by people didn’t really want to live there, or 
people who lived there had always lived there and couldn’t move on, and 
people who were there because they have very limited choice.(Richard, 
Politician support the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2014)  
The majority of long-term local residents are previously working class people 
with difficulties to undertake jobs requiring technology-based skills and are 
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facing challenges in readapting themselves into the job market. As one of the 
interviewees put it: 
‘There are now still not many job opportunities physically in the area, 
because it is predominately a residential area with a lot of shops at the 
moment…and there tend not to be working opportunities be directly 
created in the area in the future either…’ (Lim, Politician against the 
KNDC, interviewed in 2013). 
Additionally, as the non-beneficiaries of the economic transformation, 
people’s living standards in the KNDC area have lagged far behind the 
national average if evaluated against various social indicators such as the 
unemployment rates, health, education, environment and crime. These leave 
the potential buyers of houses a negative perception about the area and it 
has also seen many property owners from within the area fleeing to other 
places of the city and letting out their properties to tenants that are hard to 
reach. One of the interviewees put it like this:  
‘I think it (Edge Hill) becomes a bit of dumping ground… for 
organisations, the housing market was a bit depressed in this area, so 
that's their opportunity and that is why individuals coming here to buy a 
house, and turn it into a hostel’ (Steve, Activist against the KNDC and 
KHMRI, interviewed in 2013)   
 ‘… a lot of residents came into the area that was living in private sector 
housing, and it was much more difficult to know who is where and, you 
know to provide any services (Hillary, Scholar neutral to the KNDC, 
interviewed in 2014) 
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Due to the degree of the deprivation, energy and resources channeled into 
the area can make a difference yet were incapable of leading to a 
fundamental change to the situation. As one of the interviewees put it: 
‘…if you got a NDC in a nice little town which happen to have only one 
deprived area, then this would be absolutely the program that all would 
dedicated to support, it wasn’t quite like that here…’ (Hillary, Scholar 
neutral to the KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
‘…it was very difficult for the integrative programs to produce any job 
opportunities, especially, if they are in a list of area which is deprive more 
widely…Liverpool is short of jobs all together…the dockland is 
successful, but there only need a fraction of workforce they used to need. 
So you know there is element of the job shortage, which is very difficult 
for the regeneration to challenge…particularly as Kensington itself, in a 
sense it was not an area with industries within it. So there weren’t local 
firms on the whole you could work with to create more jobs, and even 
then also since public sector jobs began to shrink…’ (Hillary, Scholar 
neutral to the KNDC, interviewed in 2014) 
11.1.2 Fast development in the surrounding areas of the 
DTMD  
While in the Chinese case, it has seen great inflations in the price of inner city 
land and properties, which is contributed by a number of factors. First, the 
long-term underinvestment in infrastructures and residential buildings in 
Chinese cities before 1998 had led to an accumulated demand for living 
spaces with high-quality environment. Second, migration to large cities 
helped to push up the demands for apartments. Third, the bright prospect of 
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the housing market attracted speculative capitals and at the same time banks 
became one of the major sources of money that flows into the property 
market. Fourth, the urbanization and inner city regeneration was supported 
by the government, which as the legitimate owner of urban land had greatly 
benefited from the process. It has seen a rocketing property price in China 
over the past two decades and many of the previously underinvested inner 
urban areas hence became arenas for competing interests. The property-led 
regeneration propelled by the state can be found everywhere.  
Apart from the above four driving forces that speeded up the urban 
constructions in China, the city-centred urbanization policies had also played 
a significant role in pushing up China’s inner city land prices. Due to the 
limited cultivatable land and the enormous scale of population, the Chinese 
government had imposed strict restrictions on the expansion of urban areas, 
especially with low density. Moreover, the government intentionally directs 
investment into inner city areas through provision of public facilities and 
control of land provision. The inflated land prices have priced out many 
previous inner city residents together with their activities. Accordingly, many 
of the Chinese inner city regeneration projects had actually become the 
municipal government’s instrument to reap the ‘value gap’ from inner city 
residents, which would inevitably led to the disappearance of environment for 
indigenous small businesses run by local people and the job opportunities 
they created. Additionally, in the DTMD, the dilapidated physical environment 
was partly led by underinvestment in public facilities and rampant 
constructions initiated by local residents. Since the government holds the 
planning power, unless an opportunity exists enabling it to collect the rent 
gap through land expropriation and redevelopment, will it likely to either 
invest in the area or allow self-funded constructions in the area to happen. 
 338 
While in Kensington, deprivation was one of the direct results of the change 
of macro-economic environment and the massive unemployment and outflow 
of capitals. It is believed by the government that the intervention in key 
sectors such as the housing market would have a positive impact on the local 
economy.  
The Kensington HMRI was initiated when the land value of the targeted area 
deflated and the prospect of local economy was gloomy while the west 
DTMD regeneration took place in parallel with a uprising momentum of local 
economic. The government’s intervention in both cases focused on preparing 
the inner city area for investment. Yet in the HMRI project it has seen the 
government put money into the area with the hope of injecting economic 
dynamics into the area and at the same time stabilizing the social structure. 
While in the west DTMD project municipal government was more interested 
in harvesting the value gap, even at the expense of destroying the indigenous 
environment that nurtures the unique culture as well as the dynamic economy 
providing job opportunities for local people.  
Over the past ten years, people from the both case study areas have seen 
inflated housing prices. For Kensington, the rising property value undermined 
the previous assumptions underpinning the intervention and caused 
problems in rehousing the relocatees. While for the DTMD case, due to the 
resistant from the local residents, the regeneration process was suspended 
and the ‘best opportunity’ for the government to acquire the local assets and 
regenerate the area was missed. Now the costs of regenerating the area are 
too high for the government to materialize any changes in that area.  
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11.2 Devolution VS Centralization  
11.2.1 Centralization as one of the important features of the 
British Urban regeneration policies 
The New Deal for Communities (NDC) under New Labour was delivered 
through local partnerships with guidance from the central government, which 
also played an active role in granting funding and evaluating the outcomes of 
individual social/physical regeneration projects. To a large extent, central 
intervention in deprived areas manifested New Labour’s aspiration in 
reducing social disparities and its political intention to reward its voters 
through area-based regeneration schemes. 
‘The NDC was very much part of what New Labour wants to do (Nik, 
Politician against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
‘…local people were left with freedom to modify some of the things but I 
don’t think they have that kind of power to do all that, you know, sort of 
entirely shape the program (Hillary, Scholar neutral to the KNDC, 
interviewed in 2013)  
And the NDC regeneration policy can be seen as New Labour’s response to 
the overemphasis on radical marketization and non-interventionism under the 
Thatcher government. The Policy was underpinned by the ‘Third way’ 
philosophy combining thoughts from both the Left and the Right and solutions 
standing between the Keynesianism’s state interventionism and the 
Thatcherism’s prioritization of the free market. Additionally, the intervention 
from central government was backed by a realization that physical 
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regeneration alone is insufficient to uplift people who are trapped in 
deprivation, and a hypothesis that proper interventions in providing holistic 
support covering multiple factors can solve the problem. The programs were 
initiated by central government using the SEU (1998) report as the evidence 
base. To some extent, this was merely another example showing how urban 
programs can be the ‘continual victim of departmental and sociological fads 
and fashions’ (Batley and Edwards, 1978) 
If compare the scale of the funding delivered from central government with 
the challenges faced by deprived areas across the UK, it is not hard to find 
that the NDC is no more than one of the demonstration cases camouflaging 
the government’s limited ability in reacting to the inner city deprivation at such 
a large scale. Apart from the 39 communities that were artificially selected as 
vassals for the public investment, many of the rest 2961 deprived areas 
indeed haven’t seen much change over the ten years. Which is to say the 
designation of the NDC area was a highly political process dominated by 
central government and had indeed created disparity between areas in 
deprivation.  
The NDC program is also an experiment in exploring a new delivery model 
for urban regeneration programs. Municipal government, private sectors and 
various ‘Social Enterprises’ were encouraged to work together in delivering 
the outcomes expected by the central government. The ‘Social Enterprise’ 
(Third Sector) as an innovative institutional setup was seen by New Labour 
as a potential alternative, or at least a complementary part to the public 
sectors and was expected to bring in knowledge regarding local needs and to 
play a more proactive role in delivering regeneration projects. Funding was 
provided to entities of the ‘Third Sector’ to deliver regeneration programs in 
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meeting with local needs. In this process, local authorities no longer play a 
dominant role in policy formulation and delivery and the decision-making 
power falls into partnerships, for which the priority was to please central 
government by delivering its expected outcomes. As one of the local 
councillors put it:  
‘…it (the NDC) was very much, I think, about by-passing local 
government. When New Labour first came in they were quite anti-local 
government in many ways…the ideology and opinion in New Deal was 
about by-passing and reinventing local government’ (Nik, Politician 
against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013)  
Stewart, M. (1994) argued that ‘relentless centralization’ became one of the 
important features of the British urban policies and ‘central influence grew 
through the direct involvement of Ministers in urban initiatives’ (pp. 134) and 
‘…the most visible expression of the trend to centralization of urban policy, 
however, has been the establishment of a range of initiatives which by-pass 
the local political process of planning, control and accountability and which 
concentrate power in Whitehall’ (pp. 135). Evidence could also be found from 
the KNDC program, as one of the interviewees put it:   
‘…there would always be a kind of element that ‘you (the local 
partnership) get on with it, we (the central government) give you the 
resources but you actually don’t have the power…for the local players, 
actually are little room for maneuver…but then you know the national 
government saying we’ve given you all that amount of money, why you 
haven’t done that kind of thing (as we expected)…’ (Hillary, Scholar 
neutral to the KNDC, interviewed in 2014)  
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Similar to the NDC programs, the Central Edge Lane Housing Market 
Renewal program was also attached with strong features of centralization. 
From the formulation of the regeneration initiatives to the designation of the 9 
HMRI areas and the delivery programs, central government and the related 
departments had played a significant role. As one of the local politicians put 
it:  
‘…the problems that I have 40 years involving in the housing from 
Liverpool’s perspective (was that)…the housing policy, was always 
decided on the need of London…like bedroom tax, which actually makes 
sense in large cities such as London, but it doesn’t make any sense at all 
in Liverpool…the whole problem regarding housing policy for last forty 
years I’ve been involved in, is that they had been based on London 
concepts… we had to try to localize the London based policies to meet 
public needs in Liverpool’ (Richard, Politician support the KNDC and 
KHMRI, interviewed in 2014)  
One of the important facts that led to the intensified centralization perhaps 
lies in the nature of the British political system, where centrally produced 
policies frequently face resistance from municipalities.  
11.2.2 Devolution reflected in the Chinese urban policies 
In dealing with the central-local relationship, the Chinese government adopts 
a ‘centrally orchestrated decentralization’ (Peck and Zhang, 2013) model 
since the late 1970s. On the one hand, central government holds the power 
of intervening into local affairs at any time through monopolizing the 
designation of provincial and municipal cadres, which guarantees the 
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uniformity of central-local policies. On the other hand, the decision-making 
rights are highly devolved and it is indeed rare to see direct central 
interventions on local affairs such as urban regeneration programs, which 
helps to avoid the risk of repeating the failures made previously under the 
planned economy. Such a central-local relationship is not an innovation of the 
CPC, rather, it has been adopted since the imperial China and is approved to 
be effective in maintaining the vitality of local economy while reducing 
possible defiance from local politicians.  
In China the decision-making rights on local affairs such as the initiation of 
physical and social regeneration programs are highly devolved to provincial 
and municipal governments. Municipal governments are fully authorized to 
formulate urban development strategies and action plans, to implement and 
to handle the possible disputes arising from it. Interventions from central 
government stays at a comparatively macro level and usually take place in 
granting permissions to master plans for cities of strategic significance or 
granting permissions to the start-ups of key projects. Regarding social 
regeneration, the Chinese central government does not provide a 
one-size-fits-all handbook with assumptions regarding the social problems, 
detailed requirements on the genres, the delivery model and expected 
outcomes with evaluation mechanism. Social targets are usually written in 
the Five-Year-Plans produced by the State Commission of Development and 
Reform periodically in broad brush. Little centrally provide financial resources 
are in place to help carry out all these targets and most of them are realized 
by municipalities based on their own interpretations in relation to local 
realities and political considerations. However, across the main land China, 
the CPC had set up a hierarchical system equipped with standardized 
working departments and functional branches. Physical and social 
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regeneration programs, although varies from the genre and objectives, are 
largely delivered through such a system.  
11.3 Laissez-Faire VS State Capitalism  
11.3.1 Laissez-Faire model in the UK  
Interventionism exists in both countries yet is realized through different 
means. The Chinese local governments hold a considerable fiscal power and 
freedom in handling with local affairs, which is unusual even in many western 
federations. However, this does not mean the degree of governmental 
intervention is similar to that of many of its counterparts following a 
Laissez-faire model, in which boundaries between the government and the 
private sectors are clearly defined and the government as an enabler usually 
do not directly involve in profit-oriented property redevelopments that are 
mainly undertaken by private sectors. Municipal government mainly benefit 
from the new development through the increased taxations led by new 
properties and the injected economic vitalities. Physical regeneration 
programs to a large extent are led by private developers. Although the 
government holds the power of granting planning and construction 
permissions, it indeed cannot directly control the pace of the physical 
regeneration happening on the ground as for some large landowners, 
obtaining planning permissions may not necessarily lead to real constructions, 
especially when encountering a down-turn of the housing market.  
‘Whereas all of us lack of power in the market economy is lots of these 
are dictated by the market. If you got some money you would buy a 
house wherever you want to, so it is in the market, that what you see 
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people aspire to rather than what they (the government) need (Richard, 
Politician support the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2014)  
Moreover, it has also seen the development strategy for large urban areas or 
even city and city regions to be pushed forward by private landowners that 
has a high stake in those regions. Redistribution of benefits generated from 
physical development in the UK is mainly realized through the bargaining 
process between local governments and private developers following the 
section 106. Taking the Central Edge Lane HMRI in Kensington for example, 
it was delivered through a four-way partnership. The Government is the 
biggest provider of the money and holds the power to appropriate throughout 
the 9 designated HMRI areas; the city council is the major accountable body 
for the programs at local level; social housing landlords are one of the largest 
stake holders and are therefore on board and the private developers are 
brought in to deliver the expected outcomes. As one of the interviewees put 
it:  
 ‘…Liverpool’s case was (that it) split the city into four (projects), within 
each of them there are then social housing provider and a private 
housing provider.’ (Richard, Politician support the KNDC and KHMRI, 
interviewed in 2014) 
In the Central Edge Lane HMRI project, the largest social housing 
association is Riverside and the private developer is Bellway. Money from 
central government was used to buy out local residents, flatten the old 
properties, remediate the land and make it ready for development. Once local 
authorities became the landowner through property acquisition, they enjoy 
considerable freedom to dispose the land following their own rationale. In the 
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central Edge Lane case, the city council handed over the land to the Bellwey 
for free. One of the local politicians that had deeply involved in the program 
put it: 
‘… in fact, we didn’t sell the land in most of the (HMRI) cases, even to 
private developers. Because although even we have remediated the 
land, it still didn’t have much value, so basically, we then acted as the 
landowner and the planning authority, to work with private and social 
housing developers…once we knocked down and remediated, it was 
more questions of the powers of the council and the money of the 
council’ (Richard, Politician support the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed 
in 2014)  
11.3.2 State Capitalism model in China  
On the contrary, in China the government’s intervention in key social and 
economic sectors such as media, finance and energy has never faded away 
but been strengthened in parallel with the economic growth. Inner city 
regeneration projects, which are usually economically lucrative yet socially 
controversial, have long been dominated by the municipal government since 
the late 1980s. In China, private sectors also pledge land with planning 
permissions in banks for loans, yet the government as the largest land owner 
does not only decide the specific indicators of a piece of land before leasing 
them out, but also gives clear requirements on the dead line by which the 
project should be finished. The game of profiting from regeneration programs 
is dominated by municipalities that have the ability to control the provision of 
land and to grant planning permissions. The direct intervention of the 
Chinese government in the land and housing market is also reflected on its 
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direct involvement in urban development. Indeed municipal governments are 
the largest beneficiary of Chinese inner city redevelopment programs that 
turn previously dilapidated residential districts into lucrative commercial 
streets. To maximise its interests, only when the majority of the properties 
rights are acquired by the government would it initiate the regeneration 
program and invest on infrastructures in the area, as one of the interviewees 
from the east part of the DTMD put it:  
‘…In fact most of the properties on Beiyuan Gate street belong to public 
institutions which obtained them from local people either by expropriation 
or confiscation after 1949…If the majority of the commercial properties 
were privately owned, the government wouldn’t spend so much money 
on refurbishing the street and making it a tourist destination’. (Jia, local 
resident against the DTMD , interviewed in 2013) 
The government, which is supposed to be a neutral regulator of the market, 
indeed has its own interest in the urban redevelopment process and thus can 
hardly make impartial decisions. Redistribution of profits generated from 
physical development in China is realized through the land leasing fees and 
various additional taxes and charges, which is an important source of 
revenue for municipal governments to balance their expenditures on the 
provision of social services and infrastructures. Collecting the locally 
generated benefits from the regeneration programs for the local government 
is an important instrument of primitive accumulation. 
The profits are then used to compensate the expenditures on infrastructure 
provision, on social welfare and on the daily operation of the government. 
While the former two have constantly increased in parallel with the fast 
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expansion of many Chinese urban areas, local expenditures on social 
programs remains stagnated. That is to say, locally generated profits from the 
physical regeneration projects in China are not given back to local people in 
the form of welfare or social programs. Surplus from the physical 
regeneration primarily rests on the land transferring fees minus the 
compensations paid to relocatees. In many cases, the municipal 
government’s aggressive extractions on the profits generated from 
regeneration projects could severely squeeze local residents’ interests and 
therefore became the major source of conflicts. The prescriptive planning 
system serves as one of the major tools for the government to realize its 
extraction. Before the formal start of a regeneration program, municipal 
government would already have an array of power and resources at its 
disposal to consolidate its predominant position in the regeneration process. 
Specifically, the ownership of urban lands, the monopolization of planning 
power, the capacity in manipulating medias, the police, the LRC, some of the 
local elites and even the judicial system. Once such a player determines to 
compete with local residents in harvesting the ‘rent gap’ from inner city 
regeneration, it is hard for the latter to win. If public participation is to be 
promoted with the aim of enlarging local people’s control over the properties 
and resources within their own communities, it would in fact reduce municipal 
government’s revenue as currently in China the property tax is not in place to 
mitigate municipalities’ expenditures on providing infrastructures and 
services. Against such a background, public participation is nothing but a 
hegemonic project to stabilize the current accumulation regime of the 
Chinese government.  
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11.4 Democracy VS Authoritarianism  
11.4.1 The British Democracy and its Impact on the 
Regeneration and Public Participation Process 
The UK has a multiple party democracy. The Labour Party and the 
Conservative Party remained in dominant positions before the 2010. If 
examining the way in which the two parties are structured and the decisions 
are made, it is not difficult to find that both are to some extent centralized with 
an emphasis on the leadership and inner-party consensus. Specifically, at 
the central level, the appointment of cabinet members and the heads of 
governmental departments are more than often designated by the prime 
minister based on political considerations to balance various interests within 
the party, so as the formulation of some of the national policies such as the 
NDCs and HMRs. There are incentives for the formulation and 
implementation of short-term, variegated urban policies in the UK as often the 
newly elected party are eager to reward its voters. At the same time, 
politicians also bear pressure to make progress within their term. The 
implementation of particular policy national wide in the UK’s democratic 
system can be pushed forward by the ‘party machine’ with a strong incentive 
of delivering something that the predecessor party failed to provide. Although 
there are diversified interests and beliefs, it is rare to see revolt from within a 
party on the movement.  
At local level, councillors are democratically elected, and cabinet members 
are normally senior members of the majority party. Various committees are 
formed by politicians from different parties to make decisions on local issues 
such as planning, housing and education, etc.  
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The British planning system is underpinned by its democratic political system. 
Those who are affected have the right to appeal the decisions and make it a 
lawsuit going through the judicial system. The free speech also enables the 
medias to give views that are seen by the massive public as unbiased and 
neutral. All these features together makes the decisions made through the 
formal procedures legitimacy hard to be opposed. People are also more 
prone to seek solutions within the formal system while there would be debate 
on the media providing different views for people to make their own 
judgements. As is put by one of the interviewees:  
 ‘…we lived in a democracy, everyone has the right to make their point 
heard, in many ways that can do it…’ (Richard, Politician support the 
KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2014)  
Yet when it comes to physical regeneration projects involving property 
acquisition and demolition, it is impossible for the decision makers to please 
everyone, especially those local property owners that disagree with what the 
government proposed, as one of the interviewees put it:  
‘…the homeowners, very interestingly, became a key driver for change 
or the resistance of the intervention strategies like New Deal or Housing 
Market Renewal. Homeowners became a significant problem to be 
solved. (Tom, Executive of the Social Landlord support the KNDC and 
KHMRI, interviewed in 2014) 
Once local property owners go against the decisions made through the party 
machine, the democratic political system can hardly provide any alternatives 
to reconcile the conflicts between the two sides. 
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‘…it is only when something is seen have political advantage, then when 
the communities are listened to…the councilors can’t actually do 
something about it. (Jerry, Professional against the KNDC, interviewed 
in 2013) 
‘…you can make personal representation to a local councilors any 
time…but that is the last thing I would do…people would say, well, it is a 
waste of time…you come up against a wall of local 
councilors…councilors are always in a very difficult position…It is difficult 
for them do make a decision that can satisfy them all…not to mention 
they have their own priorities as well’ (Edward, Activist against the KNDC, 
interviewed in 2013) 
In the Central Edge Lane HMRI project, democratically elected local 
representatives indeed have very limited capacities in swinging the 
regeneration decisions, which were made and supported by the party 
machine. Pressures from within the party decide local representative’s 
attitude towards a particular regeneration case. More than often, it is difficult 
for junior councillors to say no to decisions that are backed by the senior 
councillors, as is put by one of the interviewees:  
‘…an junior councillor cannot very often change things they 
oppose…only when there is a strong backing from the community. Yet 
there is not strong backing from the community…as long as we have 
first-past-the-post election in the UK, it is actually quite hard to guide the 
community to build an alternative of what Kensington should look like 
and get people to vote for it…It’s usually the party machine, that manage 
the elections. So alternatives usually find very hard to get political 
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support’ (Jerry, Professional against the KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
Whether local residents’ attempt in seeking support from locally elected 
politicians to resist the municipal government’s decisions can succeed largely 
depends on whether the specific case could be used as a weapon for 
undermining the opposite party. 
‘In situations, if the projects went wrong, both parties could blame each 
other. The Lib Dems can say oh this is a stupid idea any way, the Labour 
Party could say, no this was a brilliant idea, you did it wrong. If you look 
at Liverpool that is what exactly happened’ (Steve, Activist against the 
KNDC, interviewed in 2013) 
 ‘…they spent so much time and money over the 20 or 30 years, 
acquiring properties, one by one, architectural plans and strategic 
frameworks, whatever. They will never ever not going to knock those 
houses down. So the community didn't have much to say about 
that…Community can do things at the small scale…on the big things like 
should we knock down 300 or 400 houses, in Kensington, that’s always 
very difficult, because it is so much invested in it…’ (Jerry, Professional 
against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
Not only the democratic political system, but also the planning system 
becomes dysfunctional. Theoretically, the way planning decisions are made, 
appealed and re-evaluated under the British planning system enables a 
careful evaluation regarding inputs from technicians, politicians, private 
sectors and local residents. However, the system also leaves great space for 
manoeuvre using discretionary power and resources in the hands of 
 353 
politicians and technicians. The discretionary planning system enables 
policies and guidelines to be interpreted by different players in favour of their 
own interests and the final decisions made by the planning committee within 
city council could be highly political. In many cases the communities would 
end up with a feeling that their inputs yield little impacts on the final decisions 
that would affect their life. The consultation procedure was only there to meet 
with the requirements on procedure justice. As one of the interviewees put it: 
‘When all these things are decided already, and the final things that 
happen is consultation’ (Jerry, Professional against the KNDC and 
KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
‘There is no real listening process in regeneration in the UK.  And 
particularly regeneration projects in Liverpool. Council officers do 
regeneration chiefly… the municipal planning officers are tasked of 
coming out with a solution to the problem. And if their solution is to knock 
down all these houses in this road and let us place a new school, they 
will come up with strong reasons why there is a necessary for these 
things happen…there is always disconnection between what the 
community want and what actually happened. And there is always 
disconnection between what we said what the benefits of doing it in a 
particular way and what actual benefits of doing things are’ (Jerry, 
Professional against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013). 
Moreover, within the system, there is a disparity between local people and 
the city council regarding the resources and power. Resistance from local 
people, especially from individual resident, can hardly sustain, especially 
when the case is handed to the complicate judicial system that requires 
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enormous inputs of knowledge, energy and money. As one of the 
interviewees put it:  
‘…you have a situation where the professionals, architectures, lawyers, 
the regeneration professionals, are all able to merge a huge amount of 
information, and protestors and people disagreeing are not helped at all. 
So I think it is actually very difficult for the community (to resist).... ‘(Jerry, 
Professional against the KNDC and KHMRI, interviewed in 2013) 
There are exceptions when the local residents have great capacities to 
mobilize resources and can afford to play the time-and-money-consuming 
judicial game with the local council. As one of the interviewees put it:   
‘By large middle classes don’t live in areas that you want to demolish. 
They live in richer areas…but it just so happened that in Liverpool 8. 
There were two streets, of bigger houses with left-wing middle class 
people moved into. And the person who really did it… she was a BBC 
news presenter, she is not typical of those living in that area…so she has 
a small number of people who supported her… in fact the people who 
were indigenous there voted for the program, and a small group of 
relative new incomers voted against it. And that (the project) was 
delayed for around ten years. I came around all these, because there is 
nothing purely black and white’ (Richard, Politician supports the KNDC 
and KHMRI, interviewed in 2014)  
11.4.2 The Authoritarianism in China and its Impacts on the 
Urban Regeneration Process 
At the central level, the CPC share some similar features with the two British 
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major parties. The political system is highly centralized and hierarchical and it 
is unrealistic to expect all the party members of the CPC share similar values 
and opinions on particular social and political issues. Since the establishment 
of the CPC, members were divided based on their political views into ‘The 
Left’, ‘The Right’ and ‘The Conservatives’, which was particularly the case 
between the 1950s to the 1970s when the ‘Left’ was in a predominant 
position. It has also seen politicians with different political beliefs and 
motivations became allies and compete with their rivals, sometimes 
ruthlessly. Such a tradition hasn’t been eliminated by the past 30 years’ fast 
development.  
To avoid the devastating consequences of policies such as the ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ that were produced based on Mao’s imagination and propelled from 
the top, current policy initiatives ranging from social policies to special 
economic zones advocated by central government need to be tested and 
approved workable beforehand. Which is to say policies from central 
government are usually backed by experimentations rather than pure 
theoretical hypothesis. The decentralized nature of the current Chinese 
government gives municipal governments the freedom to experiment policies 
within their jurisdictions and successful experiences would be learnt by other 
municipal politicians and applied within their domain.   
Within the CPC there is more likely to have a patronized relationship between 
the higher level and lower level cadres. Although the former holds the 
authoritarian power and can decide the promotion of the latter, they still need 
their supporters to build up a consensus among the majority within the party. 
For instance, the reform and opening up in the late 1970s was accused to be 
potentially harmful to the ‘socialist path’ and Deng had to empower some of 
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the reformists to realize his intension. At municipal level, the mayor and party 
secretary are normally appointed by the upper-level government and the 
heads of different departments and the leaders of district governments 
usually report to the municipal party secretary and the mayor, of which the 
former holds the power of nominating the lower level and is therefore seen to 
have more power than the latter. Primary cadres in the municipal government 
therefore have highly centralized power and considerable freedom in 
mobilizing resources to achieve their objectives while local residents can 
hardly find any formal channels to express their interests and to bargain with 
the municipal government. The implementation of inner city regeneration 
programs is usually supported by municipal mayor or party secretary and 
different government departments have to provide support, which can easily 
lead local people’s interests be infringed by the municipal government at 
comparatively low political and economic costs. Before 2011, CPOs could be 
imposed and implemented by the municipal government without the 
involvement of the court. The formal procedures of the regeneration-related 
decision making process, and in some cases even the judicial system can be 
manipulated. One of the interviewees put it like this:  
‘Our suggestions were neglected by the government and we hardly have 
any chance to change their mind…the police only follow the 
government’s order and it is unrealistic to expect that the court would 
provide a solution for us as well…(Ding, Activist against the west DTMD 
regeneration, interviewed in 2013)  
Technicians, politicians and private sectors are closely connected. Within the 
Chinese hierarchical system, lower profile local officials that have close 
relations with local people do not usually have the capacity and strength to 
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influence the regeneration decisions imposed from the top. High profile 
officials as the major decision makers usually expect to see no defiance from 
the government institutions within his/her domain. The pyramid structure of 
the political system on the one hand guarantees the execution power and the 
efficiency while on the other hand severely undermined the democracy.  
‘The planning bureau, the design institute, the police, the media and 
even the Residents’ Committee are all directly or indirectly controlled by 
the government and no one (in the government) really speaks for 
us…(Ding, Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed 
in2013) 
‘The Governmental departments in relation to planning, construction, 
land management and commercial and industrial management should 
fulfil their duties and cooperate the District government in accomplishing 
the demolition and construction works of the Sajingiqoa expansion 
project’ (Municipal government’s announcement, 2005)  
For Chinese government, the major threat of an ‘uncontrolled’ media comes 
from its potentiality in arousing people’s sympathy or even discontent 
towards the government, which would undermine the government’s credibility 
and bring political pressures on municipal governors. And for the Chinese 
local people, Medias controlled by the government or its branch institutions 
more than often lacks the credibility to convince the general public.  
‘…when we ask some of the local medias come to cover the demolition 
conducted by the government, none of them responded…’ (Ding, Activist 
against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 2013)  
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The judicial system, especially at local level, cannot maintain its 
independency in constraining the government’s behaviours either. According 
to a recent survey, over 90% of the law suits between the government and 
ordinary people came up with a preliminary judge in favour of the government. 
Such a structure can greatly speed up the implementation of physical 
regeneration programs yet can also result in extra social costs that are 
largely borne by the central government, which sometimes choose to 
intervene and back local people for political considerations. The Chinese 
central government’s control over the decentralized political system is 
realized through controlling the promotion of provincial and municipal cadres, 
whose legitimacy of being a local leader comes from the top rather than 
democratic elections. When necessary, central government can intervene at 
any time without provoking political revolt at local level.  
However, the undemocratic nature of the Chinese political system can 
sometimes be utilized by local people to swing the final decisions, even if 
these decisions are underpinned by strong technical rationales. Local 
residents who are experienced in resisting the government’s decision usually 
have a good understanding of the limitations of their own capacities within the 
formal structure and know that through formal procedures there is little 
chance to win the powerful municipal government. Yet they also understand 
that for the central government, its legitimacy to a large extent premised on 
social harmony. Particular planning decisions can be turned down if great 
social controversy as well as chaos is triggered, which has been approved 
repeatedly in the past. Once local people managed to win the nationwide 
sympathy, the planning proposals would normally be suspended. It has seen 
routinized resistance initiated by local people across the country in the past 
decade, and the concept that ‘resistances may be dangerous but is also likely 
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to yield higher return’ has been rooted in local people’s mind and underpins 
the rationales of their resistance. Normally in this process local people would 
mobilize all political and economic resources they have, as one of the 
interviewees put it:  
‘We got support from Muslim groups in other provinces such as 
Shandong, Gansu and Ningxia. We sent out materials to the national 
Ethnic and Religious Association and got response from them as well’ 
(Ding, Activist against the west DTMD regeneration, interviewed in 
2013).  
To reduce the discontent among ordinary people, central government from 
time to time has to play as the arbitrator when a petition is tendered and to 
win show its ‘justice’, the final decisions are more than often in the favour of 
local residents. It is the political considerations at a particular time that 
determine the central government’s attitude on how to handle the disputes 
derived from regeneration projects. Indeed, the austerity of local government 
and the economic-progress-based evaluation system used by central 
government to select and promote local governors has well demonstrated the 
central government’ acquiesce to local governments’ ‘primitive accumulation 
by dispossessing local residents’ welfare and properties. It was actually the 
Urban Property Demolition Regulations (UPDR) published by central 
government in1991 and modified in 2001 that strengthen the power of local 
authorities in initiating forced demolition and enabled the fast urbanization in 
China during the past two decades. Local people’s praises on the central 
government’s ‘fairness’ is just a tactic used to demonstrate that their activities 
are irrelevant to the political revolt but merely profit-oriented, which is more 
likely to be backed by the ‘sensitive central government’ that prioritizes the 
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‘social harmony’ over economic profits from small-scale regeneration projects. 
The central government’s support for single case may win it a reputation 
among the Chinese people yet can also lead to an explosive increase of 
bottom-up petitions. Indeed, from April 2014, central government closed the 
door for leapfrog petition, which means in the future local people with a 
situation similar to what has been encountered by people in the DTMD 
cannot tender their petition directly to the central government.  
The two systems share some similarities in dealing with local people so as to 
‘get things done’. In the UK case, in spite of the fact that decisions are made 
within a framework following certain procedures, local people can still be 
manipulated by large players with great capacities in mobilizing resources, 
selecting participants and transplanting their values and interests into public 
policies. The consultation in both countries are merely a required element to 
guarantee the procedure legitimacy of the decision making process, i.e. it is 
nothing but a hegemonic project. Inputs from the community more than often 
have very limited impacts on the final decisions that are made by the 
municipal government. Both systems enable the government’s will in 
facilitating regeneration projects to be prioritized over local residents’ 
interests in the form of imposing Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) CPOs 
on communities. For the British politicians, putting a Compulsory Purchase 
Order (CPO) on particular area more than often means extra time and money 
costs. While for the Chinese local governors, the decisions of putting a CPO 
on some areas can also not be easily made due to the consequential political 
costs, especially when the conflicts between local residents and the 
government are likely to be exposed to the higher-level government or to 
some national Medias.  
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The Government in both countries are not willing to see defiance from the 
local. In the UK, central government exerts its influences mainly through the 
centralized power while in China central government exerts its power of 
intervention through controlling the promotion and designation of local cadres. 
Local government in both cases had played a similar role in facilitating 
economic development and physical regeneration projects within their 
jurisdiction, including designating development/regeneration zones, acquiring 
properties from local residents, choosing private contractors, seeking to 
obtain social and economic returns from the regeneration projects and 
actively mobilize the statuary power and resources they have to facilitate the 
process.  
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CHAPTER 12 CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter the final conclusions for the whole thesis are illustrated. The 
initial objectives and the research findings are reviewed and it elaborates how 
the theoretical notions introduced in chapter two are relevant in interpreting 
the social realities revealed in the two case studies. Answers to the question 
of ‘what lessons could be learned from both countries’ success and failure in 
implementing the regeneration initiatives’ are then discussed and in the last 
part of this chapter suggestions for the future research are given. 
12.1 THE INITIAL OBJECTIVES 
One of the important objectives for this research is to explore the realities of 
urban regeneration and public participation in both China and the UK and to 
understand how the formation and implementation of regeneration policies 
and practices are shaped by the wider structural factors together with the 
micro politics. A number of theoretical concepts are referenced, including 
Variegated Neoliberalism and Neoliberal Urbanism and Critical Urban Theory, 
etc.  
12.1.1 Evidences for Neoliberalization in both Countries 
Neoliberalism emerged as an ideological alternative to Keynesianism and 
brought a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of collective 
interventionism. Although neoliberalism is frequently used as a short hand for 
understanding a set of socio-economic changes, in real world the process of 
neoliberalization is indeed polymorphic. The embedding of market in 
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non-market relations determines that nonmarket elements such as the 
governance regimes, regulatory frameworks and some of the coordination 
mechanisms all play a role in shaping the appearance of neoliberalism in a 
specific context. I.E. the appearances of neoliberalism actually vary from 
context to context. According to Peck and Theodore (2007, pp.765), 
‘Neoliberalism is not some generic operating environment for end-stage 
capitalism but a historically specific and hegemonic mode of regulation’ 
When examining the economic and social reforms in both the UK and China, 
a clear trajectory of Neoliberalization emerged. Typical features of 
neoliberalism such as privatization, welfare retrenchment, public-private 
partnerships and the externalization of government responsibilities in 
maintaining social welfare and providing public goods and services (peck and 
Tickell, 2002) can be found from the evolution of social and economic policies 
in both countries. As is argued by Brenner and Theodore (2005, pp.102-103), 
neoliberalism ‘hinges upon the active mobilization of state power and does 
not entail the simple rolling back of the state and the rolling forward of the 
market. Instead, it generates a complex reconstitution of state-market 
relations in which state institutions are actively mobilized to promote 
market-based regulatory arrangement’. Although in both countries the state 
has privatized the property ownership and retreated from the role as the 
direct provider of houses, it’s impact on the process of housing provision is 
indeed strengthened. With the elimination of social housing and low-rent 
accommodations, people in both countries are pushed towards the housing 
market when they need a property and financial sectors are encouraged to 
provide mortgages. Moreover, provision of public infrastructures and services 
is frequently used by the government as an instrument to render the prospect 
of an area with the aim of attracting real estate developers as well as 
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homebuyers. The government’s policies are now dominated by the 
‘pro-growth’ ideology while little attention is paid to social equity. The 
assumption behind such a paradigm shift is that once more wealth are 
generated, everyone will become better off and even the poorest of the poor 
will become much more affluent than they used to be, despite the fact that 
there is a continuous concentration of wealth towards a small group of people. 
The Chinese people appears to be more tolerable to the enlarging inequality 
led by such a growth-centered ideology than their western counterparts, as 
the extreme poverty in the 1950s and 60s led by radical economic policies 
and the cultural revolution has helped to form a consensus that the pursuit of 
egalitarian can not give Chinese people the affluent life they expect.  
As is argued by Brenner and Theodore (2005, pp. 103), ‘neoliberalism does 
not lead to identical outcomes in each context in which it is imposed. Rather, 
place-specific neoliberal regulatory projects collide with inherited regulatory 
landscapes, contextually specific path ways of institutional reorganization 
crystallize and reflect the legacies of earlier models of regulation and forms of 
contestation… neoliberalism is contested by diverse social forces that are 
connected to previous non-market or socialized forms of coordination that 
constrain unfettered capital accumulation’. In the UK, the path of 
Neoliberalization was to some extent affected by the ideologies of its two 
major political parties, namely the Conservatives and the Labour. The 
Conservatives under the lead of Mrs Thatcher had implemented radical 
marketization policies and New Labour had largely inherited the former’s 
economic policies. Although New Labour advocated the ‘Third Way’, which 
combines both free market thoughts and some of the socialism methods with 
a hope mitigating the enlarged social inequalities led by the Neoliberal 
policies it was accused for having abandoned the very core value of Labour 
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Party by many of its own left-learning members.  
Although China’s economic reform has well demonstrated its strong 
inclination of adopting some of the neoliberal policies, the CPC has 
repeatedly emphasized that the country will explore its own way for economic 
development and at the same time stick onto its current political system. 
Which is to say, China’s strong post-socialism features such as the 
one-party-ruling political system, the national ownership of urban land, the 
predominance of national state-owned companies in key areas, the special 
relationship between the people, municipalities and central government are 
less likely to be challenged. The undemocratic nature of the political system 
and the post-socialism features actually help to strengthen the government’s 
capacity in shaping the market and conquer resistances. Moreover, with the 
watering down of socialism ideology, the CPC now ties its legitimacy to its 
performance in facilitating the economic growth and proactive mobilization of 
political, administrative and financial resources towards pro-growth sectors 
thus prevails among Chinese municipalities. The Chinese social and 
economic realities reveal both post socialism and neoliberal features and 
such inner contradictions differentiate the country from many of its western 
counterparts and provide an opportunity for the realization and 
operationalization of the notions of variegated neoliberalism.  
12.1.2 Neoliberal Urban Policies Revealed in Both Case 
Studies 
From the two case studies, clear evidence has emerged that in both China 
and the UK that entrepreneurialism has replaced the managerialism to 
become the prevailing ideology for city governors. Limited resources are 
directed to increasing the competitiveness of cities in attracting investors, 
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middle-to-high class residents and tourists. The national policies in both 
countries regarding the development of individual cities are quite similar 
regarding a number of destruction and creation moments, including:  
dismantling of earlier systems of central government support for municipal 
activities and devolution of responsibilities to municipalities without resources; 
creation of incentives to reward local entrepreneurialism and increased 
reliance on local revenues and other instruments of private finance in support 
of local development; elimination of public housing and other low-rent 
accommodation and increased reliance on the housing market in the 
provision of properties; using performative discourses of urban disorder, 
dangerous classes and economic decline and normalizing ‘entrepreneurial’ 
discourses and representations focused on urban revitalization, reinvestment 
and rejuvenation. On the other hand, it has also seen the region-specific 
political, cultural and historical forces playing a crucial rule in shaping urban 
spaces, as the produce and implementation of urban policies are highly 
context-specific.  
Liverpool rose for its irreplaceable role in the Atlantic sealing industry and 
business since the 19th century yet declined because of the containerization 
and the deindustrialization in the UK since the late 1960s. The regeneration 
of the city was heavily affected by the central-local relationship under the 
Thatcher Government. Xi’an benefited from Mao’s ‘three line strategy’ and 
once became the 7th largest city of China. Yet later it lost the competition with 
coastal cities for attracting international investments. Since the late 1970s, 
neoliberal urban policies such as preparing urban land for speculation, 
making urban environment attractive to the rich and middle class, advocating 
entrepreneurship in municipalities and devolving more responsibilities with 
less resources, etc., can all be found in the practices of local governments in 
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both countries. Public resources are more likely to be channelled into areas 
with strategic importance, or in other words, to areas with the potential of 
yielding higher political and economic returns. In Liverpool, large amount of 
money was injected to regenerate the waterfront and city centre, with the 
hope of changing the city images. In Xi’an, the local government proactively 
mobilized the power and resources to develop new urban districts, where 
they can rapidly make progresses while encounters fewer resistances from 
local people regarding the issues such as the acquisition and demolition of 
private properties. Regarding inner city regeneration programs, the neoliberal 
ideology predominates the official discourse in both countries. Improving the 
performance of local housing market had been employed as an important 
strategy for revitalizing urban areas in decline or with a dilapidated physical 
environment. In the official discourses, the targeted areas for regeneration 
are often described as ‘problematic’ and property-led redevelopment was 
thought to be an effective way for resolving the problems faced by local 
people. 
Yet there are differences as well. For the British Government, urban 
regeneration projects were largely initiated to change the dilapidated 
landscape of the deprived urban areas as well as to narrow the gap between 
the rich and the poor and public money was distributed to compensate such 
regeneration projects. While for the Chinese government, especially the 
municipalities, inner city physical regeneration projects more than often serve 
as an instrument for extracting ‘the value gap’ generated from the inflated 
land prices and local residents are usually excluded from getting a fair 
compensation for the acquisition of their properties. Such a combination of 
authoritarian regime and partial-free market economy makes China different 
from other developed countries. Major differences also exist in the 
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implementation of urban regeneration projects. In the UK, public private 
partnerships are established to include the major players, such as the central 
government, the municipal government, the social housing associations and 
the private developers in delivering regeneration projects. Each of them had 
their rational for participation and played different roles in delivering the 
regeneration projects. For Labour government, distributing public funding to 
help people living in the most deprived areas was in line with its political belief 
while for the municipal government the public funding from central 
government can help to improve the images of the deprived areas within its 
domain. For the Public Housing Associations, giving up part of its ownership 
to the properties in the KHMRI area helps to curtail the expenditures on the 
maintenance of the old properties and to improve its financial performance. In 
the Chinese case, the regeneration projects were basically dominated by the 
municipal government, which controls the land circulation, planning 
permissions, private partners, finance and even media.  
Generally, Variegated neoliberalism provides an overarching theoretical 
framework for understanding how the process of Neoliberalization in both 
China and the UK are affected by non-market elements. Similar trends 
towards Neoliberalization could be found in the evolution of urban 
regeneration policies and practices in both countries, including the creation of 
opportunities for speculative investment in real estate markets, the official 
discourses of urban disorder, decline of physical environment and local 
economy as well as the ‘entrepreneurial’ discourses and representations 
focused on urban revitalization and reinvestment are playing significant roles 
in the formation and implementation of regeneration policies in both countries. 
While it is also evidenced that neoliberalism does not exist in a unique form, 
rather, it is heavily affected by a number of context-specific elements and its 
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appearance in the real world is polymorphic.  
12.1.3 Social Dynamics Observed from the Case Studies 
Another important objective for this research is to get a better understanding 
of the social dynamics reflected in urban regeneration projects and to probe 
possible trends regarding social changes. Urban is a key site in which the 
social relations and contradiction of capitalism and modern life are expanded 
and fought out. As is argued by Brenner (2005), urban itself is a terrain of 
struggle science urbanization is not simply imposed from above by rule of 
capital or by state institutions; rather, it is produced and mediated by social 
movements. The urbanization process therefore provides an ideal area for 
observing how various interest groups and players mobilize the power and 
resources they have to maximize the interests they can get from the 
interactions with each other. Brenner (2005) also argues that the interactions 
of different interest groups are not simply located within cities, but 
qualitatively connected to the changing nature of urban development and 
should be understood in relation to accumulation regimes and modes of 
regulation.  
In combining the analysis of the discourses used by different players involved 
in the regeneration projects and the recent policy changes, some of the 
traces are probed. The institutional setup in both countries, although varied in 
many aspects, had played a significant role in conquering the ‘obstacles’ for 
the implementation of property-led regeneration projects, especially the 
resistances from local residents, who intensively referenced the concepts 
such as ‘accumulation by disposition’, ‘gentrification’ and ‘value gap’ to 
legitimize their resistances against the property-led redevelopment initiatives 
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imposed on them. The government’s proactive mobilization of state power 
and resources makes it very hard for local people to resist the regeneration 
projects and it is found from the case studies that in both countries public 
participation in physical regeneration programs serves as a hegemonic 
project that is manipulated by the government to add legitimacy to the 
regeneration activities, as compared with the government, local residents are 
normally politically and economically disadvantaged.  Arnstein’s Ladder of 
Public Participation that developed in 1969 still serves as a useful instrument 
for understand the power relations in the participation process.  In the UK, 
although the democratic political system, the decision making procedures of 
the planning system and the judicial system offer local residents formal 
venues to oppose the government’s decisions, it is indeed very difficult for 
normal local residents to oppose the decisions made by municipalities 
considering their inabilities in mobilizing resources. With the ability of 
delivering large-scale public infrastructures such as the high-speed railways 
and dams, the Chinese government is seen as efficient in ‘getting things 
done’ through wielding its authoritarian power. Projects attached with high 
political priorities normally encounter very little resistances in land and 
property acquisition and it is relatively easier to relocate local residents when 
compared with the realities in the UK. However, from the case study it can be 
seen that the ‘powerful’ Chinese government is incapable of controlling the 
‘rampant’ constructions initiated by local people within old urban 
neighborhoods. In China’s inner city regeneration programs, the state 
apparatuses are more likely to be used to realize the state’s will in a ‘one 
shot’ way rather than realizing a universal control over the urban 
development due to the economic and political cost of ‘accumulation by 
disposition’. The prevailing property-led redevelopment model that dominated 
by the government in places such as the DTMD is dysfunctional and new 
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models are needed.  
12.2 LESSONS FOR BOTH COUNTRIES  
The Chines government needs to learn from its British partner on how to 
implement physical regeneration programs through partnerships that involve 
various actors. For one thing, despite the fact that the majority of the 
revenues from the recycling of inner urban land are used for the provision of 
public facilities, the municipalities’ direct intervention into the market affairs 
leave the local residents’ an impression of 'aggressive’ and therefore 
undermines its legitimacy. For another thing, in many cases, the Chinese 
government has its limitation in mobilizing local residents to accept the 
government’s proposal of regenerating the targeted urban areas due to the 
rising awareness of property rights. Therefore, the Chinese government 
should reduce its direct involvement in market affairs and encourage different 
players to form a partnership in resolving problems faced by old urban 
neighbourhoods. Partnership involving the municipal government, private 
developers and local residents can help to make the regeneration process 
more transparent and give local residents enough incentives to be 
supportive. 
The Chinese government also needs to learn how to rely on the formal 
structure to resolve the regeneration-related conflicts. From the case study it 
is learned that the biggest issue in China today is that both the municipal 
government and local residents use alternatives rather than venues provided 
by the formal structure to maximize their gains from the gaming process. This 
to some extent can explain why the number of violent incidents in relation to 
land acquisition and property demolition continuously to grow in recent years. 
 372 
The government’s abuse of state power to exert pressures on relocatees has 
resulted in endless petitions and protests. The major reason for this is the 
one party political system that leads to the lack of independency of the legal 
system, medias and various governmental departments. The Chinese 
government’s recent gestures, including prohibiting forced demolitions to be 
implemented by municipal governments and emphasizing the ‘rule of law’, to 
some extent mitigated the conflicts yet are far from enough to fundamentally 
change the way in which the municipal governments interact with local 
residents. It is perceivable that the municipalities would continue to utilize its 
advantages in mobilizing power and resources to collect the value gap from 
inner city redevelopment projects.  
Recently the Chinese government began to seek opportunities to facilitate 
the Public Private Partnership (PPP) in some areas that were formerly 
dominated by the state capital. Such a gesture implies the government’s 
intention of shifting part of its responsibilities to the private sectors. For 
communities such as the DTMD, the PPP model has the potential of 
becoming an effective mechanism in resolving the conflicts between different 
players. Yet the details such as how much interests would the government be 
willing to give up to facilitate such a model remains unknown. Moreover, it is 
perceivable that the PPP model would be highly context-specific and 
variegated in its existence. More research is therefore needed in the future in 
explaining how the PPP model can be facilitated within the Chinese social, 
economic and political context in support of urban regeneration and public 
participation.  
For the British government, one thing can be learned from the Chinese 
regeneration practices is the way in which social regeneration programs are 
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delivered. The Chinese government provides sustainable funding to support 
the semi-official organizations-the LRCs, which shoulders the responsibilities 
of getting in touch with local residents as well as initiating and operating 
area-specific regeneration programs. Although the establishment of such an 
organization involves the aim of social surveillance, it actually guarantees the 
consistency of community policies and helps the government to get in touch 
with local residents. When compared with the LRC model, the social 
regeneration programs driven by the funding from central government in the 
UK are more vulnerable to political changes associated with funding cuts, as 
the non-profit nature of social enterprises decided that it is hard for them to 
survive without external funding streams. It is not suggested here that the 
British government should also establish an LRC-style organization national 
wide, as such a suggestion is unrealistic considering the multiple-party 
democracy and the relationships between central and local governments. 
What is to be suggested here it that a proper community based organization 
with sustainability perhaps is equally important as the regeneration program 
initiatives themselves. 
The centralized nature of the British political system to some extent helped to 
shape the fragmentation and discontinuity of the British social regeneration 
policies and practices. Social regeneration programs such as the NDC are 
frequently used as a vehicle by the municipal government to demonstrate its 
willingness of delivering its political promises and at the same time to bypass 
the municipal governments. Indeed as early as in 2011 the British 
Government has published the Localism Act, which is officially summarized 
as:  
To make provision about the functions and procedures of local and 
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certain other authorities; to make provision about the functions of the 
Local Commission for Administration in England; to enable the recovery 
of financial sanctions imposed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union on the United Kingdom from local and public authorities; to make 
provision about local government finance; to make provision about town 
and country planning, the Community Infrastructure Levy and the 
authorization of nationally significant infrastructure projects; to make 
provision about social and other housing; to make provision about 
regeneration in London; and for connected purposes (UK Parliament, 
2011)  
Although the Act was envisaged to be able to bring wide-scale 
decentralization, so far very little progress has been achieved and it was 
believed that ‘the deep-rooted centralization in the UK has not been 
challenged (Pipe, J., 2013). Perhaps the British Government can learn from 
the Chinese experiences in facilitating decentralization and giving the 
municipalities more freedom fiscal power in designing regeneration strategies 
that fits the local needs and delivering urban regeneration programs. So far it 
is unclear whether decentralization would be central to the agenda of the 
newly elected British Government. Although the Scotland’s latest 
Independence Vote had led to another round debate on whether areas such 
as the North West and North East in England should also receive similar 
degree of decentralized power that were promised to Scotland, with the close 
of 2015 general election, the issue of decentralization was once again laid 
aside.  
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12.3 LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS 
RESEARCH AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
WORK  
Perhaps the biggest limitation of this research is the single case study 
strategy, based on which the cross-national comparison was conducted and 
some of the conclusions were drawn. To some extent, both of the case 
studies selected are special in their own country. In the DTMD case, the 
ethnic minority issue makes it very different from other inner city regeneration 
projects in China. Firstly, the ethnic bonds have significantly enhanced the 
social cohesion of the community. With strong sense of belonging to the 
community, local residents were able to unite and collectively resist the 
municipal government’s actions. Secondly, local residents’ ethnic identity 
was associated with great political sensibility, which was used by local people 
to exert pressures on the municipal government. Thirdly, the economy in the 
DTMD area is actually on the rise due to tourism and many local residents 
involved in tourism-related small businesses such as selling cuisine and 
souvenirs. Which is to say, the relocation plan has to consider not only just 
accommodating the relocatees but also providing them with new working 
opportunities. Regarding the regeneration programs, the west DTMD 
regeneration was a pure property-led redevelopment project initiated in the 
name of ‘road widening’ while the social regeneration programs introduced in 
the case study is a general practice of the LRC. One thing makes the social 
regeneration in the DTMD different from that in many other areas is that its 
Chief executive was a NPC member, which means she can use the social 
connections to attract more resources in support of the social programs 
within the community. The Kensington Regeneration case actually contains 
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two central government funded regeneration initiatives-the KNDC and the 
KHMRI, of which the boundaries were largely overlapped. While the KNDC 
was a ten-year regeneration program aiming at making improvements in five 
areas, the KHMRI only lasted for 7 years and mainly focused on physical 
regeneration. The delivery and public participation mechanism of both 
initiatives were also different. In spite of such differences, both initiatives had 
an impact on people living in the Kensington Regeneration area in the 2010s. 
Besides, in both countries the selected cases locate in the North West, where 
economic development comparatively lagged behind that of the affluent 
South, and this to some extent hampered the research findings from been 
generalized. Moreover, the cross-national comparison, especially the data 
the data collection was constrained by the limited time and resource. In spite 
of the limitations listed above. This research reviewed the evolution of urban 
regeneration policies and practices in both UK and China since the World 
War II and uses variegated neoliberalism as an analytical framework in 
comparing the differences and similarities revealed in real regeneration 
cases in both countries. It strove to explore how are the differences and 
similarities regarding the policy design and project implementation of urban 
regeneration programs are shaped by the wider structural factors, including 
the prevailing neoliberalism ideology and the social, political and economic 
contexts in both UK and China. It further examined how different players 
interact with each other under in the regeneration process and how are their 
actions been legitimized by their own discourses. Apart from revealing the 
realities of urban regeneration and the related public participation practices in 
both UK and China, this research used the variegated neoliberalism as a 
theoretical framework in conducting the cross-national comparison and 
explaining how the differences and similarities are shaped. This research 
helps to lay the foundation for mapping successful experiences regarding 
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urban regeneration and public participation between China and the UK.  
Recently the Chinese central government has announced the ‘urban 
boundary’ strategy in curbing the erosion of arable land in urban peripheries 
and it is perceivable that when a boundary on the urban construction area is 
drawn, the Chinese municipalities will have to face the issue of large-scale 
inner city redevelopment, which would lead to much more conflicts and a 
proper mechanism is needed to implement such programs. With the rising 
awareness of property rights among Chinese citizens, the legitimacy of the 
governmental intervention in market affairs in the form of state-led urban 
redevelopment is questioned and the municipal governments’ monopolization 
of the value gap generated from the circulation of urban land seems to be 
unsustainable. Local residents, as one of the major stakeholders in inner city 
regeneration programs, should be involved in the regeneration-related 
decision making process, not only to be consulted, but also to be given more 
power and freedom to decide how the regeneration programs should be 
implemented and how the interests should be distributed. Yet currently 
community empowerment in China is facing at least three challenges: Firstly, 
the value gap generated from the circulation of inner urban land is one of the 
most important financial sources for municipal governments to compensate 
the expenditures on the provision of infrastructures and services. Indeed, in 
the 1950s and 60s, due to the constrained resources, local residents were 
allowed to refurbish their own properties. Yet the restrictions on granting 
planning permissions for self-funded constructions were tightened since the 
2000s when the real estate industry began to play an increasingly significant 
role in the national economy. The government’s intention to control the inner 
city development and to maximize its revenues from the land circulation was 
clear. Secondly, even if the municipalities are willing to empower 
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communities to implement the physical regeneration programs, a proper 
mechanism is needed to help facilitate it. Currently at the city level, the 
Chinese government mainly use regularity detailed planning to control the 
inner city redevelopment. The attributes regarding the targeted areas, 
including the FLR, Density and the location of entrances, etc., are given and 
the constructions of new buildings are expected to follow the given indicators. 
Such a mechanism is more suitable for new development programs initiated 
by single developers on pre-evacuated land rather than for redevelopment 
initiatives took place in old urban areas with multiple occupiers, as the later 
requires negotiation and reconciliation in deciding the plan. In other words, 
the current planning system leaves little room for local residents to influence 
the regeneration-related decision making process. Whether the community 
can play a more important role in Chinese urban regeneration in the future 
partly rely on how inner city redevelopment programs would be regulated in 
the future.  
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS FOR THE 
BRITISH INTERVIEWEES  
1. Questions for the executive team and the sub-committees: 
a. How to describe the attribute of this organization now? Has the 
remove of funding and direct access to the central government 
resulted in any sustainability concerns to the organization? 
b. Who can ultimately exert the most significant influence on this 
organization? The local people? The government? The private 
sectors or all of them?  
c. How public participation is organized/facilitated through this 
organization?  
d. What is approved to be useful in integrating the local 
communities? 
e. How does it handle the disputes regarding housing related 
interests? 
f. How does it connect the external institutions such as developers 
and the local residents?  Whether there is strong conflict 
between the local residents and the developers or the city 
council? What’s the CIC’s position when there is a confrontation 
between the local residents and the government/developers?   
g. How do they guarantee the quality of communication and to 
improve the turn out rates? 
h. What are the local people’s motivation for participation and how 
community are centered in programs involving housing 
acquisition and redevelopment? 
i. What is the major role of the NDC?-facilitator? Interface? 
Delegates for the local people as well as watch dog of the local 
people’s interest?  
j. Such an institution must bear pressures from both sides, how 
does it evaluate itself?  
k. As the CIC now receives money from the municipal government, 
would they have any influence on the candidates of the board 
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members or do they even incline to propose persons who they 
believe fits the position? 
2. Questions for the Kensington Regeneration Board members: a. How have NDC Partnerships spread messages about what they 
have done, and achieved, to different stakeholders and 
audiences? b.  What type of messages have NDC Partnerships 
communicated? c.  What works well in communicating with different stakeholders 
and audiences? d. How do communications strategies address diversity and 
equalities issues? e. How do communications strategies interact with community 
development strategies? f. How do NDC Partnership Boards link with communications 
activity? g. How do communications activities link to and coordinate with 
mainstream providers? h. How do communications strategies relate to succession 
planning? 
3. Questions for the community representatives on the NDC board 
a. How do you get involved in the NDC? Why do they want to be 
elected as representatives and what do they do? 
b. Can you get access to the high-level decision-making process? 
c. How do you fell about the experience of participating in the 
decision making process? Largely negative? Positive or both? 
Why? 
d. Do you identify yourself as ‘working-class’ or ‘middle class’ or 
neither? Why? 
e. Is there any difference between the local board members and 
the rest of the local residents? 
f. To what extent do you think you can influence the 
decision-making? Why? 
4. Questions for professionals and staff in planning institutions 
a. How do you define the function and attribute of Liverpool vision 
in Liverpool’s regeneration process? How do you define the 
relationship between Liverpool vision and the local government/ 
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private sectors? Is it now being operated differently after the 
transformation?  
b. Where do you think the problems laying in the targeted 
regeneration areas? 
c. What evidence bases are usually used for defining the 
problems and the need for housing demolition, local residents’ 
relocation and redevelopment of properties? Can local 
residents be convinced by these evidence bases? Why? 
d. Are there voices from inside of the planning institutions on 
issues such as conservation or demolition? Or do the designers 
always keep in line with their clients I.E the city council or the 
private developer? What does it usually end up with? Why? 
And How? Any examples based on your own experiences? 
e. From the professional’s perspective, what do you think about 
the local residents’ requirements in housing regeneration cases? 
Are they themselves problematic? Do they often require too 
much if judged by any measures? Or are they in fact been less 
well paid because of the manipulation of bigger players? Do 
they have a clear vision about the future of their community? 
Are these realistic? 
f. Are there any workable alternatives to the current prevailing 
model of regeneration? Who do you thinks should take the 
leadership in such a model? And how should it be delivered?  
5. Questions for professionals 
a. What is the challenge for evaluating such a ten-year 
regeneration project (KNDC)? Who commissioned this 
evaluation? 
b. What is the overall conclusion if compared with Paul Lawless’ 
Chart saying minor changes have happened in the KDNC area 
compared providing if there is no such a NDC funding?  
c. Was the NSNR’s assumption hypothesis regarding the 
connections between deprivation and the five factors the case 
for the KNDC? Or could some of the reasons such as jobs and 
housing been prioritized?  (According to the evaluation, only 
794 people went into employment, while over 50% are living on 
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benefits). Has the KNDC program addressed the most 
profound problems within the area rather than the symptoms? 
What do you think is the most successful job done by the KNDC 
regeneration group?  
d. Has sustainability of the social enterprises a concern for the 
evaluation? 
e. Private and voluntary sector hasn’t had a significant 
contribution to the over spending in the KNDC, which was 
certainly not what was expected by the government, total 80.8m, 
private 1.27m, voluntary: 295k, what does the figure mean? 
And what has led to it?  
f. Would there be a more efficient way of using the money? 50% of 
it was spent on infrastructures, and the rest more or less evenly 
distributed to the five areas, eventually over 50% of people in 
the area are still living on benefits, and now there isn’t any more 
funding channeled in. Do you think the New Labour’s thought 
that underpinned by the ‘third way’ really work?  
g. What was the central government’s role, if it was significant, in 
the KNDC program?  
h. What was the KNDC partnership’s role and how was the 
partnership organized and work? The Leader ship, the division 
of responsibilities? Has it been similar to any previous 
community based organizations?  
i. Is empowerment in the form of community partnership an 
effective resolution for the problems in KNDC? From your 
perspective, what is the potential advantage as well as 
challenge for such an institutional setup? Is there any danger 
for part of community been marginalized or untouched? Would 
there be more arguments regarding the distribution of funding? 
What about the legitimacy of the board members? Do you think 
the representatives in the KNDC board are low profile figures 
without much decisive rights?  
j. Was the relationship between board members good? Where 
does the tension come from?  
k. Been described as a learning process, with a huge learning 
curve for community representatives, had the learning process 
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been too expensive? What has really been learned from the 
institutional setup of the KNDC board? 
l. If the way the NDC used to reach local residents that are ‘hard to 
reach’ still based on the service provider-consumer’ model at 
community level?  
m. I’ve spoken with Allen Tap, the chief executive of the 
Kensington Community Learning Centre, as he said once the 
KNDC money spent out, the social enterprises would normally 
gone as it is hard for them to survive, seems the intensive 
experiment in community empowerment had yield many failed 
experiences? 
n.  In the evaluation report you and your team mentioned that the 
delay of the physical regeneration programs, considering the 
significance attached, has become a distraction to the board 
members and keep them from concentrating on strategically 
important issues, By which do you mean delivering such a huge 
regeneration project has gone beyond some of the board 
members’ capacity? For the government, would it be a too 
expensive skill training program?  
o. Five years from now on, what evidences do you think can prove 
that the KNDC program has made a great difference to the 
area?  
p. You mentioned the community members all want to establish 
their own social programs rather than encompassing the 
available programs and inject money into it, does that mean a 
certain degree of vested interests?  
q. You mentioned so much of the efforts has rested on personal 
relationships and would be taken away with the swap of 
individuals, could that also be understood as some sort of 
monopolization rather than democracy?  
r. Has the so called central government’s intention of ‘by pass’ the 
Municipal government indeed undermined the city council’s role 
in the regeneration program? To what extent do you think it is 
the case?  
s. In the report you and your team mentioned the KNDC 
partnership should have more pressure on developing strategic 
partnerships with Liverpool First, what happened?  
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6. Closing  
a. (Summarize) I appreciate the time you took for this interview. Is 
there anything else you think would be helpful for me to know or 
any person you would like to introduce to me for another 
interview? 
b. (Action to be taken) I should have all the information I need. 
Would it be all right to email you if I have more questions? 
Thanks again.  
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONS FOR THE 
CHINESE INTERVIEWEES  
针对政府规划管理部门管理人员，专业城市规划人员的采访问题 
questions for officials and professionals:  
1. 您觉得当地居民不配合规划实施的主要原因是什么？ 
Why do you think the local residents will resist the demolition 
order? 
2. 您觉得在规划方案编制过程中邀请当地居民参与是否有助于规划的
编制和实施？为什么？ 
Do you think it will be helpful to involve residents before decisions 
are made? 
3. 您觉得规划实施过程中如果遭到当地居民的抵制并进一步演化为冲
突是否会对政府形象造成损害？如果是那么这您觉得这种矛盾的长
期积累将带来哪些问题？  
Do you perceive the conflicts and protests will be harmful to the 
government’s image among the locals? 
4. 您觉得公众参与在多大程度有利于对于收集公众意见和对本地规划
有所帮助的信息的收集？ 
How effective do you think the P.P is in terms of collecting public 
opinions and gathering useful information for the decision making? 
5. 您觉得政府评价公众参与活动是否有效的最重要的标准是什么？ 
What’s the most important criteria for the government to evaluate 
the effectiveness of P.P? Are the procedures or outcomes? (What 
is the value judgements behind the answer?) 
6. 您觉得规划管理人员是否倾向于通过严格控制规划编制流程并限制
公众参与从而前减少规划编制过程中可能出现的不确定性甚至错
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误？您觉得这和中国自上而下的政治体制是否有关？ 
Do you think it was the officers’ intention to reduce the risk of 
making mistakes through firmly controlling the process of public 
participation? Is It related to the top-down political system?  
7. 您觉得职业规划师在规划编制规划过程中面临哪些方面的压力？尤
其在平衡公众利益与政府目标实现的效率方面？ 
What kind of pressure is faced by professionals in balancing the 
public interests and the efficiency? 
8. 您觉得近年来政府在涉及政策制定与实施的步骤和方法方面做出了
哪些改善从而减少因城市更新活动带来的冲突？您觉得这些改变在
多大程度上发挥了作用？ 
Are there any changes in recent years made by the government to 
modify the procedures and measures of decision-makings and 
implementation so as to mediate the conflicts between the locals 
and the governments? To what extent do you think these changes 
are effective? 
针对当地居民的采访问题： 
Questions for local residents:  
1. 您对现在的生活环境满意么？为什么？ 
Are you satisfied with your living conditions? Why? 
2. 您对您的社区满意么？为什么？ 
Are you satisfied with your community? Why> 
3. 您未来有搬出这一区域的打算么？为什么？ 
Do you want to move outward in the future? Why? 
4. 您觉得这一区域应该被改造么？为什么？怎么改？改造之后您愿意
搬回来么？主要原因是什么？ 
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Do you want this area to be regenerated? Why? Do you want to 
move back after the regeneration of this area? Why? 
5. 对于之前本地区进行的改造您觉得怎么样？您对政府在改造过程中
采取的措施满意么？您从中有没有得到什么经验？ 
Are you satisfied with the measures taken by the government in 
former regeneration? Why? What experience did you get from it? 
6. 如果您拿到拆迁款并搬到其他地方居住，您对那里的环境有什么要
求？ 
If you get the compensation and want to move out to other districts, 
what do you expect to seen in the new community?  
7. 您对城市规划的编制，实施及相关管理部门的职能熟悉么？您通过哪
些渠道获取规划信息？ 
Are you familiar with the procedures of planning making, 
administration and implementation? What kind of venues do you 
have to collect planning information?  
8. 您曾经有过申请政府或法院仲裁城市规划有关的纠纷的经历么？您
对于仲裁结果怎么看？ 
Do you have any experiences of tendering the planning related 
conflicts to the court or higher-level government for judgement? 
What do you think of the outcomes?   
9. 当地居民能够通过哪些正式渠道向政府提出自己的意见，建议或诉
求？有没有作为居民代言人的组织或者个人来增强居民与政府之间
的交流？  
What kind of formal venues do local people have in expressing 
their opinions, suggestions and requirements? Do you have your 
own delegates to facilitate the communication?  
10. 您有没有参加其他组织或团体？这些团体或组织在您遇到困难的时
候能否代您发声？他们的经费从哪里来？ 
Do you have your own organizations that can represent your 
interests? Where the founding comes from? 
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11. 您有没有考虑过聘请专业的城市规划师作为您的代表参与同政府的
协商？为什么？ 
Have you ever thought of hiring professional planners to 
delegate you when bargaining with the government? Why? 
12. 您觉得政府管理人员对当地居民的想法了解么？您觉得他们通过哪
些渠道收集当地信息？ 
Whether d you think the local authority know about the local 
residents’ opinions? What venues do you think they have to obtain 
such information? 
13. 您对当地居民与政府的之间的沟通如何评价？ 
How do you evaluate the communication between local people and 
the government? 
14. 如果面对强拆，您将如何处理？您觉得钉子户的方法有用么？为什
么？ 
Suppose you are facing a forced eviction, what are you going to 
do with it? Do you think it is useful to delay the development 
through resist? 
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APPENDIX C: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES  
Name  Title  Identity   Time of Interview  
Alicia Rose  Miss  The last resident in the Edge 
Hill HMRI area that was 
targeted for demolition.  
July, 2013 
Allen Tapp Mr The chief executive of the 
Kensington Community 
Learning Centre. 
June, 2013 
Cotton Edward Mr Local tenant in the Kensington 
Regeneration area  
July, 2013 
Lim Robinson Mr Local councillor (Labour 
Party)  
July, 2013 
Martin Curry  Dr.  Head of Department, 
Liverpool Hope Business 
School 
July, 2013 
Nik Small Mr. Cabinet member of Liverpool 
City Council (Labour Party) 
July, 2013 
Steve Faragher Mr.  Local activist, the director of 
Liverpool Community Radio  
June, 2013 
Jerry Spencer Mr.  Professional previously works 
Liverpool Vision 
June, 2013 
 
Hillary Russell  Pro. Liverpool John Moores 
University    
Oct, 2014 
Tom McGuire Mr. Senior Manager of River Side  Oct, 2014 
Richard Kemp Mr. The Leader of Liverpool Lib 
Dems 
Oct, 2014 
    
Ding, Xu Mr. Local activist Nov, 2013 
Bai, Xiulan  Mrs. Executive of the LRC Nov, 2013 
Liu, Chunkai  Mrs.  Chief Planner of the DTMD 
Regeneration 
Nov, 2013 
Li, Zhiping  Mr. Local tenant (Han) Nov, 2013 
Liu, Guizheng  Mrs.  Local tenant (Han) Nov, 2013 
Ma, Yucheng Mr. Lcoal resident  Nov, 2013 
Ma, Guangwen Mr. Local resident  May, 2012 
Wang, Zhonghe Mr. Former local resident (Han)  Nov, 2013 
Wang, Cailian  Mrs Staff of the LRC Nov, 2013 
Zhao, Xinming Mr. Relocatee Jan, 2014 
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Bai, Youming  Mr. Local resident Jan, 2014 
Chen, Zhizhong  Mr. Local resident Jan, 2014 
Ma, Jian Mr. Relocatee Jan, 2014 
Ding, Qiang Mr. Local tenant Jan, 2014 
Jia, Wu Mr. Local resident  Jan, 2014 
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